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1 Introduction
The development of modern welfare states is an issue that has attracted
enormous attention within social science. One could easily fill an impressive
library with books and articles about the issue. The reasons for this interest
are straightforward. The welfare state is a highly important phenomenon in
Western societies. It strongly influences the life of nearly the entire popula-
tion in the Western world. Thus, researchers interested in different subjects
such as gender relations (e.g. Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993) or poverty (e.g. Kor-
pi & Palme 1998) automatically come to focus on the welfare state.
Until about 20 years ago, studying the development of modern welfare
states was synonymous with studying their growth. This no longer applies.
Welfare-state retrenchment has been on the political agenda of most of the
rich oecd countries for the last 20 years, and almost all countries have ex-
perienced welfare-state retrenchments (Stephens, Huber, & Ray 1999).
This has been part of a larger attempt of Western societies to adjust their
models of welfare capitalism to a changed economic environment (cf.
Kitschelt et al. 1999; Regini 2000; Scharpf & Schmidt 2000a). Evidently,
the recent development of modern welfare states has also affected the schol-
arly interest. Research into welfare-state growth is still ongoing (e.g. Hicks
2000; Iversen & Cusack 2000; Mares 2000; Huber & Stephens 2001a).
However, starting with Pierson’s (1994; 1996) groundbreaking studies of
welfare-state retrenchment in primarily the United States and Britain, a
scholarly debate about retrenchment has gained momentum.
This book is an investigation of retrenchment in Denmark and in the
Netherlands during the period 1982 to 1998, focussing on retrenchment of
old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, and disability pensions/early re-
tirement benefits. The general aim of the book is to contribute to the schol-
arly debate about welfare-state retrenchment in a number of ways. The
main aim is to add to the knowledge of the factors causing variation in re-
trenchment between countries and across social-security schemes. Here, the
argument of the book is that politics is the main factor causing variation. In
this way, the book differs from most other writings on retrenchment that
13
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follow the new institutional wave within political science in general, high-
lighting the role of institutional factors. An additional aim of the book is to
add to the empirical knowledge about retrenchment. As argued by Alber
(1996: 3), ‘… systematic studies of retrenchment processes in a comparative
perspective are still thoroughly missing.’ This book aims to fill a small part
of that vacuum.
However, this book should not only interest scholars engaged in the de-
bate about welfare-state retrenchment. As argued above, welfare-state re-
trenchment is part of the broader effort of Western governments to adjust
their models of welfare capitalism to a new economic environment. Wel-
fare-state retrenchments are probably the most controversial part of this ef-
fort, and this book, therefore, contributes to the understanding of different
country’s capacity to adjust their models of welfare capitalism. Further,
Denmark and the Netherlands have come to be seen as two of the success
stories with regard to this adjustment process. Scholars are thus debating
both a Dutch and a Danish miracle (cf. Visser & Hemerijck 1997; Schwartz
2001a, and Green-Pedersen 2001a). The book draws attention to the role
that party politics has played in the adjustment processes within the two
countries. This includes both the development of the party systems in the
two countries and the situation of the Social Democratic Parties. The dis-
cussion of the latter factor also contributes to the wider debate about the
dilemmas of European Social Democracy.
Before presenting a brief overview of the book, it is worth spelling out the
main arguments of the book.
The arguments in brief
In its briefest form, the theoretical argument of this book is that politics
matter for welfare-state retrenchment. But what does that mean, politics
matter? This claim consists of two parts. First, the argument is that govern-
ments’ possibilities of implementing retrenchment measures are crucially
dependent on their capabilities of justifying the measures in the eyes of the
electorate. If voters consider retrenchment measures unfair or driven by
hidden ideological motives, they are likely to punish governments at the
polls. In this way, as Pierson (1994) argues, the politics of retrenchment are
the politics of blame avoidance. Instead, governments must convince the
electorate that they are retrenching the welfare state to improve its financial
viability or to remedy some of the policy failures that may follow from it.
The question then is which factors determine governments’ capabilities of
justifying retrenchment measures?
14 introduction
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Two linked factors relating to party politics produce variation between
countries because they shape governments’ possibilities of justifying re-
trenchments. First, the electorate has certain standard views of political
parties. Parties of the left are expected to focus on social justice and to sup-
port the welfare state, whereas parties of the right are expected to concen-
trate on keeping taxation down and things such as economic management.
Christian Democratic Centre Parties fall in between. In addition, they have
a reputation for political compromise and social accommodation that may
facilitate the justification of retrenchment measures. These standard views
of political parties influence the electorate’s judgment of the political par-
ties’ arguments concerning retrenchment. They are much more likely to ac-
cept a left-wing parties’ attempt at justifying retrenchment than they are to
accept arguments from right-wing parties. In the latter case, they tend to be-
lieve that there are hidden ideological motives. Second, the way political
parties compete affects governments’ possibilities of justifying retrench-
ment measures. What governments need in order to be successful with their
justification strategy is a party consensus in the sense that no other major
party attacks their strategies of justification. Whether or not such a consen-
sus emerges depends on the system of party competition and the party-color
of the government. In bloc systems of party competition, a consensus
emerges only if the left-wing bloc holds office. Bloc systems are systems
where a left wing and a right-wing bloc compete over government power by
seeking as many votes as possible. The reason for this dynamic in bloc sys-
tems is that due to voters’ standard expectations of political parties ex-
plained above, the right-wing bloc has no votes to gain by attacking a left-
wing government for retrenchment. Pivot systems of party competition are
systems in which a centre party, often a Christian-Democratic one, is piv-
otal as it can determine whether it wants to govern with the major left or
right-wing party. Such a system produces a party consensus on retrench-
ment when the centre party opts for retrenchment because the left-wing
party then has to accommodate the centre party if it wants to gain office.
The factor argued to cause variation across social-security schemes is the
degree of connection to the labour market of different social-security
schemes. This factor first affects governments’ options of justifying re-
trenchments. For instance, retrenching unemployment benefits can be justi-
fied by arguing that generous unemployment benefits encourage passivity.
Further, the economic incentives to retrench schemes with close connection
to the labour market are greater.
Generally, the developments in Denmark and the Netherlands during the
period 1982 to 1998 support the arguments. The book thus offers an expla-
15the arguments in brief
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 15
nation why, despite a number of similarities between the two countries,
more retrenchment has been implemented in the Netherlands than in Den-
mark. They both have very extensive and popular welfare states with fairly
similar institutional characteristics; they have faced basically the same
macro-economic challenges in the period, and have quite similar macro-po-
litical institutions. The difference in systems of party competition, bloc sys-
tem in Denmark vs. pivot system in the Netherlands, explains the variation
between the two countries. The argument also offers an explanation why
more retrenchment has been implemented in Denmark after 1993 than dur-
ing the period 1982 to 1993: Denmark was governed by social democratic-
led governments from 1993 and during the rest of the period studied. Final-
ly, the theoretical argument also provides an explanation as to why old-age
pension schemes have experienced the least retrenchment in both countries;
when governments in both countries started focussing on fighting inactivi-
ty, old-age pension schemes were out of focus because of their more limited
connection to the labour market.
The structure of the book
Chapter 2 is devoted to giving a review of the literature on welfare-state de-
velopment. The main focus is on the literature on welfare-state retrench-
ment. However, to make sense of this latter debate, a short introduction to
the debate about the growth of the welfare state is also provided. Concern-
ing the literature on welfare-state retrenchment, the focus will be on the ar-
guments about variation across social-security schemes and between coun-
tries.
Chapter 3 sets up a theoretical framework for governments’ choices about
retrenchment. The main argument of this framework is the one presented
above. That is, several factors cause variation in retrenchment because they
affect governments’ possibilities of justifying retrenchment in the eyes of the
electorate. In addition, the chapter also argues that office- and vote-seeking
governments are prompted towards welfare-state retrenchment by econom-
ic factors.
Chapter 4 has two primary aims. The first aim is to justify the choice of
cases, that is the choice of countries, social-security schemes and time peri-
od. Second, the chapter outlines the theoretical and operational definition of
retrenchment used in this book. Here, it is worth emphasizing from the out-
set that the book builds on a fairly narrow theoretical definition of retrench-
ment as another word for cutting-back or scaling-down social-security ben-
16 introduction
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efits.1 The chapter ends by deriving 6 hypotheses about the scale of retrench-
ment to be expected in the two countries.
Chapter 5 uses the definition and operationalisation of retrenchment pre-
sented in chapter 4 to evaluate changes in old-age pensions, unemployment
benefits, and disability pensions/early retirement benefits in Denmark and
in the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998.2 The chapter then summarises the
variation in retrenchment identified and discusses to what extent it matches
the hypotheses derived in chapter 4.
Chapter 6 and 7 provide in-depth case studies of the politics of welfare-
state retrenchment in the Netherlands and Denmark, focussing mainly on
the period 1982 to 1998. The aim of these case studies is to explore to what
extent the causal mechanisms surrounding retrenchment actually are the
ones suggested in chapter 3. What is provided in chapter 5 is basically corre-
lation evidence for the theoretical argument; that is the correlation between
the predicted and the actual welfare-state retrenchment. Yet, the question
remains whether the variation has actually come about for the reasons sug-
gested in chapter 3.
Chapter 8 first summarises the results of the two different types of empiri-
cal evidence for the theoretical argument; that is both the correlation evi-
dence and the in-depth case studies. The chapter then continues with a dis-
cussion of a number of alternative explanations for the variation in re-
trenchment identified in chapter 5. The point is whether the theoretical ar-
gument of this book can explain more of the variation in retrenchment than
other theoretical arguments.
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the entire book and tries to draw some
lessons from it at two levels. First, the lessons for the retrenchment debate
will be discussed. Then the chapter moves on to discuss the broader issue of
the two country’s apparent success in adjusting their models of welfare cap-
italism to a changed economic environment.
17the structure of the book 
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2 From theories of expansion to theories 
of retrenchment
Following Pierson’s seminal work (1994; 1996), it has become conventional
wisdom within the literature on welfare-state retrenchment that retrench-
ment politics are fundamentally different from expansion politics. This in-
dicates that the scholarly debate about welfare-state retrenchment would be
markedly different from the debate about welfare-state expansion, which in
several respects is also the case (Green-Pedersen & Haverland 2002). Never-
theless, as will become clear below, the retrenchment debate has not started
from scratch. It has been influenced by the preceding and ongoing debate
about the growth of the welfare state. Therefore, it is necessary to start with
a short introduction to the voluminous literature on welfare-state expan-
sion.
Theories of welfare-state expansion 
In the following, a brief sketch of the main positions with regard to the
growth of the welfare state will be given.1 This should provide the reader
with the necessary background for understanding the retrenchment debate.
In general terms, theoretical arguments about the expansion of the welfare
state fall into three groups; namely structural or functional theories, theo-
ries emphasising the role of politics, especially party politics, and state-cen-
tered or institutional theories.
Structural theories all link the emergence of the welfare state to structural
changes in society such as modernisation, democratisation, economic
growth, or changes in labour market structures (Wilensky 1975; Flora &
Alber 1984; Iversen & Cusack 2000, cf. also Pierson 1991: chap. 1 & 2).
These societal changes have lead to the emergence of the welfare state. The
main aim of these theories has been to explain why all Western countries de-
veloped some kind of welfare state. Less attention has been paid to compar-
ative differences. Still, some ‘structural studies’ have focussed on variation
among welfare states. By way of example, Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein
19
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(1985) emphasize the degree of openness of the economy as a factor leading
to different welfare-state developments. Nevertheless, the main impact of
the ‘structural theories’ has been to highlight the existence of certain prereq-
uisites for welfare-state development such as democratisation, modernisa-
tion etc.
The second group of theories all emphasize the role of politics, especially
party politics, in the expansion of the welfare state. With the structural the-
ories, these theories share the ambition of explaining the growth of the wel-
fare state in general. However, the focus of this second group of theories has
also very much been on explaining comparative differences both in welfare
effort, that is how much is spent, and in the content of welfare states, that is
the way it is spent.
The most prominent of these theories and probably among all theories of
welfare-state expansion is what is known as ‘power-resources theory’ (cf.
Castles 1978; Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; 1989; Shalev 1983; Esping-An-
dersen 1985b; 1990; Esping-Andersen & van Kersbergen 1992; Hicks
2000; Huber & Stephens 2001a). The core idea of power-resources theory
is that the welfare state is part of the distributional struggle in capitalist so-
cieties between the working class and the bourgeoisie. A rapid transition
from capitalism to socialism never occurred, but instead the welfare state
was established. Its basic aim is to secure workers against the perils of the
market, that is to de-commodify them.
The establishment of the welfare state became possible with the introduc-
tion of universal suffrage and the numerical rise of the working class. Both
developments strengthened the political position of the working class com-
pared to other classes. Social Democratic Parties backed by trade unions
and opposed by bourgeois parties could implement welfare legislation.
Thus, in the sense of the party-color of the government, politics matter
(Castles & McKinlay 1979; 1997; Jackman 1986; Esping-Andersen & van
Kersbergen 1992). Welfare-state variation has sometimes been explained
simply by the power resources of the working class, that is its numerical
strength, the strength of trade unions and the extent of social democratic
government participation (Korpi 1989). Other studies have given more
complicated explanations by including such factors as the possibilities of an
alliance with the middle class (Esping-Andersen 1985b; 1990) and the unity
of the bourgeois opposition (Castles 1978). However, the bottom line re-
mains that the welfare state is seen as an opportunity for the working class
to limit the influence of the market on the distribution of wealth in society
(cf. Esping-Andersen 1985c).
Increasingly, scholars arguing from the power-resources approach have
20 from theories of expansion to theories of retrenchment
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emphasized that the goal of the working class and social democracy has not
just been the establishment of a generous welfare state, but the establish-
ment of a generous welfare state with certain characteristics. This is the ar-
gument behind Esping-Andersen’s (1990) famous identification of three
welfare-state regimes. For instance, Esping-Andersen (1985b; 1990) argues
that the achievement of Social Democratic Parties in Scandinavia is an insti-
tutional welfare state, that is a welfare state relying on especially universal
welfare benefits. Along the same lines, Huber & Stephens (2000) argue that
Social Democratic Parties, unlike Christian Democratic Parties, have re-
sponded to women’s entry to the labour market by expanding publicly fund-
ed and publicly provided welfare services.
In the 1990’s, a number of studies have challenged the strong focus within
the power-resources theory on social democracy. They have all argued that
political parties or interest groups other than Social Democratic Parties and
trade unions have been driving forces behind the creation of modern welfare
states. This claim has been strong in relation to the role of Christian Democ-
ratic Parties in the building of the welfare states in Continental Europe.2
Van Kersbergen (1995) has shown how Christian Democratic Parties have
established their own version of the welfare state distinct from Social De-
mocratic welfare states (cf. also Castles 1994). Still, studies highlighting the
positive role played by political forces other than Social Democratic ones
have not focussed merely on Christian Democratic Parties. Baldwin (1990)
has shown the importance of agrarian and middle-class interests for the in-
troduction of universal welfare benefits in a number of countries, including
the Scandinavian ones. Finally, a new literature is emerging stressing the
positive role in welfare-state expansion played by employers (Swenson
1991; Martin 1995; Mares 2000, cf. Pierson 2000b).
The third group of theories about welfare-state expansion is known as
state-centered or institutional theories. This is the most heterogeneous
group of theories, and basically it is just a heading for a number of theories
emphasizing how ‘the state’ has affected welfare-state expansion (Heclo
1974; DeViney 1983; Skocpol & Ikenberry 1983; Weir & Skocpol 1985;
Skocpol & Amenta 1986). Where both structural and ‘political’ theories
explain welfare-state expansion by focussing on societal forces such as po-
litical parties, interest groups, or economic changes, all the studies belong-
ing to this third group argue that the state has had an independent effect on
the welfare state.
The heterogeneity of this group of theories is due to the quite different
conceptualisations of ‘the state’. Thus, Heclo (1974) points to the role
played by bureaucrats in the shaping of the British and Swedish welfare
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states as well as learning from previous policies. Weir & Skocpol (1985)
point to the same two variables, but also the role played by state structures
and state capacities. As a third example, DeViney (1983) operationalises
the role of the state as the impact of, among other things, the resources of the
state bureaucracy, reliance on indirect taxes and a centralised state. Alto-
gether, the claim that ‘the state’ has played an autonomous role in the shap-
ing of modern welfare states points to the impact of quite different factors,
and consequently testing the claim has proven difficult. The main contribu-
tion of this group of theories has probably been in explaining American ex-
ceptionalism, that is why the American welfare state developed quite differ-
ently from its European counterparts (cf. Skocpol & Ikerberry 1983).
One of the latest waves within the study of the growth of the welfare state
consists of a number of quantitative studies of welfare-state expansion us-
ing new methodological tools such as pooled time-series and cross-sectional
data (Hicks & Swank 1992; Hicks & Misra 1993; Huber, Ragin &
Stephens 1993; Huber & Stephens 1993; Birchfield & Crepaz 1998; Crepaz
1998; Huber & Stephens 2001a), or Boolean techniques (Hicks, Misra and
Ng 1995). These studies have tested a number of hypotheses derived from
the above three groups of theories. Not surprisingly, the findings do not
point to one single cause of welfare-state expansion. Yet, the main finding is
that party politics matter (but see Birchfield & Crepaz 1998; Crepaz 1998).
The positive impact of Social Democratic Parties on welfare-state expan-
sion is generally repeated in these studies. However, the role of other politi-
cal forces, especially Christian Democratic Parties, is also clear and these
studies thus add to the criticism of the power-resources model for focussing
too much on the role of social democracy.
Altogether, even with the latest wave of quantitative studies, the debate
about the creation of modern welfare states has not come to an end in the
sense that one single explanation for the expansion of modern welfare states
has been found. However, there is considerable evidence that political par-
ties, but not necessarily Social Democratic ones, have been the main driving
force behind the expansion of modern welfare states. In other words, party
politics matter.
The changed economic environment of the welfare state was already
clearly visible 20 years ago. The first reaction that this provoked within
scholarship was a literature on ‘the crisis of the welfare state’ (O’Connor
1973; Gough 1979; Offe 1984, cf. also Moran 1988). The gist of these often
Marxist-inspired crisis theories was that the problems of the welfare state
were not just problems, but rather expressions of crisis in the sense of a fun-
damental contradiction between modern welfare states and a capitalist
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economy. What could be derived from these studies was the expectation
that modern welfare states could not survive, at least not without funda-
mental changes. Yet, this proved false. Modern welfare states did survive
and most often without fundamental changes (Klein 1993; van Kersbergen
2000). Therefore, as will be explained below, it is not surprising that the
starting point for the recent retrenchment debate has been just the opposite
of the crisis literature; namely the persistence of the welfare state.
Theories of welfare-state retrenchment
As mentioned above, the scholarly debate about welfare-state retrenchment
was initiated by Pierson’s seminal work (1994; 1996). Therefore, a brief in-
troduction to this work is essential as a starting point for a survey of the re-
trenchment debate.
Pierson – the new politics of the welfare state and blame avoidance
One of the central claims in Pierson’s work is that one cannot expect theo-
ries explaining welfare-state expansion to explain welfare-state retrench-
ment. The reason is that the political logic of retrenchment is fundamentally
different from that of expansion. According to Pierson (1994: 17-19; 1996:
144-147), there are two reasons for this. First, retrenchment is by itself haz-
ardous since it implies imposing losses on concentrated groups in return for
dispersed gains to, say, all taxpayers. The interests surrounding retrench-
ment are asymmetrically distributed to the disadvantage of retrenchment.
In addition, what is known as ‘the negative bias of voters’ makes retrench-
ment politically dangerous. The negative bias of voters refers to the finding
of electoral research that voters react more strongly if something is taken
away from them than if something is given to them (cf. Lau 1985). Accord-
ing to Pierson, the second reason why the political logic of retrenchment is
different from that of welfare-state expansion is the growth of the welfare
state itself. Under the label of ‘the new politics of the welfare state’, Pierson
mentions two feedback effects from the expansion of the welfare state,
which he argues influence the politics of retrenchment. First, welfare pro-
grammes have gained strong popularity among the electorate. One can
speak of a ‘popular entrenchment’ of the welfare state. Second, the growth
of the welfare state has created a number of interest groups such as organi-
sations for the elderly and unions of public employees likely to meet sugges-
tions of retrenchment with stiff opposition.
In what way is the political logic of retrenchment then fundamentally dif-
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ferent from the logic of expansion? For the two reasons outlined above, Pier-
son argues that the politics of welfare-state retrenchment are an exercise in
blame avoidance as laid out by Weaver (1986). Due to the electoral dangers
seemingly involved, politicians worrying about their chances of being re-
elected will shun retrenchment, unless they find some way of minimising the
electoral dangers.
As mentioned before, Pierson’s work has been the starting point for the
whole debate about welfare-state retrenchment (cf. Ross 2000c). The argu-
ment that the politics of retrenchment are different from the politics of ex-
pansion and that the former is about how to avoid blame, has become con-
ventional wisdom within the literature on retrenchment (e.g. Esping-Ander-
sen 1996a; Stephens, Huber & Ray 1999; Vail 1999; Ross 2000a; Kitschelt
2001). This may be due to the fact that the hypothesis about welfare-state
continuity that can be derived from the argument has generally been con-
firmed (cf. Stephens, Huber & Ray 1999; Kuhnle 2000; van Kersbergen
2000). As Esping-Andersen (1996a: 266-267) puts it: ‘….contemporary
politics of the welfare state is a politics of status quo’.
Increasingly, however, variation in welfare-state retrenchment has come
into focus. Even if the general picture is one of continuity, it is clear that
there is variation in the limited extent of retrenchment that has taken place,
and this has drawn increased attention. Variation in welfare-state retrench-
ment can be identified at two levels. First, variation can be identified among
countries. Thus, one challenge for theoretical propositions about welfare-
state retrenchment is to explain why some countries have implemented
more retrenchment than others. Second, variation can be found among dif-
ferent social-security schemes. Some schemes have fared better than others
and this must be explained by theoretical arguments about welfare-state re-
trenchment as well.
Theories of variation in retrenchment across social-security schemes
Pierson (1994: 166-176) himself focussed on explaining variation across
social-security schemes. The main variable he singled out as the cause of
such variation is an institutional one, namely what he labels ‘the program-
matic structure’ of social-security schemes. This variable is basically a
shorthand for a number of characteristics of the rules concerning social-se-
curity schemes. The programmatic structure can be identified by answering
such questions as, how are eligibility and duration decided? who adminis-
ters benefits?; etc. In other words, former political decisions about the struc-
ture of social-security schemes have feedback effects on the politics of re-
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trenchment, and the possibilities of implementing retrenchments will be
path-dependent (cf. Pierson 1993; 2000a).
Pierson’s (1994: 19-26) argument about why the programmatic structure
is likely to be decisive for how different schemes fare is the following: De-
spite the electoral risks involved, politicians facing ‘permanent austerity’
(Pierson 1998) are willing to engage in retrenchment if they are able to pur-
sue some kind of blame avoidance strategy, that is some way of minimising
the electoral risks involved. Pierson himself identifies three different blame
avoidance strategies: strategies of obfuscation, division, and compensation
(op. cit.). The strategy of obfuscation goes back to Arnold’s (1990) idea of
causal chains. If voters are to react on a change in public policy, they have to
construct a causal chain between government action and positive or nega-
tive effects on their lives. Strategies of obfuscation aim at making it more
difficult for voters to construct such causal chains. The strategies of division
aim at dividing the political opponents. A united opposition is harder to
fight, so if a government can split its opponents, it may lessen the political
costs of retrenchment. The third strategy is the compensation strategy.
Here, the idea is to offer side-payments to specific groups considered to be
central for the mobilisation of political opposition.
The possibilities of pursuing such blame avoidance strategies depend on
the programmatic structure of the schemes. For instance, Pierson (1994: 53-
73) explains Thatcher’s relative success in retrenching the British pension
system by, among other things, the absence of a unifying scheme, the way
benefits were indexed, and the existence of private alternatives. However,
Pierson does not put forward any general hypotheses about which types of
programmatic structures offer the best possibilities of pursuing the three
blame-avoidance strategies.
Other scholars also aiming at explaining variation across social-security
schemes have generally followed in Pierson’s institutional footsteps. They
have also focussed on the programmatic structures of social-security
schemes, especially the way they are financed. However, there is some dis-
agreement about which form of financing, social contributions vs. tax-fi-
nancing, leads to the most extensive retrenchment measures. For instance,
Anderson (1998) partly explains variation across social-security schemes in
Sweden in the 1990’s by the degree to which they are financed by contribu-
tions from employers. Such contributions have an easily identifiable effect
on international competitiveness. Yet, Alber (1996; 1998) argues that gov-
ernments will be most interested in retrenching social-security schemes hav-
ing a direct impact on the government budget, that is schemes financed
through taxation.
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Another type of argument focuses on other institutional characteristics of
social-security schemes arguing that universal schemes will fare better than
selective schemes. Universal schemes are schemes providing adequate levels
of benefits for the majority of the population including the middle-class (cf.
Rothstein 2000), whereas selective schemes are schemes providing meager
and means-tested benefits for a limited part of the population. The underly-
ing idea is that the political feedback from universal schemes protects them
against retrenchment. This argument has been based on a power-resources
theory (Korpi 1980), but also on the norms and attitudes towards social se-
curity that universal schemes create (Rothstein 2000).
Arguments other than institutional ones about variation across social-se-
curity schemes also exist. Partly following Pierson (1994: 164-166), it could
be argued that the strength of organised interest attached to different
schemes is decisive. Some schemes, for example old-age pensions, are linked
with strong user groups or client networks doing whatever they can to draw
political attention to retrenchment. Other schemes such as social assistance
or child benefits have no or weakly organised interest to protect them. If the
strength of organised interests matters, the latter type of schemes should be
most vulnerable to retrenchment. In addition, trade unions have long had
close links to certain schemes, especially unemployment benefits since they
are involved in the administration of the schemes. However, different opin-
ions exist as to the importance of trade-union attachment. Pierson (1994:
164-166) argues that due to the declining power of trade unions, the
schemes they protect are more vulnerable than, for instance, old-age pen-
sions. Anderson (2001), on the other hand, argues that in Sweden, where
trade unions are still strong, they have been able to protect unemployment
benefits from being exposed to retrenchment measures. Finally, Alber
(1998) presents what he labels a Marxist perspective. Here, schemes such as
unemployment and sickness benefits closely connected to the labour market
are more vulnerable to retrenchment due to the interest of ‘capital’ in re-
commodifying labour.
Theories of variation in welfare-state retrenchment among countries
The debate about the factors explaining variation among countries has been
more vivid than the one about variation across social-security schemes.3 Ba-
sically, three positions can be identified in the former debate under the head-
ings of economics, institutions, and politics. To some extent, these three
groups of arguments resemble the three groups of theories of welfare-state
expansion. The arguments about economics, to some degree, are simply re-
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versions of the structural theories of welfare-state expansion. The institu-
tional arguments come close to several versions of the state-centered theo-
ries. Finally, some attention has been paid to the effects of politics on wel-
fare-state retrenchment, especially party politics, but also political dis-
course.
Arguments about the importance of economics can be further divided into
two subtypes. The most prominent subtype relates welfare-state retrench-
ment to governments having to respond to macro-economic difficulties such
as budget deficits, high unemployment, declining competitiveness, etc.
Therefore, the extent of the retrenchment measures governments will imple-
ment depends on economic factors such as the gravity of the economic situa-
tion and how extensive and hence costly welfare states they govern are. For
instance, Castles (2001) shows that the development of public expenditure
from 1983-1995 depended on a number of economic factors such as unem-
ployment and economic growth. Along the same lines, Huber & Stephens
(2001a) argue that most welfare state retrenchments have been unemploy-
ment driven.
A second subtype of economic arguments is the increasing literature that,
inspired by the idea of ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Soskice 1999), focuses on
the interplay between welfare states and ‘political economies’, especially
labour markets (cf. Pierson 2000b). This has been a leitmotif in Esping-An-
dersen’s work (1990; 1999); Huber & Stephens (2001b) have analyzed the
interplay between welfare states and production regimes, just as Iversen &
Wren (1998) have discussed the challenges facing different political-eco-
nomic models. The contribution of this literature to the retrenchment de-
bate lies in its emphasis on welfare states’ close connection with labour mar-
kets, implying that analyses of retrenchment cannot ignore different labour-
market structures. Yet, it is not always quite clear which hypotheses con-
cerning retrenchment to derive from such arguments. Yet, both Esping-An-
dersen (1996b) and (Scharpf 1997; 2000b) have emphasized the very diffi-
cult situation facing Continental welfare states with regard to the interplay
between the labour market and social security.4
The most prevalent types of theories about variation in welfare-state re-
trenchment are theories focussing on the effects of institutions. The new in-
stitutional wave within political science in general (cf. Hall & Taylor 1996;
Peters 1999) has certainly also swept across the welfare-state retrenchment
debate. Upon a closer look, the institutions matter claim in relation to re-
trenchment can be divided into two groups, one focussing on macro-institu-
tions and one focussing on micro-institutions.
Theories concentrating on macro-political institutions have focussed
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mainly on formal institutions or constitutional structures, that is electoral
systems, bi-cameralism, presidential vs. parliamentary systems, federalism,
etc. Generally, the starting point for this group of theories is the notion of
veto points developed by Immergut (1992) and Weaver & Rockman (1993).
A veto point refers to a situation in which a certain actor can block a politi-
cal decision. The general literature on veto points argues that an increasing
number favour status quo, as the number of actors that may block political
decisions increases. This argument has generally been taken over by the lit-
erature on welfare-state retrenchment in the sense that it is argued that a
large number of veto points, albeit often in combination with other factors,
inhibits retrenchment and vice versa (cf. Pierson 1998; Huber & Stephens
2001a, chap 7; Bonoli, George & Taylor-Gooby 2000; Merrien & Bonoli
2000; Bonoli 2001).
Crepaz & Birchfield (2000) and Swank (2001) have extended the argu-
ment by suggesting that what Lijphart (1999) labels ‘consensus democra-
cies’ should experience less retrenchment than ‘majoritarian’ countries. A
consensus democracy is a democracy with political institutions favouring
inclusion and power sharing, whereas the political institutions of a majori-
tarian democracy aim at power-concentration and an adversarial style of
politics. Following the same line of thought, two analyses of retrenchment
in France (Bonoli 1997; Vail 1999) highlight the importance of a consensual
vs. an adversarial style of welfare-state retrenchment. Yet, these studies con-
clude that consensual styles favour retrenchment.
The second group of institutional theoretical arguments focuses on mi-
cro-institutions; namely the programmatic structure of social-security
schemes. Hence, this group of theories basically extends the idea of the im-
portance of programmatic structures to entire welfare states. This is possi-
ble because, as implied by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) idea of types of welfare
states, social-security schemes in the same country tend to share certain in-
stitutional characteristics. One implication of a number of arguments about
programmatic structures is that Continental or conservative welfare states
should experience the least retrenchment. Swank (2001) argues that the in-
volvement of labour and business in the administration of social-security
schemes, which is strongest in Continental welfare states, tends to hamper
retrenchment. Bonoli, George & Taylor-Gooby (2000: 144) argue that, in
theory, Bismarckian insurance systems, that is conservative welfare states,
should be most resistant to retrenchment, especially if employee contribu-
tions are predominant. Finally, Palier (2000: 120-121) points to the linkage
between contributions and benefits in Continental insurance systems as a
source of resistance to retrenchment.
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Another argument based on Esping-Andersen’s typology is that a univer-
sal welfare state should be less vulnerable to retrenchment due to the politi-
cal feedback from universal social-security schemes (Rothstein 2000).5 Par-
allel to this is Korpi & Palme’s (2001) argument that encompassing and
state-corporatist welfare states should experience less retrenchment than
basic security, targeted, and voluntary state-supported welfare states, be-
cause the former keep the middle class away from private alternatives.
As argued by Ross (2000c), party politics (the factor highlighted by the
literature on welfare-state expansion) has generally been downplayed in the
welfare-state retrenchment debate. A few studies (e.g. Borchert 1995;
Hicks 2000, chap. 7; Korpi & Palme 2001) have followed the literature on
welfare-state expansion arguing that retrenchment results from strong
right-wing parties vs. weak left-wing parties. However, some of the main
proponents of the politics matter thesis in relation to welfare-state expan-
sion argue that politics do not matter anymore (Castles 2001), or that the
role of partisanship has declined (Huber & Stephens 2001a; Stephens, Hu-
ber & Ray 1999).
Taking issue with these findings, a few recent studies have argued that par-
ty politics are still crucial for welfare-state development. Yet, the effect is
visible only if conceptualised differently from the traditional welfare-state
expansion debate. Ross (2000a) has argued that left-wing parties are less
likely to be punished for welfare-state retrenchment by the electorate than
right-wing parties. Consequently, left-wing parties can exploit a ‘Nixon
goes to China logic’. However, this strategic advantage tends to disappear in
multi-party systems where the major parties of the left face competition
from parties further to the left. Levy (1999) has argued that Social Democ-
ratic Parties in Continental Europe have been able to pursue a ‘vice into
virtue’ strategy. They have combined retrenchments of social-security
schemes with ‘perverse’ consequences, such as extremely generous pension
systems, with progressive welfare reforms. Also, Kitschelt (2001) has ar-
gued that different configurations of party competition affect welfare-state
retrenchment. For instance, retrenchment is less likely to take place in coun-
tries where party competition is primarily between a Social Democratic Par-
ty and a Christian Democratic Party, with liberal parties playing a limited
role (e.g. Germany).
A number of studies also emphasize the importance of politics in the sense
of political argumentation and discourse. Cox (2001) explains why welfare
reforms happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but not in Germany by
the social construction of imperatives for change. Schmidt (2002) highlights
the importance of governments’ attempts to justify welfare-state reforms
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through normative discourse. A strong affinity exists between these argu-
ments about political discourse and arguments about the importance of
framing for the opportunities of implementing retrenchment (Ross 2000a).
As can be seen from the above, the debate about welfare-state retrench-
ment is still in the making. However, a number of plausible theoretical
propositions about variation across social-security schemes and among
countries have been put forward. Generally, Pierson’s argument that expla-
nations of welfare-state expansion cannot just be turned upside down to ex-
plain retrenchment has been accepted as a premise for the whole debate.
Nevertheless, the factors emphasized by the literature on retrenchment are
not new. Most of them were also prominent in the debate about expansion.
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3 A framework for government choice on retrenchment
This chapter aims at developing a theoretical framework to explain varia-
tion in welfare-state retrenchment, both among countries and across social-
security schemes. More precisely, the framework seeks to map the factors
influencing government decisions on retrenchment. Theoretically, the
framework draws on ideas put forward in a number of the studies referred
to above and some insights developed by rational-choice theory.
Political parties: their objectives and incentives for retrenchment
As the framework is centered on political parties, it is worthwhile to start
with some theoretical deliberations on them. The literature on political par-
ties points to three different goals: office, votes, and policy (Strøm 1990a;
Müller & Strøm 1999b). This framework is based on the assumption that
the ultimate goal of political parties is to gain office; that is government
power. However, this does not imply that they disregard votes. To gain of-
fice, any party needs votes. Consequently, in the following political parties
are seen as office- and vote-seekers having office as the ultimate goal. Policy
per se is not assumed to be important for political parties. Thus, the frame-
work follows Downs (1957: 28) in arguing that, ‘parties formulate policies
to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’.
In some situations, the office- and vote-seeking strategies coincide in the
sense that the best way to gain office is to gain as many votes as possible.
However, in other cases, parties face a trade-off between office and votes,
which in effect is a trade-off between the short- and long-run (Müller &
Strøm 1999b: 9-11). How parties will respond to this trade-off in a concrete
situation is difficult to predict, as it will depend on the actual situation and
their time preferences (cf. Müller & Strøm 1999a). Still, as gaining office is
the ultimate goal, parties are not expected to sacrifice office for votes repeat-
edly. In situations where vote- and office-seeking possibilities are unrelated,
for instance, because a party is sure to continue in power, political parties
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are expected to seek as many votes as possible. The reason is that electoral
success per se has a number of positive side effects such as a positive spirit
within the party and an improvement of the party’s bargaining position vis-
à-vis other political parties.
As vote-seeking is assumed to be a central goal, albeit not the ultimate
goal, for political parties, it is reasonable to deliberate on the situation in
which vote-seeking parties find themselves in relation to retrenchment. The
framework follows Pierson in seeing retrenchment as an unpopular policy.
For the reasons outlined when presenting Pierson’s argument in chapter 2,
retrenchment is expected to be unpopular with the persons actually affected
and with the electorate in general.1 The politics of welfare-state retrench-
ment are the politics of blame avoidance.
This immediately provokes a puzzle. If vote seeking is an important goal
for political parties and welfare-state retrenchment is unpopular since vot-
ers are likely to punish parties for retrenchment, should rational political
parties not be expected to stay away from retrenchment? To some extent,
the answer to this question is yes. Governments are not expected to imple-
ment sweeping retrenchment. However, vote-seeking governments do have
incentives for retrenchments identified in the way voters keep governments
responsible for the economic well being of their country. As argued by
Kitschelt (2001), the ‘push’ factors for governments in relation to retrench-
ment are economic.
Following the idea of ‘nested games’, put forward by Tsebelis (1990), the
politics of welfare-state retrenchment are seen as nested with the politics of
economic management and visa versa. To make sense of the decisions in one
arena, one needs to pay attention to the other arena. The extensive literature
on vote and popularity functions has shown that governments are blamed
for not keeping the economy on track (cf. Lewis-Beck 1988; Nannestad &
Paldam 1994; Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000). Thus, governments have a
cross party-color incentive to welfare-state retrenchment.
At the general level, the economic push factors in relation to retrenchment
are connected to the changed economic environment of the mature welfare
state within the last 20 years (cf. Pierson 1998; 2001a; Scharpf 2000a).2
There are several specific economic reasons as to why managing the econo-
my pushes governments towards retrenchment. An obvious reason is bud-
getary problems. A well-managed economy requires control of budgetary
deficits. Considering the fact that social-security benefits take a large share
of government budgets, a strict budgetary policy tends to imply retrench-
ment of social security. In the cases where social-security schemes are not
directly part of government budgets but financed through separate social
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contributions, the incentives for retrenchment are more indirect. Social con-
tributions will often be seen as another tax and they are often integrated
into the tax system. Therefore, if they become too high, they will limit gov-
ernments’ possibilities of levying other taxes and thus their possibilities of
balancing budgets. This provides governments with an incentive to keep the
expenditures down even though they do not directly affect the government
budget. However, government incentives for retrenchment do not just relate
to the direct costs of social security. For instance, economists (e.g. Layard,
Nickell & Jackmann 1994; oecd 1994: 171-213) have argued that gener-
ous unemployment benefits and social assistance discourage the unem-
ployed from job seeking. In other words, generous social-security schemes
may lead to higher levels of unemployment. Generous early retirement and
pension schemes with easy access also encourage older workers to leave the
labour market at a time when a diminishing workforce is becoming a con-
cern for many governments (oecd 1997). Finally, limiting or abolishing au-
tomatic indexation of social-security benefits has been used as a means to
fight inflation.
Altogether, the situation of vote-seeking parties in relation to welfare-
state retrenchment can be summarised as a dilemma between economic
constraints and popular entrenchment. If governments shun retrenchment,
they risk not being able to manage the economy. If they do retrench, they
risk being punished by the electorate as well. One way out for governments
is to make use of blame-avoidance strategies.
A justification strategy of blame avoidance 
As explained in chapter 2, Pierson suggests three types of blame-avoidance
strategies: strategies of obfuscation, division, and compensation. In the fol-
lowing, the argument is that government decisions whether or not to re-
trench social-security schemes are determined by the possibilities of pursu-
ing a somewhat different blame-avoidance strategy, labeled a ‘justification
strategy’. The starting point for this strategy is the importance, as suggested
by extensive literature (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995), of
agenda setting in politics. The fact that governments have implemented an
unpopular policy does not automatically imply that voters will punish them
at the polls. For this to happen, retrenchment must be politicised and come
on the political agenda so voters actually evaluate governments on the basis
of their retrenchment record.
Considering the importance of modern welfare states for peoples’ well be-
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ing, it is unlikely that governments can introduce significant retrenchments
without it becoming a political issue. Pursuing a strategy of agenda denial in
relation to welfare-state retrenchment is not a real option for governments.
Still, what governments should avoid is not necessarily retrenchment be-
coming a political issue. The role of agenda setting is not just a question of
issues coming on the agenda or not, but also a question of how the issues are
defined or framed. As Schattschneider (1960: 68) argued long ago, ‘the defi-
nition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’, and later Riker
(1986: 1-17) gave some very good examples of the importance of that power
to define the issue.
Such considerations are relevant in relation to welfare-state retrenchment
as well (Ross 2000b). To see why, a closer look at the research into voters’
attitudes towards the welfare state is required. As noted above, this research
has found broad support for the welfare state across countries. Yet, as indi-
cated by a number of studies (Taylor-Gooby 1982, 2001; van Oorschot
2000; Andersen 1999a; Overbye 1999, cf. also Papadakis 1992), voters’ at-
titudes towards the welfare state are complex, and basic support should not
be confused with uncritical support. For instance, voters are often critical
of the economic viability of extensive welfare states. They regard many so-
cial-security schemes as very complicated and open for cheating, and show
limited support for further increases in taxation. To make sense of this, An-
dersen (1999a), inspired by Svallfors (1991) and Rothstein (1998), distin-
guishes between solidarity in the sense of the support for the welfare state
per se, and trust in the way the idea of a welfare state is actually implement-
ed. Andersen (1999a) further divides trust into three different elements: 1)
that the procedures for distributing costs and benefits are fair, resulting in,
for instance, low levels of fraud, 2) that the welfare state is efficient and
achieves its goals, for instance, equality, and 3) that it is economically feasi-
ble.
The voters’ basic support for the idea of solidarity is what makes welfare-
state retrenchment a question of blame avoidance. The default reaction of
the electorate to retrenchment is negative. However, voters might abstain
from punishing the government if they can be persuaded that the retrench-
ment measures take away benefits from some undeserving group or improve
the economic viability of the welfare state. To borrow an expression from
Levy (1999), governments must pursue a ‘vice-into-virtue strategy’, argu-
ing that retrenchment is pursued to cure some of the problems of implement-
ing the idea of solidarity. Governments must be able to persuade voters that
the welfare state is retrenched to save it or to remedy its policy failures. Alto-
gether, any support for or lack of punishment for welfare-state retrench-
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ment is contingent upon governments’ ability to argue convincingly that
welfare-state retrenchment improves the implementation of the principle of
solidarity. If retrenchment is politicised as a matter of being for or against
the welfare state per se, the electoral dangers will be insurmountable.
Unfortunately, pursuing this kind of justification strategy of blame avoid-
ance is not an easy task for governments. For example, the positive effects of
retrenchment on the economy are generally medium- or long-term and indi-
rect. Understanding why retrenchment may have positive economic effects
and thus may save the welfare state often requires voters to construct long
and complicated causal chains. On the other hand, it is easy to understand
that retrenchment has negative effects on those affected by it. In addition,
even if voters might accept the necessity of retrenchments, they will still re-
act negatively if they find that the burdens are unfairly distributed. There-
fore, one should not expect governments to implement sweeping retrench-
ment. Yet, they have an incentive to implement some retrenchments in com-
bination with the application of blame-avoidance strategies.
The overall situation of vote-seeking parties in relation to retrenchment
can be summarised in the following way. They are caught in an unpleasant
dilemma between the popular entrenchment of the welfare state and eco-
nomic constraints, which may also result in electoral punishment. The best
way to avoid blame from the electorate is implementing some but not
sweeping retrenchment combined with a justification strategy of blame
avoidance. For example, such a strategy consists of emphasizing the finan-
cial need for retrenchment. The question then becomes: which factors affect
vote-seeking political parties’/governments’ possibilities of pursuing a jus-
tification strategy? This question can be addressed at two levels; namely at
the country level and at the level of different social-security schemes.
Systems of party competition and their effects on the possibilities of
pursuing a justification strategy 
Starting with the country level, the following argues that the decisive factor
is party competition among political parties with the goals outlined above.
To explain this, the situation of different kinds of political parties in relation
to welfare-state retrenchment needs some elaboration.
Political parties find themselves in different strategic situations in relation
to retrenchment. The reason should be found in what Ross (2000a) aptly
coins ‘issue association’. Based on the salience theory (cf. Budge & Farlie
1983), the idea is that voters have certain fixed views of what to expect from
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political parties. These expectations form the basis of their evaluation of
political parties. A political party can ‘own’ a certain issue. Left-wing par-
ties generally own the welfare state issue in the sense that the electorate ex-
pects left-wing parties to fight hard for social security and social justice. On
the other hand, the electorate is more sceptical of the abilities of left-wing
parties to take good care of the economy. Voters’ expectations of right-wing
parties, liberal or conservative ones, are basically the expectations of the left
in the reverse. Voters view the commitment of the right wing to the welfare
state with scepticism, but they have confidence in its ability to manage the
economy (Ross 2000a).
In addition, a third group of parties must be discussed as they play a cru-
cial role in a number of countries; namely Christian Democratic Parties.
Voters view Christian Democratic parties as holding a centre position be-
tween left and right-wing parties.3 On the one hand, unlike parties of the
right, Christian Democratic parties have a reputation as creators of the wel-
fare state, giving them partial ownership of the welfare-state issue. Howev-
er, it is limited ownership compared to that of left-wing parties. On the oth-
er hand, the electorate does not view the Christian Democratic Parties’ abil-
ity to manage the economy with the same scepticism as that of the social de-
mocrats. Furthermore, it is important to note that Christian Democratic
Parties are more than simply a compromise between social democracy and
conservatism/liberalism. As argued by van Kersbergen (1994; 1995), Chris-
tian democracy is a distinct political phenomenon. What makes it distinct,
besides its attempt to strike a balance between social democracy and conser-
vatism/liberalism on the socio-economic dimension, is its adherence to
compromise, integration and societal accommodation as goals per se. This
has made pragmatism and flexibility two central characteristics of Christ-
ian democracy.
In relation to social and economic policies, the existence of these different
‘party images’ has consequences for different political parties’ capabilities
of pursuing a justification strategy of blame avoidance. Parties of the right
find themselves in the most difficult situation. Voters are likely to be scepti-
cal towards a claim from these parties that retrenchments are made out of,
for instance, economic necessity. The voters’ suspicion will be that these
parties have hidden ideological motives. Furthermore, voters trust their
ability to manage the economy. Consequently, right-wing parties have few-
er incentives to demonstrate such ability through ‘tough policies.’ Parties of
the left are in the opposite situation. Voters are much more likely to trust
left-wing parties arguing that retrenchments are introduced merely to reme-
dy policy failures. Therefore, left-wing parties can exploit a ‘Nixon goes to
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China logic’ in relation to welfare-state retrenchment (cf. Ross 2000a;
Kitschelt 2001). They also often have a need to prove their ability to manage
the economy. As Downs argued (1957: 96-113), vote-seeking parties must
appear consistent in the eyes of the electorate. This perspective limits how
much left-wing parties can exploit a ‘Nixon goes to China logic’. Christian
Democratic Parties are in an intermediate position. Their possibilities of ex-
ploiting a ‘Nixon goes to China logic’ are not as good as that of the left-wing
parties. On the other hand, due to their partial ownership of the welfare-
state issue, they hold a better position than the right-wing parties. Further-
more, their adherence to compromise, integration, and societal accommo-
dation is likely to represent an asset when trying to persuade the electorate
to accept retrenchment.
However, governments do not engage with voters in isolation from other
political parties. This is why systems of party competition must be taken
into account. For instance, what makes it difficult for right-wing parties to
justify retrenchment measures is not just their image among the electorate,
but also the existence of left wing and/or Christian Democratic Parties like-
ly to attack parties of the right for being on an ideological crusade against
the welfare state. In addition, looking at the system of party competition
also brings into the theoretical framework how the trade-off between vote-
and office seeking affects political parties’ strategies towards welfare-state
retrenchment. The reason is that the system of party competition is a crucial
variable in determining to what extent political parties face a trade-off be-
tween vote- and office seeking.
In the following, the impact of two different configurations of party com-
petition will be discussed; namely bloc systems and pivot systems.4 Bloc sys-
tems are dominated by a bloc of left wing and a bloc of right-wing parties.5
Christian Democratic Parties are either non-existent or play a minor role. In
such systems, vote- and office-seeking strategies will coincide. The best way
to achieve government power is to seek votes. In such systems, what hap-
pens in terms of retrenchment is dependent on which of the two blocs holds
government power. If the right-wing bloc holds power, a small scale of re-
trenchment can be expected to take place. The reason is that such a govern-
ment finds it extremely difficult to pursue a justification strategy of blame
avoidance. Basically, the electorate will be sceptical of its motives and the
vote-seeking left-wing opposition can be expected to do everything possible
to create an image of a right-wing government on an ideological crusade
against the welfare state. In other words, the right-wing parties will find it
difficult to avoid retrenchment being turned into a question of being for or
against the welfare state, a battle they have few chances of winning.
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If the left holds office, they have a good chance of exploiting the ‘Nixon
goes to China logic’. The only political alternative is the right-wing bloc.
Yet, credibly attacking the left-wing bloc for being against the welfare state
per se is not possible for right-wing parties. Actually, due to the fear of ap-
pearing inconsistent, the right wing will find it difficult to oppose retrench-
ment measures altogether. Therefore, a left-wing government has a good
chance of achieving political consensus, including parliamentary support
for the legislation from the opposition. Parliamentary support does not only
secure government control of the way the issue is defined, it also gives the
opposition a share in the possible blame.
Party competition in pivot systems works in somewhat different ways. As
laid out by Keman (1994 & 1997), pivot systems are party systems in which
a pivotal centre party dominates both government formation and legisla-
tion. It can choose to govern with either the major party to the left of it or
with the major party to the right of it, and forming a government without it
is politically impossible.6 Because the pivot party will automatically be in
power, it can focus on vote seeking. The major left or right-wing party not
included in the government will face a difficult choice between vote- and of-
fice seeking. In terms of votes, the best strategy will often be to distance it-
self from the policy of the government. However, this also implies distanc-
ing itself from the Christian Democratic Centre Party and thus from gov-
ernment participation. Having this as the ultimate goal, the party will find it
difficult to constitute a strong opposition for a very long time. Consequent-
ly, in a pivot system, whether or not welfare-state retrenchment will be in-
troduced depends on the interest of the Christian Democratic Party. As the
party will be vote seeking, its situation in relation to welfare-state retrench-
ment is the same as for any vote-seeking party outlined above. The best way
out of the dilemma between economic constraints and popular entrench-
ment will be to implement some retrenchment measures in combination
with a justification strategy of blame avoidance. The Christian Democratic
Parties’ reputation for societal accommodation and pragmatism is an addi-
tional asset in terms of succeeding with such a strategy. More importantly, it
is almost certain that not even the left-wing party will constitute a stiff op-
position for a long time, as this will imply political isolation. Thus, the same
type of party consensus that may surface in bloc systems if the left-wing bloc
holds office is likely to emerge in pivot systems as well, once the Christian
Democratic Centre Party opts for retrenchment. This will most likely hap-
pen if the Christian Democratic Party governs with the left-wing party,
since otherwise some left-wing opposition can be expected, especially in the
short-run.
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Summing up, the argument is that variation in the scale of welfare re-
trenchment implemented in different countries can be explained by differ-
ent systems of party competition. Concerning bloc systems, the hypothesis
that can be derived is that retrenchment will take place when the left-wing
bloc governs, as it can exploit a ‘Nixon goes to China logic’. If the right-
wing bloc holds power, little if any retrenchment is expected since it will be
found electorally too dangerous. Pivot systems of party competition are ex-
pected to be conducive to welfare-state retrenchment because of the power
of the Christian Democratic Party. Once this party opts for retrenchment, a
party consensus around retrenchment can be expected to emerge. Thus, ce-
teris paribus, the hypothesis is that more retrenchment will be implemented
in countries with pivot systems of party competition than in countries with
bloc systems of party competition. Only if bloc systems are governed solely
by the left, the same scale of retrenchment seen in pivot systems can be ex-
pected. Furthermore, in pivot systems, it is expected that more retrench-
ment will take place if the Christian Democratic Party governs with the left-
wing party than if it governs with the right-wing party.
Connection to the labour market: which social-security schemes will be
retrenched the most?
The next step is to investigate governments’ possibilities of pursuing a justi-
fication strategy in relation to individual social-security schemes. Govern-
ments do not retrench welfare states; they retrench old-age pension
schemes, social-assistance schemes, etc. Thus, a justification strategy of
blame avoidance must also relate to specific social-security schemes and this
level of analysis must be included as well. Yet, including it does not imply
that governments’ decisions whether or not to introduce retrenchment can
be understood solely by focussing on factors at this level. General political
considerations such as the reactions of competing political parties will be
crucial when governments consider whether or not to retrench at all, and at
which scale. However, which social-security schemes should be targeted de-
pends on factors at the level of social-security schemes.
The following argument is that the connection to the labour market is de-
cisive for the vulnerability of social-security schemes to retrenchment. This
factor was introduced as a Marxist perspective in chapter 2, arguing that
schemes covering risks generated by the labour market were most vulnera-
ble to retrenchment because of a government or a capitalist interest in re-
commodifying labour. From a non-Marxist perspective, social-security
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schemes covering social risks generated by the labour market are likely to be
more vulnerable to retrenchment for two related reasons. First, govern-
ments have stronger incentives to retrench schemes closely linked to the
labour market. The reason is that they tend to have negative effects on the
labour market. As already mentioned, economists (e.g. Layard, Nickell &
Jackmann 1994; oecd 1994: 171-213) have argued that the generosity of
unemployment benefits affects the willingness of the unemployed to search
for a job. Another example is that generous early retirement schemes reduce
the supply of labour. Second, a close connection with the labour market also
provides governments with ways of justifying retrenchment. Schemes close-
ly linked to the labour market can be considered ‘evils’ in the sense that most
people will agree that, irrespective of the expenditure, having a large num-
ber of sick or unemployed is a problem, and that keeping down the number
of claimants can be considered a goal per se. Ideally, claimants of schemes
closely connected to the labour market should be working. Thus, a large
number of unemployed or disabled can be argued to be a policy failure of the
welfare state. Related to this, the popular images of claimants of schemes
with limited connection to labour tend to be more positive. Old-age pen-
sioners or families with children are often seen as deserving their benefits,
for instance, after a long working life. The same sense of deservingness is
not present in relation to schemes closely connected to labour, such as un-
employment benefits. Benefits are given to the unemployed because they
cannot find a job, not because they deserve it.
Summing up, governments have different ways of pursuing a justification
strategy in relation to different social-security schemes. They also have dif-
ferent degrees of incentive for retrenchment. In relation to schemes with
limited connection to the labour market, the only relevant question is ‘how
much can we afford to give to this deserving group’. Governments can only
legitimise retrenchment measures by referring to the cost of the schemes.
Even such arguments about cost are weak since it can be argued that less de-
serving groups should be affected. In relation to schemes closely linked to
the labour market, governments have far better capabilities of justifying re-
trenchment. Apart from cost considerations, governments can, for exam-
ple, refer to the problem of too many claimants and argue that the schemes
have gone ‘way out of hand’. In relation to schemes closely connected to the
labour market, governments also have stronger incentives to introduce re-
trenchment measures.
It is now possible to derive some hypotheses about the scale of vulnerabili-
ty of different social-security schemes. Schemes such as old-age pension
schemes and child-allowance schemes have limited connection to the labour
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market. Such schemes are expected to suffer the least retrenchment. The op-
posite group consists of schemes with claimants with a close connection to
the labour market. The most obvious example in this group is unemploy-
ment benefits, which are expected to be highly vulnerable to retrenchment.
The theoretical argument in brief 
The aim of this chapter is to put forward a theoretical framework mapping
the factors affecting government decisions concerning retrenchment. The
starting point for the framework is political parties assumed to be vote- and
office seekers with the latter as their ultimate goal. Their incentive for wel-
fare-state retrenchment is generated by a changed economic environment
and an electoral need to govern the economy successfully. Yet, the populari-
ty of welfare states makes retrenchment an exercise in blame avoidance. Po-
litical parties are caught in an unpleasant dilemma between popular en-
trenchment and economic constraints. The best way out is argued to be the
implementation of some retrenchment measures in combination with a jus-
tification strategy of blame avoidance. This raises the question of determin-
ing the factors affecting governments’ possibilities of pursuing such a strat-
egy. Concerning variation among countries, the argument, based on the no-
tion that political parties own certain issues, is that different systems of par-
ty competition are the decisive factor. The system of party competition
shapes political parties’ trade-off between votes and office. With respect to
variation across social-security schemes, this is expected to depend on the
schemes’ connection to the labour market. Different degrees of labour mar-
ket connection affect governments’ possibilities of justifying retrenchment
as well as their incentives to retrench.
A number of hypotheses can be derived from this framework. One hy-
pothesis is that given the electoral dangers for vote-seeking governments,
sweeping retrenchment is not a real option. In bloc systems, welfare-state
retrenchment is expected to take place only if the left-wing party is in gov-
ernment. Only then will the kind of consensus necessary for the application
of justification strategy of blame avoidance emerge. More retrenchment is
expected to take place in pivot systems. In such systems, parties of the left
and right can only obtain government power by cooperating with the Chris-
tian Democratic Centre Party. This is expected to produce a political con-
sensus conducive to welfare-state retrenchment because the left-wing party
will be forced to accept retrenchment measures in order to gain power. The
most retrenchment-favorable political climate is expected to be when the
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centre party governs with the left-wing party. As regards variation across
social-security schemes, schemes such as unemployment benefits with close
connection to the labour market are expected to experience the most re-
trenchment. Schemes such as old-age pensions with a more limited connec-
tion to the labour market are expected to experience the least retrenchment.
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4 Research strategy and research design
The aim of this chapter is to present the research strategy and research de-
sign of the study. As will be further explained below, the overall research
strategy of this study is comparable case studies. The chapter therefore
starts with a discussion of the choice of cases. This includes both the choice
of countries, social-security programmes, and time period. The chapter
then goes on to discuss the definition and measurement of the dependent
variable, namely retrenchment. The overall aim of the empirical parts of the
study is to determine whether or not there is empirical support for the theo-
retical framework developed in chapter 3. Following King, Keohane & Ver-
ba (1994), the best way to investigate the explanatory power of a frame-
work is to derive as many empirically observable implications or empirical
hypotheses from it as possible and to see whether these match the actual em-
pirical developments. Therefore, this chapter ends by developing 6 hypothe-
ses about variation in retrenchment across the selected cases.
Denmark and the Netherlands – a most similar systems design
Starting with the country level, the study is based on a most similar systems
design (Lijphart 1971; Frendreis 1983). This implies that the two ideal cases
for this study would be two countries representing the two different modes
of party competition discussed in chapter 3, while at the same time being
similar in all other relevant respects. The relevant respects with regard to
this study are the institutional and economic factors discussed in chapter 2.
Two such ideal countries do not exist. However, as will be argued below,
Denmark and the Netherlands are fairly close and have been investigated.
As will be further argued in chapters 6 and 7, the two countries exemplify
the two different modes of party competition. Denmark represents the bloc
type of party competition. It is either governed by social democratic govern-
ments, often including one or several small centre parties,1 or right-wing
governments, mostly involving both the two major right-wing parties, the
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Conservatives and the Liberals (Damgaard 1992). The Netherlands repre-
sents the pivotal type of party competition. The pivotal party is the Christ-
ian Democratic Party or cda.2 Until 1994, the party could usually choose to
govern with either the Social Democrats (pvda) or the Liberals (vvd) (An-
deweg & Irwin 1993; Keman 1996).3
As displayed in Table 1 below, Denmark was governed by 5 different gov-
ernments of right-wing parties from 1982 to 1993, but by social democrat-
ic-led governments from 1993 onwards. In the Netherlands (cf. table 2), the
cda governed with both the vvd, from 1982 to 1989, and with the pvda,
from 1989 to 1994.4 Thus, the composition of the government has varied in
both countries, providing additional cases for investigation of the empirical
support for the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3.
As regards to economic factors, Tables 3 to 8 provide a number of macro-
economic indicators for the two countries for the period investigated, 1982-
1998 as well as for the preceding years, 1973-1981.5 For both countries, the
period 1973 to 1981 was the end of the booming economy of the 1960’s.
Both countries experienced years of negative growth. Unemployment,
which was more or less non-existent in 1973, rose steadily causing rapid
growth in social-security expenditure. Inflation reached double figures and
budget surpluses disappeared. It seems that Denmark was hit the hardest.
On average, unemployment and inflation were higher in Denmark than in
the Netherlands and growth was lower. In addition, Denmark’s chronic,
current account deficit was further aggravated while the Netherlands, part-
ly due to its natural gas resources, had current account surpluses during
most of the years. Public deficits were, however, generally higher in the
Netherlands.
If we turn to the period studied, 1982-1998, the two countries have fared
somewhat similarly with regard to most of the macro-economic indicators
presented in Tables 3 to 8. Average growth and unemployment, when using
the standardised unemployment figures, were very similar. Furthermore,
both countries have continued to spend a large portion of their gdp on so-
cial security. Inflation has been slightly higher in Denmark than in the
Netherlands, but broad unemployment has been slightly higher in the
Netherlands6 and the same goes for public deficits. The major macro-eco-
nomic difference between the two countries was Denmark’s current ac-
count deficit in the 1980’s. The deficit was problematic because Denmark
had had a significant current account deficit since the beginning of the
1960’s (Hansen et al. 1994: 291). In 1982, Denmark had an external debt
equal to 32% of gdp (op. cit.; oecd, National Accounts). Altogether, in
terms of macro-economic troubles, the two countries can generally be con-
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sidered most similar cases. If the theoretical argument about the degree of
macro-economic difficulties were to predict any differences between the
two cases in terms of retrenchment, it would be that Denmark should have
experienced the most retrenchment because of its chronic current account
problem.
The macro-economic trajectories of the two countries from 1982 to 1998
have been quite similar as well. Both countries found themselves in dire eco-
nomic straits during the first half of the 1980’s. When excluding the current
account, the Danish economy recovered quite well in the mid-1980’s but
then experienced another recession until 1994. In the Netherlands, the
economy improved at a steadier rate during the last part of the 1980’s, but
then worsened again around 1992 and 1993. From 1994 and onwards, the
two countries have been macro-economic success stories. Growth has been
high, inflation low, public deficits have disappeared and unemployment has
declined steadily. It has become common to speak of both a Dutch (Visser &
Hemerijck 1997) and a Danish miracle (Schwartz 2001a; Green-Pedersen
2001a). The fact that both countries went through macro-economic ups
and downs during this period opens up the possibility of investigating the
theoretical argument about the effects of macro-economic difficulties over
time in both countries (cf. chapter 8).
The second group of economic arguments about retrenchment contains
arguments about the interplay between welfare states and different coun-
try’s political economies, and their labour markets in particular. Scholars
working along these lines (Iversen & Wren 1998; Huber & Stephens 2001b)
have clustered countries into groups fairly similar to Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) three welfare-state regimes. In the clustering of both Huber &
Stephens (op. cit.) and Iversen & Wren (op. cit.), Denmark is seen as an ex-
ample of a social democratic political economy, and the Netherlands as an
example of a Christian democratic political economy. Simply put, the dif-
ference between the two types of political economies is that the social demo-
cratic ones have aimed to maximize labour force participation for women,
and parallel to that have expanded publicly provided welfare-state services.
In contrast, Christian democratic political economies are to a large extent
based on a small and very productive male labour force. That these descrip-
tions also fit Denmark and the Netherlands is best observed by examining
women’s labour force participation. In 1983, the female labour force as a
percentage of females aged 15-64 was 39% in the Netherlands and 73% in
Denmark. In 1997, the figures were 62% in the Netherlands and 75% in
Denmark (Scharpf & Schmidt 2000b: table A.12).
As argued in chapter 2, what to expect in terms of retrenchment from the
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arguments about differences in political economies is not apparent. Howev-
er, there seems to be some agreement that the Christian democratic political
economies were facing the most severe economic problems due to their very
low levels of overall employment. To the extent that the solution to this
problem is retrenchment of social security, one should expect the most re-
trenchment in Christian democratic political economies, and hence more
retrenchment in the Netherlands than in Denmark. In this regard, the two
countries are not most similar cases.
The other major group of theoretical arguments about retrenchment iden-
tified in chapter 2 was institutional arguments, found in both a macro and a
micro version. As to the theoretical arguments about macro-institutions,
these were found in two subversions. Some focussed solely on formal insti-
tutions while others focussed on a broader range of macro-institutions.
With regard to the formal political structures, these are quite similar in the
two countries. Both countries are parliamentary systems with proportional
electoral systems and are unitary states. The only notable difference is
Dutch bicameralism. However, the Dutch First Chamber only plays a mar-
ginal role. The Second Chamber is ‘the real political arena’ (Andeweg & Ir-
win 1993: 139) and Dutch bicameralism can be ignored.7
Some of the arguments about macro-institutions took a broader focus by
referring to Lijphart’s (1999) idea of consensual vs. majoritarian democra-
cies. On both dimensions used by Lijphart (1999: 312-314), the two coun-
tries have quite similar scores and can also be considered most similar cases
in this regard (cf. also Lijphart 1999: chap. 14). Before concluding that the
two countries are also most similar cases with regard to macro-institutions
in general, one difference between them is important to note. As demon-
strated in Tables 1 and 2, the Netherlands has had majority governments
during the entire period studied here, mostly minimal winning coalitions,
whereas Denmark has had almost solely minority governments. In this re-
gard, the two cases are not most similar.
Turning to micro-institutions, the theoretical argument explained in
chapter 2 was that the programmatic structure of social-security schemes
would affect the extent of retrenchment. In addition, social-security
schemes in the same countries tend to share certain characteristics. Conse-
quently, it makes sense to discuss the institutional characteristics of entire
welfare states.
One attempt at measuring the institutional characteristics of different
welfare states is Esping-Andersen’s (1990) idea of three different welfare-
state regimes. Different welfare states are placed in the different regimes on
the basis of indices measuring two dimensions; namely the degree of de-
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commodification and the way in which social policy stratifies. In terms of
de-commodification, the Danish welfare state is ranked as the third most de-
commodifying among the 18 countries covered, while the Netherlands is
ranked fourth (op. cit.: 52). The way social policy stratifies is measured by
several indicators on the basis of which welfare states are clustered into
three groups corresponding to the three worlds of welfare capitalism (op.
cit.: 69-78). Both Denmark and the Netherlands are argued to belong to the
socialism (social democratic) cluster (op. cit.: 76).8 Altogether, Esping-An-
dersen’s analysis indicates that the institutional characteristics of the Dan-
ish and Dutch welfare states are not radically different (cf. also Goodin &
Smitsman 2000). Korpi & Palme (1998) also classify both welfare states as
basic security models. Finally, both countries have very comprehensive wel-
fare states in the sense that they spend a large portion of their gdp on social
security. As displayed in Tables 4 and 7, in 1982, Denmark spent 29.5% of
its gdp on social expenditure while the Netherlands spent 30%.9
However, upon closer inspection, there are differences in the program-
matic structures of social-security schemes in the two countries that must be
taken into account. Two differences are worth emphasizing; namely a dif-
ference in the way benefits are financed and in the role of social partners in
social-security organisation. In Denmark, social security is almost exclu-
sively financed from general taxation (cf. chap. 5). In the Netherlands, the
picture is more diversified.10 Dutch social-security schemes can be divided
into three types, which are financed in different ways; namely people’s/na-
tional insurance (volksverzekeringen), workers’ insurance (werknemers-
verzekeringen), and social provisions (sociale voorzieningen). Both the peo-
ple’s insurance and the workers’ insurance are financed mainly (cf. chapter
5) through social contributions. The contributions are paid into specific
funds covering the expenditure on the schemes and are generally regulated
to meet the expenditure. However, in the people’s insurance, everyone is au-
tomatically insured and pays a percentage of their income in general, not
just income from work, above a certain level and with a maximum amount.
Thus, in reality, the people’s insurance is financed through an earmarked in-
come tax. In the workers’ insurance, only people working are insured and
the contributions from employers and employees are calculated as a percent-
age of income from work. Social provisions are financed from general taxa-
tion. Altogether, social security in the Netherlands is financed from a mix-
ture of sources. Yet, it is important to note that contributions from employ-
ers are not as extensive in the Netherlands as in many other Continental Eu-
ropean countries (cf. oecd 1999: table A.4).
In the Netherlands, the social partners were closely involved in the admin-
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istration of the workers’ insurance. These schemes were administered by or-
ganisations at industry level controlled by representatives from Employers
Associations and Trade Unions. In Denmark, unemployment benefits (ar-
bejdsløshedsdagpenge) and early retirement benefits (efterløn) are adminis-
tered by unemployment funds with a close relationship with the trade
unions. Hence, social partners play a role in the administration of these
schemes. However, since all the other social-security schemes apart from
workers’ accident insurance are administered by central or local govern-
ment, social partners play a more limited role in Denmark than in the
Netherlands.
Altogether, despite the general similarities in the programmatic structures
of social-security schemes in the two countries, there are differences with re-
gard to the funding and involvement of social partners. These differences
are important because a number of the theoretical arguments about pro-
grammatic structures focus on exactly these two aspects. The argument was
that close involvement of the social partners would imply less retrenchment.
On this basis, one should expect the most retrenchment measures in Den-
mark. Based on the arguments about the effects of the financing of social se-
curity schemes, one should also expect more retrenchment in the Nether-
lands than in Denmark due to the importance of social contributions in the
Netherlands.
Other than the similarities relating to economics and institutions, Den-
mark and the Netherlands are similar with regard to public support for the
welfare state. Survey research in each of the two countries points to the pop-
ularity of the welfare state (on Denmark: Nannestad & Paldam 1993; An-
dersen 1999a; on the Netherlands: Bijlsma & Koopmans 1991; van
Oorschot 1997). In addition, Ferrera (1993) has conducted a study on atti-
tudes towards social security asking the same questions in the eu countries.
In this study, the Danes and Dutch gave almost identical answers to general
questions about support for social security (op. cit.: 5).
Summing up on the comparison, it should be emphasized that arguing that
these two countries can be used for a ‘most similar systems’ design does not
imply that they are similar in all respects. What they share are a number of
basic similarities. The most important ones relate to the macro-economic
difficulties they faced from 1982 to 1998, their formal political institutions,
and the institutional characteristics of their welfare states. At the same time,
they represent different types of party competition; a bloc system vs. a pivot
system. Upon closer examination, there will always be differences between
two countries. Governments in the Netherlands in the period studied were
all majority governments, whereas all Danish governments except one were
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minority governments. A great part of social security in the Netherlands is
financed through social contributions while almost all security schemes in
Denmark are financed through general taxation. Furthermore, social part-
ners played a greater role in the implementation of Dutch social security.
Also, the political-economic models in the two countries are different, sub-
stantiated by the different labour-force participation rates for women. As
theoretical arguments have been put forward explaining why such differ-
ences could lead to different degrees of retrenchment, there must be a fur-
ther discussion of the effects of these differences. This discussion is provided
in chapter 8.
The choice of social-security schemes
This study analyses old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, and disabili-
ty pensions/early retirement benefits. There are two considerations behind
the choice of these schemes. First, in order to carry out a general analysis of
the ‘politics’ surrounding welfare-state retrenchment in the two countries, a
focus on the most important social-security schemes is required. Second,
the schemes providing the best possibilities of investigating the explanatory
power of the theoretical framework put forward in chapter 3 and alterna-
tive theoretical propositions should be chosen.
The old-age pension schemes in the two countries, ‘folkepension’ in Den-
mark and ‘aow’ (algemene ouderdomswet) in the Netherlands, are the
most costly social-security schemes. Therefore, they are obvious candidates
for this study. In Denmark, the unemployment-benefit scheme (arbejds-
løshedsdagpenge) is the other scheme imposing great costs on the welfare
state, whereas the disability-pension schemes, wao (Wet op de arbeids-
ongeschiktheids-verzekering) and aaw (Algemene arbeidongeschiktheids-
wet), are central in the Netherlands. Thus, focussing on old-age pensions,
unemployment benefits and disability pensions offers good possibilities for
investigating politics in general in the two countries.
In addition, focussing on these three schemes provides opportunities for
investigating the explanatory power of the theoretical framework put for-
ward in chapter 3, since it predicts variation in the extent of retrenchment
across the three schemes. Also, as will be shown in chapter 8, choosing these
schemes also provides fairly good possibilities for empirical analyses of al-
ternative theoretical propositions about variation across social-security
schemes. Alternative theoretical propositions generally predict a different
pattern of variation across the three types of schemes from the one predicted
by the theoretical framework of this study.
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Before turning to the choice of time period, some delimitation problems
must be addressed. ‘Folkepension’ in Denmark and the ‘aow’ in the Nether-
lands are the only public pension schemes in the two countries.11 Thus, in-
vestigating these two schemes does not create any specific delimitation
problems.12 In relation to unemployment benefits, the most important de-
limitation is that social-assistance schemes covering unemployment are not
included as this would imply investigating social assistance in general, that
is adding a fourth type of social-security scheme to the study. In Denmark,
‘arbejdsløshedsdagpenge’ is studied. In the Netherlands, the two closely
connected unemployment-benefit schemes that existed in 1982, ww (werk-
loosheidswet) and wwv (wet werkloosheidsvoorziening) are studied. Final-
ly, concerning disability pensions, the two closely connected Dutch disabili-
ty schemes, wao and aaw, have been analysed together with ‘førtidspen-
sion’ in Denmark. However, as will be explained in chapter 5, the adminis-
tration of the Dutch disability-pension schemes was so lenient that they de
facto came to function as early-retirement schemes. Thus, simply compar-
ing the Dutch disability-pension schemes with the Danish disability-pen-
sion scheme would not be appropriate. Therefore, both the Danish disabili-
ty-pension scheme (førtidspension) and the Danish early-retirement scheme
(efterløn) have been analysed and compared to the Dutch disability-pension
schemes.
The choice of time period
The time period studied is 1982-1998. The reason for starting the investiga-
tion at the beginning of the 1980’s is that around this time when the effects
of the second oil crisis were visible, it was becoming clear to governments in
the Western World that the macro-economic difficulties they were facing
were not simply signs of a temporary crisis. The macro-economic difficul-
ties indicated that the economic order of the 1950’s and 1960’s was definite-
ly history. From an international perspective, the ‘embedded liberalism’ or-
der was disappearing (Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984). From a national per-
spective, the varieties of Keynesian compromises were becoming increasing-
ly vulnerable. This was clearly illustrated by the fate of the Keynesian policy
pursued by the new socialist government in France at the beginning of the
1980’s (Scharpf 1984). Expansion of the welfare state had been an integrat-
ed part of both Keynesianism and ‘embedded liberalism’. The emerging,
new economic environment necessitated an adaptation of the different
models of welfare capitalism bringing welfare-state retrenchment onto the
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Table 1 Governments in Denmark,1982-2002
Prime Minister Party composition Minority/Majority
1982-1984 Poul Schlüter Conservatives,Liberals,cd,and  Minority
(Conservative) Christian People’s Party
1984-1987 Poul Schlüter Conservatives,Liberals,cd,and Minority
(Conservative) Christian People’s Party
1987-1988 Poul Schlüter Conservatives,Liberals,cd,and Minority
(Conservative) Christian People’s Party
1988-1990 Poul Schlüter Conservatives,Liberals,and Minority
(Conservative) Social Liberals
1990-1993 Poul Schlüter Conservatives and Liberals Minority
(Conservative)
1993-1994 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen Social Democrats,Social Liberals, Majority
(Social Democrat) cd,and Christian People’s Party
1994-1998 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen Social Democrats,Social Liberals, Minority
(Social Democrat) and cd (stepped out in 1996)
1998-2001 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen Social Democrats and Minority
(Social Democrat) Social Liberals
Table 2 Governments in the Netherlands,1982-2002
Prime Minister Party composition Minority/Majority
1982-1986 Ruud Lubbers (cda) cda and vvd Majority
1986-1989 Ruud Lubbers (cda) cda and vvd Majority
1989-1994 Ruud Lubbers (cda) cda and pvda Majority
1994-1998 Wim Kok (pvda) pvda,vvd, and d66 Majority
1998-2002 Wim Kok (pvda) pvda,vvd, and d66 Majority
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Table 3 Macro-economic indicators for Denmark,1973-1981
Growth of Current Inflation General Unemploy- Social 
real GDP account (Change in government ment expenditure
(percent)* balance consumer financial (percent)* (as percentage
(percentage prices)* balances of GDP)#
of GDP)* (as percen-
tage of GDP)*
1973 3.6 -1.7 9.3 5.2 1
1974 -0.9 -3 15.3 3.1 2.3
1975 -0.7 -1.5 9.6 -1.4 5.3
1976 6.5 -4.8 9 -0.3 5.3
1977 1.6 -3.7 11.1 -0.6 6.4
1978 1.5 -2.5 10 -0.4 7.3
1979 3.5 -4.5 9.6 -1.7 6.2
1980 -0.4 -3.7 12.3 -3.3 7 29.1
1981 -0.9 -3.2 11.7 -6.9 9.2 29.4
Average 1.5 -3.2 10.9 -0.7 5.6
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook (various years)
# Source:oecd,National Accounts (various years),and oecd,Social Expenditure Data Base, 1980-1998
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Table 4 Macro-economic indicators for Denmark,1982-1998
Growth of Current Inflation General Social
real GDP account (Change in government expenditure
(percent)* balance consumer financial (as percentage
(as percentage prices)* balances of GDP)#
of GDP)* (as percentage
of GDP)*
1982 3 -3.9 10.1 -9.1 29.5
1983 2.5 -2.4 6.9 -7.2 29.9
1984 4.4 -3.1 6.3 -4.1 28.7
1985 4.3 -4.6 4.7 -2 27.9
1986 3.6 -5.3 3.7 3.4 27
1987 0.3 -2.9 4 2.4 27.8
1988 1.2 -1.4 4.5 0.5 29.2
1989 0.2 -1.3 4.8 -0.8 29.5
1990 1 0.9 2.6 -1.6 29.3
1991 1.1 1.4 2.4 -2.4 30.2
1992 0.6 2.6 2.1 -2.2 30.7
1993 0 3.3 1.3 -2.9 32.3
1994 5.5 1.8 2 -2.4 33.1
1995 2.8 1 2.1 -2.3 32.4
1996 2.5 1.8 2.1 -1 31.7
1997 3.1 0.6 2.2 0.1 30.7
1998 2.3 -1.2 1.8 0.9 29.8
Average 2.5 -0.7 3.7 -1.8 30
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook, (various years)
# Source:oecd,National Accounts (various years),and oecd,Social Expenditure Data Base, 1980-1998
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 53
54 research strategy and research design
Table 5 Unemployment indicators for Denmark,1982-1998
Unemploy- Standardised Broad Unemployment
ment unemploy- (percentage of broad 
(percent)* ment labour force receiving
(percent)* social-security benefits1,
18-66 years old)#
1982 9.7 8.4
1983 10.3 9
1984 9.9 8.5 20
1985 8.9 7.1 19.1
1986 7.7 5.4 18.2
1987 7.7 5.4 18.7
1988 8.4 6 19.6
1989 9.2 7.3 20.6
1990 9.4 7.7 20.7
1991 10.3 8.4 21.9
1992 11 9.2 22.7
1993 12.1 10.1 24
1994 12 8.2 26
1995 10.2 7.2 25.6
1996 8.7 6.8 25
1997 7.7 5.6 24.1
1998 6.4 5.2 23.3
Average 9.4 7.4 22
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook, (various years)
# Source:Danmarks Statistik,Statistisk tiårsoversigt (1999;2000)
1 See note 6 for additional information
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Table 6 Macro-economic indicators for the Netherlands,1973-1981
Growth of Current Inflation General Unemploy- Social
real GDP account (Change in government ment expenditure
(percent)* balance consumer financial (percent)* (as percentage
(percentage prices)* balances of GDP)#
of GDP)* (as percentage
of GDP)*
1973 4.7 3.8 8 0.9 1.4
1974 4 4.1 9.6 -0.2 1.7
1975 -0.1 2.7 10.2 -2.8 3.3
1976 4.8 3.6 8.8 -2.6 3.5
1977 2.6 1.1 6.4 -1.8 3.4
1978 2.4 -0.9 4.1 -2.7 3.4
1979 2.3 0.1 4.2 -3.7 3.5
1980 0.9 -0.6 6.5 -4 4.1 27.4
1981 -0.7 2.5 6.7 -5.5 6.3 28.4
Average 2.3 1.8 7.2 -2.5 3.4
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook, (various years)
# Source:oecd,National Accounts (various years),and oecd,Social Expenditure Data Base, 1980-1998
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Table 7 Macro-economic indicators for the Netherlands,1982-1998
Growth of Current Inflation General Social 
real GDP account (Change in government expenditure
(percent)* balance consumer financial (as percentage
(percentage prices)* balances of GDP)#
of GDP)* (as percentage
of GDP)*
1982 -1.2 3.4 5.9 -7.1 30
1983 1.7 3.5 2.7 -6.4 30.3
1984 3.3 4.8 3.3 -6.3 29.1
1985 3.1 3.2 2.3 -4.8 27.6
1986 2.8 2.4 0.1 -6.1 27.2
1987 1.4 1.9 -0.7 -6.5 27.5
1988 2.6 2.9 0.7 -5.1 27.1
1989 4.7 4.2 1.1 -5.3 26.5
1990 4.1 3.1 2.5 -3.2 28
1991 2.3 2.6 3.2 -4.4 28.1
1992 2 2.2 3.2 -3.6 28.6
1993 0.8 4.2 2.6 -4.2 28.8
1994 3.2 5.1 2.8 -4.2 27.1
1995 2.3 5.8 1.9 -1.8 25.9
1996 3 5.4 2 -1.2 25.3
1997 3.8 7.5 2.2 -0.8 24.9
1998 3.7 5.5 2 0.5 23.8
Average 2.6 4 2.2 -4.1 27.4
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook (various years)
# Source:oecd,National Accounts (various years),and oecd,Social Expenditure Data Base, 1980-1998
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Table 8 Unemployment indicators for the Netherlands,1982-1998
Unemploy- Standardised Broad Unemployment
ment unemploy- (percentage of broad 
(percent)* ment labour force receiving
(percent)* social-security
benefits1, 15-64 years old)#
1982 8.5 8.1 24.1
1983 11 9.7 25.6
1984 10.6 9.3 26.4
1985 9.2 8.3 25.3
1986 8.4 8.3 24.5
1987 8 8.1 23.8
1988 7.7 7.6 23.4
1989 6.9 6.9 23.4
1990 6 6.2 23.1
1991 5.4 5.8 23.1
1992 5.4 5.6 23.2
1993 6.6 6.6 23.6
1994 7.6 7.1 24.2
1995 7.1 6.9 23.7
1996 6.6 6.3 23.8
1997 5.5 5.2 22.8
1998 4.2 4 21.8
Average 7.3 7.1 23.9
* Source:oecd,Economic Outlook (various years)
# Source:Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau,Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport (1998)
1 See note 6 for additional information
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agenda of the rich oecd countries (cf. Scharpf 2000c). The oecd (1981)
now declared the welfare state in crisis, marking the end of its Golden Age.
As illustrated in Tables 3 to 8, Denmark and the Netherlands also found
themselves in dire economic straits at the beginning of the 1980’s, forecast-
ing new policy measures. The new times were clearly indicated by the new
governments taking office in the autumn of 1982; the first Lubbers govern-
ment in the Netherlands and the first Schlüter government in Denmark.
Therefore, the autumn of 1982 is an obvious starting point for this study,
covering the period until 1998.
The next step is then to develop a number of hypotheses about variation in
the extent of retrenchment across the selected case. It is, however, necessary
to discuss the definition and measurement of the dependent variable, i.e. re-
trenchment, further and in advance.
Definition and measurement of retrenchment
The definition and measurement of retrenchment are problems haunting
much of the work within this field. In the wake of Pierson’s seminal work on
welfare-state retrenchment, a separate ‘dependent variable debate’ has thus
emerged (Pierson 1994; 1996; 2001(a); Alber 1996; Clayton & Pontusson
1998; Lindbom 2001; van der Veen, Trommel & de Vroom 1999; Kitschelt
2001; Green-Pedersen 2002a).
As a starting point, it is important to keep one thing in mind: the questions
about conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent variable are
necessarily closely connected to the theoretical approach as well as to the re-
search question (King, Keohane & Verba 1994: 55-63; Peters 1998: 218-
219). There is no such thing as retrenchment per se. Therefore, the follow-
ing first outlines the theoretical definition of retrenchment and then goes on
to the operational definition.13
A theoretical definition of retrenchment
In this study, retrenchment of a certain social-security scheme has been de-
fined as a change in the scheme making it less attractive to the (potential)
claimants. The ‘attractiveness’ of social-security schemes includes two di-
mensions, the quality of the benefits and the criteria that have to be fulfilled
to ensure eligibility for benefits. For example, the quality of the benefits im-
plies the amount of money you receive and the duration of the period in
which you are entitled to benefits. Retrenchment is any change in social-se-
curity schemes affecting one of these two aspects negatively. It is another
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word for cutting back, scaling down, or curtailing benefits. Hence, exam-
ples of changes considered as retrenchment in this study are lowering bene-
fits, tightening eligibility, shortening duration, etc.
The choice of this fairly narrow definition is based on the theoretical per-
spective of this study as outlined in chapter 3. Theoretically, the focus in this
study is on the interplay between political parties and the electorate, or, to
use Rokkan’s terminology (1966), on the ‘electoral channels of politics’.
One of the premises of this focus is that the electorate actually pays atten-
tion to the changes in social security and, if they have the character of re-
trenchments, dislikes them, although the government is not necessarily
punished. This premise seems fulfilled once the focus is on changes to social-
security schemes that affect their ‘attractiveness’, as defined above. Such
changes have an obvious positive or negative effect on the claimants.
If the focus of the study had been broadened by choosing a more encom-
passing definition of retrenchment, it would be an open question whether
this premise was fulfilled. For example, it is not apparent that the electorate
would care about changes to the organisational structure of social security if
the changes had no impact on ‘attractiveness’. In contrast, organised inter-
ests such a trade unions would care very much if, for instance, the govern-
ment would try to take the administration of a certain social security away
from them, regardless of the impact on ‘attractiveness’. Thus, to explain this
type of changes to social security, a different theoretical perspective would
probably be needed. Instead of focussing on the interplay between political
parties and the electorate, this perspective would probably have to focus on
the power of different organised interests and their negotiations with the
government.
Therefore, one must distinguish between retrenchments as defined here
and what could be labelled ‘restructuring reforms’. Examples of such re-
forms are:
1 Reforms aiming to change the content of social-security schemes such as
the introduction of active labour market policies. This change may con-
tain elements of retrenchment that must be included in this study (see be-
low). However, the main aim of these reforms is not to curtail benefits, but
rather to add an element of education or activation (cf. Clasen 2000).
2 Reforms aiming to change the organisation and financing of social-securi-
ty schemes, for instance privatisation. If such changes imply retrenchment
in line with the above definition, they should be included in this study.
However, a change in the organisational structure and financing alone will
not be considered retrenchment. The reason is that it is unclear whether
such changes of social-security schemes affect their attractiveness.
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An operational definition of retrenchment
The next step is to provide an operational definition of retrenchment. An ad-
ditional reason for choosing the fairly narrow definition of retrenchment
outlined above is that it makes the operationalisation more manageable. As
Alber (1996: 7-13) points out, the lurking danger is to end up with only very
imprecise measurements such as ‘substantial’, ‘less than one might expect’,
‘extensive’, etc. There would be no guarantee that the measurements would
be reproducible and this would seriously bring the whole study into ques-
tion.
Basically, there are two ways of meeting these requirements; namely a
macro-level and a micro-level approach (cf. Kitschelt 2001). A macro-level
approach implies the use of aggregate social-security expenditure data, per-
haps disaggregated to the level of individual social-security schemes. Such
an approach is widespread within welfare-state research. Yet, it poses a
problem since changes in social-security expenditure are not necessarily due
to changes in legislation. For instance, changes in the unemployment rate
automatically affect social-security expenditure as more or fewer people
claim benefits. In addition, the effects of many changes in social-security
schemes only gradually manifest in social-security expenditure. For in-
stance, the full effects of a number of the changes in social-security schemes
that will be discussed in chapter 5 will only be visible in social-security ex-
penditure in 10 to 20 years. Therefore, a micro-level approach will be ap-
plied in this study. It consists of providing a measurement of the effects of
each change in social-security legislation. The question then is which mi-
cro-level measure to apply.
In this study, the extent of retrenchment following a specific change in a
social-security scheme has been measured by its budgetary implications.
More specifically, the likely budgetary savings as a percentage of the total
expenditure on the scheme have been calculated and used as the basic mea-
sure of retrenchment. This operational definition should provide the neces-
sary kind of reproducible and quantitative retrenchment indicators without
implying the same problems as a macro-level approach. It also provides a
common yardstick for comparing very different changes in very different
social-security schemes. For instance, tightened eligibility criteria of the
Dutch unemployment-insurance scheme have been compared to a freeze of
the benefits of the Danish early-retirement scheme. Budgetary implications
seem to be the only type of measure allowing the comparison of such rather
different changes. Some elaborating comments on this operational defini-
tion are warranted.
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First of all, it should be stressed that the aim is to explain the political deci-
sions concerning retrenchment. As these are based on the likely budgetary
consequences of the changes, they are of principal interest. However, deter-
mining the likely budgetary implications of specific changes in social-secu-
rity schemes is not always an easy task and may involve great uncertainties.
In order to ensure as valid estimations as possible, two measures have there-
fore been used. Apart from the principal measurement defined above, the
outcome of the decisions in the sense of the actual spending consequences of
changes has been studied as well. Due to changes in factors such as the level
of unemployment, the level of inflation, or implementation problems, the
amount of cash actually saved may differ significantly from the likely out-
come as seen from the time when the changes were passed. However, by cor-
recting the figures for changes in, for instance, the level of inflation and the
level of unemployment, the worst of these problems are hopefully avoided.
As the expected savings are the principal interest, the actual savings are the
less important of the two measures. It has been included as a way of ensur-
ing that the former measure does not entail serious misjudgments of the
budgetary consequences.
Needless to say, even the combination of two measures does not take away
all uncertainties about the budgetary implications of changes in social-secu-
rity schemes. Therefore, the results must be interpreted cautiously and con-
clusions should not be based on minor differences in the extent of retrench-
ment. These may simply be due to measurement errors. Thus, the figures
will be interpreted on an ordinal level. If significant differences in retrench-
ment are found, conclusions about the extent of retrenchment can be
drawn. Conclusions on an interval scale will not be drawn. Due to the un-
certainties involved, the figures can say something about the magnitude of
retrenchment implied by a certain change, but they cannot give a very pre-
cise measure. Furthermore, when comparing figures for the expected and
actual budgetary effects, an identical result is unrealistic in light of the mea-
surement uncertainties involved. This operational definition, of course,
raises a number of questions about delimitation, which figures to use, etc.
Appendix 1 discusses a number of these questions and provides two exam-
ples of the calculations.
A further caveat against the operational definition is that it has difficulties
handling indirect retrenchments, i.e. retrenchments working over very long
periods or in a very indirect way. Following the idea of blame-avoidance
strategies, implementing retrenchment working indirectly and/or over long
periods would be attractive for governments (cf. also Bonoli & Palier 1998;
Taylor-Gooby 1999). Two things will be done to address this point of criti-
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cism. First, as explained in appendix 1, the focus will be on the budgetary
implications of fully implemented changes. At least in some situations, this
should make it possible to measure gradually implemented retrenchments.
Second, when going through changes in the social-security schemes, major
changes in rules that do not directly regulate the attractiveness of schemes
will receive attention as well. In other words, in relation to each scheme,
there will be an examination into whether or not restructuring reforms
have taken place with indirect retrenchment effects modifying the conclu-
sions drawn from examining retrenchment in accordance with the above
outline.
Summing up, each social-security scheme has been investigated as fol-
lows. All legislative changes have been recorded and, whenever possible,
likely and actual budgetary implications have been measured in accordance
with the operational definition. On the basis of these figures, a conclusion
about the magnitude of retrenchment in each scheme will be drawn. Finally,
there will be a discussion of possible retrenchment effects of restructuring
reforms. The results of this will be presented in the next chapter.
Some hypotheses
After having discussed the definition and measurement of retrenchment,
the rest of the chapter is devoted to presenting the hypotheses about the cas-
es derived from the theoretical framework put forward in chapter 3. First of
all, the framework predicts that sweeping retrenchment will not have taken
place in either of the two cases.14 Further, the framework predicts that more
retrenchment will have taken place in the Netherlands than in Denmark.
The reason is the different systems of party competition. In a bloc system
like the Danish one, retrenchment is expected only when the left-wing bloc
governs. As the right-wing bloc governed Denmark in the main part of the
period studied (1982-1993), little retrenchment is predicted to have taken
place. In contrast, pivot systems are expected to be conducive to retrench-
ment, paving the way for a larger scale of retrenchment in the Netherlands.
If the focus is on Denmark exclusively, the framework predicts more re-
trenchment to have taken place from 1993 to 1998, the period of left-wing
rule, than during the preceding period of right-wing rule. When concentrat-
ing only on the Netherlands, the framework predicts that more retrench-
ment will have taken place from 1989 to 1994, when the cda governed with
the pvda, than from 1982-1989, when the cda governed with the vvd. The
reason is that the cda-pvda government did not have any major opponents
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to the left. The ‘purple governments’ from 1994 and beyond represent
somewhat of a problem for the framework, as they constitute a break with
the pivotal position of the cda in Dutch politics. The hypothesis that can be
derived from the framework is that less retrenchment will have taken place
after 1994 than under cda-pvda rule, but more than under cda-vvd rule.
The reason is that the ‘purple governments’ have faced an opposition party,
the cda, which with some credibility could argue that the purple govern-
ments were attacking the welfare state per se. Yet, due to the participation
of the pvda, the purple governments have been in a much more favourable
position than the cda-vvd governments.
Turning to variation across social-security schemes, the framework would
predict schemes with strong labour market connection to be retrenched
more than schemes with limited labour market connection. In Denmark, the
old-age pension and the disability-pension schemes can be argued to have
limited labour market connection. Old-age and disabled persons are not ex-
pected to be part of the labour market. Unemployment benefits and early re-
tirement benefits are, on the other hand, closely connected to the labour
market. The claimants in both schemes could just as well be working.
Therefore, these two schemes are expected to suffer the most retrenchment.
In the Netherlands, unemployment benefits are expected to suffer more re-
trenchment than the old age and the disability pensions. Table 9 provides a
survey of the hypotheses concerning the cases derived from the theoretical
framework.
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Table 9 Hypotheses concerning (variation) in retrenchment in Denmark and the Nether-
lands,1982-1998
No ‘sweeping’retrenchment
More retrenchment in the Netherlands than in Denmark
More retrenchment in Denmark from 1993 to 1998 than from 1982 to 1993
More retrenchment in the Netherlands from 1989 to 1994 than from 1994 to 1998 and more
from 1994 to 1998 than from 1982 to 1989
More retrenchment in the Netherlands of unemployment benefits than of disability pension
and old-age pension
More retrenchment in Denmark of unemployment benefits and early retirement benefits
than of disability pension and old-age pension
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5 Retrenchments in Denmark and the Netherlands
This chapter first reports the results of the investigation of the extent of re-
trenchment in each of the selected social-security schemes carried out as de-
scribed in chapter 4 and appendix 1. The discussion of each scheme is divid-
ed into two parts. First, there will be a short description of the scheme as of
1982. Second, there will be an analysis of developments in the scheme from
1982 to 1998, based on the reported calculations of expected and actual
savings.1 These are reported in tables.2 The chapter then summarises the
findings of variation in retrenchment,3 and compares them with the hy-
potheses developed in chapter 4 to see to what extent the theoretical frame-
work developed in chapter 3 has been capable of predicting the actual varia-
tion in retrenchment.
Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands
The Danish old-age pension
The Danish old-age pension, ‘folkepension’, was4 a pension for all citizens
aged 67 or more with two types of benefits.5 A basic amount paid to every-
one regardless of other income and an income-tested pension supplement. In
1982, 49% of all pensioners received the full supplement, 19% part of it,
and 32% no supplement at all (Danmarks Statistik, Statistiske efterret-
ninger afdeling A 1982: 1282-1283). Compared to the basic amount, the
supplement was of limited importance, as the maximum supplement in
1982 amounted to only 18% of the basic amount.6 Benefits could also be
awarded to persons under the age of 67 in two cases. First, single females
aged 62-67 were entitled to a pension. Second, if special, social or medical
conditions were present, a pension could be awarded to people aged 55-67.
In both cases, the basic amount and the pension supplement were subject to
an income test. Benefits were taxable as any other income, but single pen-
sioners were entitled to an enhanced personal tax-exemption. Thus, single
pensioners living from only the national pension paid no income tax. Bene-
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fits were linked to the development in prices and tax financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis.
Development of the Danish old-age pension from 1982 to 1998
Table 10 provides an overview of changes in the Danish old-age pension
from 1982 to 1998 and their budgetary implications, if measurable. The
main conclusion from Table 10 is that the Danish old-age pension has not
been retrenched. Actually, it has been expanded. From 1986 to 1990, bene-
fits were raised in general and the income testing of the pension supplement
eased. The changes in the structure of benefits when the special tax-exemp-
tion for single pensioners was abolished implied a minor retrenchment, but
taken together, all the changes equal an expansion of 10.4%.7 Furthermore,
benefits have been tied to the development in wages instead of prices, a
change that will imply expansion in the long run. Finally, all possibilities of
receiving pensions before the age of 67 were transferred to the new disabili-
ty-pension scheme as of 1984, and the pension age was lowered to 65 in
1999.8
The issue then is if the scheme has been subject to restructuring reforms
indirectly implying retrenchment. The basic structure of the scheme has
been unchanged within the period. The scheme is still a tax-financed pay-as-
you-go scheme. Still, one change warrants attention in this connection.
As mentioned above, the benefit structure was changed when the special
tax-exemption for single pensioners was abolished. In the short-run, the
budgetary consequence was a small retrenchment. This retrenchment was
the result of enhanced importance of income testing within the scheme, as
the importance of the income-tested pension supplement relative to the ba-
sic amount was raised quite considerably. Thus, the pension supplement as
a percentage of the basic amount increased from 26% in 1993 to 44% in
1994. When the special-pension supplement, which temporarily compen-
sated single pensioners for the loss of the special tax-exemption, had been
fully transferred to the normal-pension supplement in 1999, the basic
amount and pension supplement were almost identical for single pension-
ers. Once the number of pensioners with additional pensions rises, it will
have retrenchment effects.9 For instance, if the calculations made in relation
to the changes (see Green-Pedersen 2000: 210-212) are redone with 50% of
all pensioners being entitled to the full supplement, 20% to half of it, and
30% to no pension supplement, the retrenchment increases from 0.8% of
the total expenditure in 1993 to 5.2%. Thus, this change will imply re-
trenchment in the long run, but exactly how much will depend on the in-
come-situation of the future pensioners.
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Table 10 Changes in the Danish old-age pension,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 136,137 June January All possibilities of receiving
1982-1983 1983 1984 a pension for people under 
67 were transferred to the 
new disability-pension
scheme1
L 119 June January
1986-1987 1987 1988 Income testing of pension  +22.1% +3.0%
supplement was eased (covers part
of L 168 as 
well)
L 218 April April Pension supplement +1.1%
1986-1987 1987 1987 increased
L 168 March July All benefit levels were +6.4% +6.2%
1987-1988 1988 1988 increased and the easing (covers only
of the income testing of parts of the 
the pension supplement law)
was hastened and followed 
by a further ease
L 223 June January Benefits were tied to No measurable
1989-1990 1990 1991 the development in real budgetary
wages implications,
but expansion in 
the long-run
L 224 June January The basic amount was +1.6%
1989-1990 1990 1991 raised for most married
pensioners
L 314 May January Conversion of benefits for -0.8% +1.3%
1993-1994 1993 1994 single pensioners into 
taxable income.
Improvements of the 
pension supplement.
Cutback of the basic amount
L 175 April July Pension age lowered from
1998-1999 1999 1999 67 to 65 years3
Total +10.4%
1 Analysed in connection with the Danish disability-pension scheme.
2 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment.
3 Analysed in connection with the Danish early-retirement benefits scheme.
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Summing up, the general picture of the Danish national pension is still one
of expansion, although the expansion seems less once the long-term conse-
quences of the changes in 1993 are taken into account.
The Dutch old-age pension
In the Dutch old-age pension, aow, everyone was entitled to a pension from
the age of 65.10 Benefits were flat rate and not related to other income. On
the other hand, they depended on matrimonial status and were related to the
net minimum wage as follows. A married couple was entitled to 100% of
the net minimum wage and a single pensioner to 70%. In general, married
women had no personal right to a pension. Whether a married couple was
entitled to a pension depended on the age of the husband. However, if the
wife reached the age of 65 before her husband, she was entitled to the pen-
sion for married couples in certain cases.
The net value of benefits was linked to the development of the net mini-
mum wage, that is the gross minimum wage minus income taxes and social
contributions. The gross minimum wage was linked to the development of
wages (index regelingslonen), so benefits would be affected by development
in wages. Benefits were indexed twice a year (cf. Vording 1993: 14-28). In
principle, benefits were taxable income, yet special rules implied that old-
age pensioners paid limited income tax and social contributions from the
aow. The scheme was a peoples’ insurance scheme (cf. chapter 4) adminis-
tered by the Social Insurance Bank (svb) and mainly financed from a de fac-
to earmarked income tax. Yet, the state, that is general taxation, supported
the scheme with minor contributions. In 1982, this amounted to 4.2% of
the total expenditure (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, Statistisch Jaar-
boek 1984: 328-329).
Development of the Dutch old-age pension from 1982 to 1998
Table 11 gives an overview of the legislative changes in the Dutch old-age
pension from 1982 to 1998. The general picture emerging is one of some-
what retrenchment of the scheme. This is primarily the result of limited in-
dexation of benefits from 1982 to 198411 and from 1993 to 1995. Still, the
abolishment of the special supplement for pensioners with a partner
younger than 65 contributes as well.
Apart from the changes reported in Table 11, a number of minor changes
have taken place in relation to the special supplement for pensioners with a
partner younger than 65. This supplement was introduced in 1985 when the
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Table 11 Changes in the Dutch old-age pension,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 749, December January Indexation of benefits -16.6%2
1982 1982 1983 limited to 1% in 1983
L 674, December January Benefits frozen for 1984 -2.7%
1983 1983 1984
L 652, December January Benefits frozen for 1985 -1.5%
1984 1984 1985
L 627, December January Benefits frozen for 1988 +1%
1987 1987 1988
L 625, December January Benefits frozen for 1989 +2.3%
1988 1988 1989
L 624, November December New indexation rules No direct budgetary 
1991 1991 1991 implications
Freeze of Benefits frozen for 1993 -1.6%
social security 
benefits for
19933
Freeze of Benefits frozen for 1994 -1.9%
social security 
benefits for 
19943
Freeze of Benefits frozen for 1995 -1%
social security
benefits for 
19953
L 696, December January The special supplement -5.4% Not yet
1995 1995 1996/97 for pensioners with a  measurable 
partner younger than 65
abolished 
Total -17.4%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment
2 Due to the way benefits were indexed,providing measures for actual budgetary implications of the
freezes is impossible (see Green-Pedersen 2000:213-216)
3 The decision was taken in the autumn of the preceding year
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scheme was ‘individualized.’12 Each married person became entitled to a
pension equal to 50% of the net minimum wage. The special supplement,
equal to 50% of the net minimum wage, was then introduced for pensioners
married to a person younger than 65 with no right to his/her own pension.
In the case where the man was older than his wife, this had no material con-
sequences compared to before. However, a number of couples where the
wife was older than her husband now became entitled to a pension. To re-
duce the expenditure, the government gradually introduced income testing
on the supplement. In the following years, the rules concerning this supple-
ment were changed a number of times until it was finally abolished in 1995.
Before concluding that a retrenchment of 17.4% has taken place in rela-
tion to the Dutch old-age pension, it must be investigated whether any re-
structuring reforms have taken place. The basic principles of the Dutch old-
age pension scheme have remained unchanged. It is still a pay-as-you-go
scheme. The financing changed within the period as the government with-
drew its support for the scheme. However, the government has recently de-
cided to support the scheme again. A new law concerning the financing of
the peoples’ insurance was passed in 1998. The law placed a maximum on
the contributions to the scheme and left the rest of the expenditure for the
government. To meet some of these expenditures, the government is creat-
ing a special fund. The estimation in the law was that when the expenditure
on the pension peaks in 2040, the government will pay approximately 31%
of the total expenditure (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1997-1998:
25699, nr. 3, 11, cf. also van Oorschot & Boos 1999). The question is
whether this will indirectly affect the scheme. For two reasons, this is un-
likely. First, the major part of the expenditure will still be paid by contribu-
tions. Second, as will be argued in chapter 8, different ways of financing so-
cial-security schemes do not seem to have much effect on their vulnerability
to retrenchment measures.
The Danish unemployment-benefit scheme
The Danish unemployment-benefit scheme was a voluntary insurance
scheme administered by the unemployment funds.13 As mentioned in chap-
ter 4, these funds were independent organisations with close links to the
trade unions. In 1982, 66.6% of the labour force was insured (Danmarks
Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1991).
Membership in itself was not sufficient to be eligible for benefits in the
case of unemployment. One year of membership plus 26 weeks of work
within the last three years were required. The unemployed person had to
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register at the employment service, be willing to accept a job when offered
one, and be actively seeking a job. Whether these requirements were met,
was decided by the unemployment funds.
Benefits were in principle equal to 90% of the former wage, but a maxi-
mum rate existed. In 1982, 35% of all claimants received the maximum
rate. Most of the remainder received an amount just below this. Thus, aver-
age benefits were equal to 89% of the maximum benefits in 1982 (Direk-
toratet for Arbejdsløshedsforsikring 1983). All benefits were taxed in the
same way as earnings from work and were linked to the development in real
wages.
An unemployed person was entitled to benefits as long as he or she, before
each monthly payment, fulfilled the requirement of 26 weeks of work with-
in the last three years. This rule implied that the unemployed would lose
their right to benefits after approximately two and a half years. However, in
reality, benefits were continuous due to a law passed in 1978 (Lov om ar-
bejdstilbud til ledige) that entitled the unemployed to a job offer lasting at
least 26 weeks in due time before losing their right to benefits.
The scheme was financed by three sources: General taxation, employer
contributions, and member contributions.14 Each member paid a tax-de-
ductible premium plus an amount to cover the administration expenditure
of the funds, and the employers paid a contribution for each employee. The
government, that is general taxation, paid the expenditure exceeding the
revenues from the two types of contributions and thus carried the marginal
burden. It also paid the major part of the expenditure. In 1982, 86% of the
total expenditure on unemployment benefits and early-retirement benefits
was paid by the government (Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt
1991; Danmarks Statistik, Skatter og afgifter: Oversigt 1992).
Development of the Danish unemployment benefits from 
1982 to 1998
Table 12 gives an overview of the legislative changes in the Danish unem-
ployment-benefit scheme from 1982 to 1998. The general picture emerging
from Table 12 is one of significant retrenchment. The freeze of benefits from
1982 to 1986 had significant effects, even if it was somewhat modified by
the raising of maximum benefits in 1987. The limitation in the duration of
benefits and introduction of extended benefits in 1985 also implied re-
trenchment, but was given up in 1988 before having real effects. In the
1990’s, eligibility criteria were tightened from 26 to 52 weeks of work with-
in the last three years, the duration of benefits was reduced to 4 years, and
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Table 12 Changes in Danish unemployment benefits,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 10/11 October January Full or partial freeze of -118.8% -18.4%
1982-1983 1982 1983 benefit levels for 21⁄2 years
L 165 May October Freeze of the maximum -2.8% Not
1983-1984 1984 1985 level of benefits for one year measurable
L 109/110 June July De facto shortening of -2.3% Not
1984-1985 1985 1985 duration of benefits and measurable
introduction of extended
benefits
L 160/161 March July Maximum benefits +7.1 +5.3
1987-1988 1988 1988 increased.Rules concer- 
January ning extended benefits
1989 given up
L 223 June Januari Benefits tied to the No direct
1989-1990 1990 1991 development in real budgetary 
wages implications
L 272-275 June January Labour market reform No direct
1992-1993 1993 1994 budgetary 
implications
L 14-15 December January Cuts in benefits for -9% Not
1995-1996 1995 1996 young people with no measurable
January qualifying education 
1997 after six months of 
unemployment.
Duration of benefits 
shortened to five years.
Eligibility rules tightened
L 32
1998-1999 December January Duration limited to four -4.2% Not
1998 1999 years,and rules tightened measurable 
for unemployed over 50
Total -30%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment
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benefits for younger unemployed persons were cut. After the freezing of
benefits from 1982 to 1986, benefits were indexed by parliament on a year-
to-year basis until 1990 when they were tied to real wages again.
The next question then is whether any restructuring reforms that may in-
directly lead to retrenchment have been implemented. The organisational
structure of the scheme has basically remained unchanged (cf. Nørgaard
1997: 271-337). Regarding the financing of the scheme, the general picture
is also one of continuity. The government, that is general taxation, still pays
most of the expenditure and carries the marginal burden. Member contribu-
tions were raised somewhat in 1982 and the following years, but still remain
fairly limited. The contributions from employers were abolished in 1988,
but they were forced to pay for the first two days of unemployment in the
following years.
Finally, Danish labour-market policy has changed. Starting in the 1980’s
(Jensen et al. 1991) and most pronounced with the labour-market reform in
1993, Danish labour-market policy has become more active. This implies a
stronger focus on upgrading and improving skills, on individual plans for
training and education, establishment of subsidised jobs, introduction of
leave arrangements, etc. (Cox 1998; Etherington 1998; Jensen 1999). The
question is whether some of these changes imply retrenchment. As partici-
pation in the various activation measures is mandatory to acquire eligibility
for benefits, one could argue that some of these measures make unemploy-
ment benefits less attractive. The new labour-market policy contains a
stronger focus on the requirement of being willing to accept a job. Yet, it is
also an offensive policy aiming to improve the skills of the work force (cf.
Etherington 1998; Jensen 1999). Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that
certain demands on the claimants of unemployment benefits, for instance,
the requirement of being at the disposal of the labour market, have always
existed (Nørgaard 1999). The long duration of unemployment benefits in-
troduced in 1978 was also based on the acceptance of job offers.
Altogether, a number of restructuring reforms of the Danish unemploy-
ment-benefits scheme have been implemented, but there is no indication that
any of the reforms will have significant retrenchment effects and thus will
disturb the conclusion about significant retrenchment.
The Dutch unemployment-benefit scheme(s)
In 1982, the Netherlands had two schemes covering the risk of unemploy-
ment. The ww and the wwv.15 The ww was a workers’ insurance and the
wwv a social provision. 
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To be eligible for ww, 130 days of work within the last year was required.
Furthermore, the unemployed were required to register at the labour ex-
change, be willing to accept suitable work, and be actively seeking work.
ww benefits were equal to 80% of the former wage with a fairly high maxi-
mum. The duration of ww was 26 weeks. The wwv was basically an exten-
sion of the ww. However, benefits were lower; namely 75% of the former
wage, also with a fairly high maximum. The duration of the wwv was two
years. Both benefits from the ww and from the wwv were taxable income in
the same way as income from work. The wwv benefits were indexed twice a
year on the basis of the changes in wages (cf. Vording 1993: 14-28).
Development of the Dutch unemployment-benefit scheme(s), from 1982
to 1998
Table 13 reports the legislative changes in the Dutch unemployment-benefit
scheme(s) from 1982 to 1998. The picture emerging from Table 13 is one of
significant retrenchment. The level of benefits has been reduced significantly
as a result of the freezing of benefits from 1982 to 1987 and 1993 to 1995
and as a result, the reduction of the level of benefits from 80/75% of former
wage to 70%.16 Eligibility has also been tightened, especially as a result of L
955. In relation to the duration, the picture is mixed. For the young unem-
ployed, the duration has been shortened significantly, whereas for older un-
employed, there has been an expansion.
Looking at the institutional arrangement of the scheme, there are several
important changes. The merging of the ww and wwv implied that unem-
ployment benefits were now fully financed by contributions from employers
and employees. In other words, the tax financing was removed. However, it
is difficult to determine whether this change would imply more or less re-
trenchment. As will be argued in chapter 8, there is no clear indication that
the way of financing social-security schemes affects their vulnerability to re-
trenchment.
The changes in the administrative structure of the schemes are more inter-
esting (cf. Teulings, van der Veen & Trommel 1997; Bannink 1999; van der
Veen & Trommel 1999): In 1994, a new organisational act abolished the
svr, a body with representatives from trade unions and employer organisa-
tions and independent members appointed by the government surveying the
work of the Industrial Insurance Organisations. After some intermediate
arrangements, the coordinating functions were transferred to the lisv
(Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen). This institution has a tripartite
structure with an independent chairman. The supervisory tasks of the svr
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Table 13 Changes in Dutch unemployment-benefits scheme(s),1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 737 December January Tightening of the rules -11.1% See below
1982 1982 1983 concerning minimum
benefits
L 749 December January Indexation of benefits -4.2% -3.3%
1982 1982 1983 limited to 1% in 1983 (includes L 737
as well)
L 278 June July Duration of benefits -2.9% Not
1983 1983 1983 limited for most measurable
unemployed under 
23 years of age
L 674 December January Most benefits frozen for -3.8% -3%
1983 1983 1984 1984.Benefits cut by 
2.3/2.4%
L 652 December January Most benefits frozen -2.3% See below
1984 1984 1985 for 1985
L 633 December January Benefits in both schemes -5.5% -10.7% 
1984 1984 1985 reduced to 70% of former (includes L 652 
wage.Earlier,nominal cuts as well)
in benefits reversed
L 704 December January Most benefits frozen for -1.6%
1985 1985 1986 1986
L 566 November January A new unemployment- 0% (see appendix 1)
1986 1987 benefit scheme introduced.
ww and wwv merged
L 624 November December New indexation rules No direct
1991 1991 1991 budgetary 
implications
Freeze of social-security Most benefits frozen -2.2% -2.3%
benefits for 19932 for 1993
Freeze of social-security Most benefits frozen -1.8% see below
benefits for 19942 for 1994 for 1994
Freeze of social-security Most benefits frozen -1.9% see below
benefits for 19952 for 1995 for 1995
L 955 December March Eligibility rules tightened -6.4% -3.0% (covers
1994 1994 1995 the freeze in 
1995 as well,
but only part
of the effects
of L955).
Total -33.7%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme:– indicates retrenchment
2 The decision was taken in the autumn of the preceding year
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were taken over by the ctsv (College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen).
This is an independent institution headed by three government-appointed
leaders. The Industry Insurance Associations were long planned to be trans-
formed into market organisations competing with each other, but in the
end, new government agencies responsible for the administration of benefits
in workers’ insurance were chosen. Reintegration efforts, however, were
privatised.
The issue is whether these changes may indirectly lead to retrenchment of
the scheme. The main reason for the changes was to limit the influence of the
social partners on the administration of the scheme, since it was considered
too lenient. In other words, retrenchment, in the sense of a more strict ad-
ministration of the schemes, was the purpose for the changes. However, the
impact of these changes remains to be seen. The administrative arrangement
is most important in situations where the rules leave considerable discretion
to whoever is administering the scheme. Generally, the rules concerning the
ww do not allow much discretion. The rules concerning eligibility, duration
and the level of benefits are quite simple and clear. When it comes to the
question of being willing to accept a job, actively seeking a job, etc., who ad-
ministers the rules is probably more important. Thus, the administrative
changes may imply further retrenchment, but it seems unlikely that the im-
pact will affect the conclusion of significant retrenchment of the scheme.
Just as Denmark, the Netherlands has witnessed the introduction of an ac-
tive labour-market policy (cf. Visser & Hemerijk 1997: 155-178; Cox
1998; van der Veen & Trommel 1999). The Dutch active labour-market
policy has consisted of elements such as, subsidised jobs, reforms of the un-
employment service, and stronger focus on the duties of the unemployed, for
instance, through changes in the definition of ‘suitable jobs’. As in relation
to the Danish active labour-market policy, the question is whether this may
‘scare off’ some of the unemployed. The stronger focus on the duties of the
unemployed may have such effects. Thus, van der Veen & Trommel (1999:
305) report a significant rise in the use of sanctions in the scheme. Such sanc-
tions are imposed if the unemployed person is not willing to accept an of-
fered job or if the job-searching efforts are found to be insufficient. Howev-
er, other changes such as the introduction of subsidised jobs, may be per-
ceived as an improvement since it enhances the possibilities of re-entering
the labour market. In other words, also in the Dutch version of active
labour-market policy, an offensive element is present. In summary, the in-
troduction of active labour-market policy may have some retrenchment ef-
fects through the increased focus on the duties of the unemployed, but paral-
lel to the administrative changes, significant retrenchment seems an unlikely
result.
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Altogether, a number of restructuring reforms have been passed in rela-
tion to Dutch unemployment benefits. There has been a shift in financing
from tax financing to social contributions, the influence of the social part-
ners on the administration has been limited, and an active labour-market
policy has been introduced. These changes may result in some retrench-
ment. Particularly, the combination of the changes in the administrative
structure and the stronger focus on the duties of the unemployed may make
this scheme less attractive for the unemployed. It is difficult to anticipate the
precise extent of such retrenchments, let alone convert them into figures, but
it seems unlikely to have much effect on the conclusion of significant re-
trenchment.
The Danish disability-pension scheme
The Danish disability-pension scheme known as ‘invalidepension’ could
award a disability pension to everyone aged 15-67.17 The scheme was ad-
ministered by the municipalities, but they did not award pensions. This
competence had been given to the regional ‘boards of rehabilitation and
pension’. Members of these boards were partly local politicians and partly
experts appointed by the Minister of Social Affairs. Central government re-
imbursed the expenditure of the municipalities by 100%.
The basic criterion for being awarded a pension was a permanent reduc-
tion of work capacity. Whether or not this had occurred was mainly a med-
ical judgment, but certain social criteria were involved as well. Three levels
of benefits were awarded depending on the degree of reduction in work ca-
pacity. To be eligible for the highest level, the remaining work capacity had
to be zero or insignificant. The middle level was awarded if the person had
lost around two-thirds of his or her work capacity. The lowest level was
awarded if the applicant had lost more than half but less than two-thirds of
his or her work capacity. In other words, applicants who were judged to have
more than half of their work capacity intact were not eligible for benefits.
The highest level of benefits consisted of four different types: The basic
amount and the pension supplement of the old-age pension (see above), yet
both of them were subject to an income test. Furthermore, an invalidity sup-
plement and a work-incapacity supplement were awarded regardless of oth-
er income. Both supplements were equal to approximately half of the basic
amount. The middle level of benefits consisted of the basic amount, the pen-
sion supplement, both subjected to an income test, and the invalidity
amount. The lowest level of benefits consisted of half of the basic amount,
subject to an income test, and half of the invalidity amount.
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The invalidity amount was tax-free, whereas the other types of benefits
were taxable income. However, the special tax rules that made the old-age
pension for single pensioners with no other income tax-free also applied to
disability pensioners. Once benefits were awarded, the person would be eli-
gible until he or she turned 67. Benefits were linked to the development in
prices.
Development of the Danish disability-pension scheme 
from 1982 to 1998
Table 14 below summarizes the legislative changes in the Danish disability-
pension scheme from 1982 to 1998. The general picture emerging from
Table 14 is not one of retrenchment but one of significant expansion of the
scheme. Benefits were improved two times from 1986 to 1988, and slightly
in 1993. From 1990, benefits were also tied to the development in wages in-
stead of prices. However, the major expansion came with the 1983 reform
of the scheme, introducing three new levels of benefits:
1 The highest level could be awarded to anyone aged 18-59 upon the condi-
tion that he or she, due to health problems, had lost any significant capaci-
ty to work. Benefits were the same as the highest level in the old scheme.
2 The middle level was awarded to anyone aged 18-59 who, due to health
problems, had lost around two-thirds of his or her work capacity, or to
anyone aged 60-66 who fulfilled the criteria for obtaining the highest level
of benefits. Benefits were the same as the middle level in the old scheme.
3 The normal level of benefits could be awarded in three different situations.
First, to anyone who, due to health problems, had lost less than two-thirds
but more than half of his or her work capacity. Second, to anyone aged 18-
66 whose work capacity, due to either health or ‘social’ problems, had
been reduced by at least 50%. A need for provision, established through
means testing, had to be present as well. Third, anyone aged 50-66 could
be awarded normal benefits for ‘social reasons’.
Also in this case, a need for provision had to be documented. Normal bene-
fits were equal to the basic amount plus the pension supplement of the old-
age pension, but both types of benefits were subject to an income test. As of
1985, everyone awarded a normal pension before the age of 60 would be en-
titled to a tax-free and not income-tested supplement equal to half of the in-
validity amount. Apart from including the elements of disability pension
that had existed in other schemes, this new scheme significantly expanded
the possibilities of awarding a pension for other than strictly medical rea-
sons. In addition, the reform improved benefits slightly.
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Table 14 Changes in the Danish disability-pension scheme,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 136,137 June January New disability-pension +115% (rough
1982-1983 1983 1984 scheme:All elements of estimation
disability pensions from partly based
other schemes trans- on the devel-
ferred to this scheme. opment in actual 
Benefits improved. expenditure)
Increased possibilities
of awarding pensions
for ‘social reasons’
L 119 June January Income testing for the +4.2% +3.3%
1986-1987 1987 1988 basic amount and pension (covers part
supplement eased of L168)
L 168 March July Benefit levels increased, +3.4% +5%
1987-1988 1988 1988 the easing of the income (covers only
testing for the pension parts of the
supplement hastened, law)
and the income testing 
further eased
L 223 June January Benefits tied to the No measurable 
1989-1990 1990 1991 development in real budgetary 
wages implications,
yet expansion
in the long-run
L 314 May January Changes of some bene- +1.8% -0.9%
1993-1994 1993 1994 fits for single pensioners 
into taxable income.
Improvements of the 
pension supplement.
Cutback in the basic amount
Total +24.4%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment
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The next question is whether there have been any restructuring reforms
that may indirectly lead to expansion or retrenchment. This is indeed the
case. In the 1990’s, the financing and the competence to award pensions
were changed a number of times making it significantly more difficult to ob-
tain a pension (Christiansen 2000). In 1991, taking effect in 1992, the right
to award normal benefits was transferred from the boards of rehabilitation
and pension to the municipalities. At the same time, the reimbursement
from the central government was changed from 100% of the expenditure to
50% in relation to all new, normal pensions being awarded. However, cen-
tral government still reimbursed the entire expenditure on all pensioners
aged over 60. Taken together, these changes gave the municipalities a finan-
cial interest in awarding as few normal pensions as possible, an interest that
the boards of rehabilitation and pensions had not had (op. cit.).
In 1994, the rules were changed again. The municipalities could now ap-
ply for the right to award the highest and middle level of benefits. In 1997,
this right was fully transferred to the municipalities. Furthermore, the joint
financing of central and local government was extended to all new pension-
ers, and the process of awarding a pension could no longer be initiated by
the disabled, but only by the municipality. In other words, the municipali-
ties achieved much more control of the awarding process. In 1998, the fi-
nancing was changed again as central government reimbursement for new
pensioners was cut back from 50% to 35%. Thus, the incentives for the mu-
nicipalities to limit the number of pensions being awarded were significantly
strengthened and the competence of the municipalities has been spread out
to all types of disability pensions.
As Christiansen (2000) shows, the effect of these changes is a reduction of
20% in the number of awarded pensions from 1990 to 1997. The effect of
the most recent changes seems to be an even more significant reduction in
the number of awarded pensions (op. cit.). The falling level of unemploy-
ment has probably played a role as well. Yet, Christiansen’s analysis shows
that the role has been limited. Due to transitional effects in the awarding of
pensions (op. cit.), the exact magnitude of the reduction in the number of
awarded pensions can only be established after some years. However, it is
already obvious that these changes strongly affect the conclusion of signifi-
cant expansion of the scheme. A conclusion of neither retrenchment nor ex-
pansion seems more appropriate when these institutional changes are taken
into account.18
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The Danish early-retirement benefits scheme (efterløn)
The Danish early-retirement benefit scheme (efterløn) offered the possibili-
ty of early retirement for people aged 60 to 66.19 It was organised as an ex-
tension of the unemployment-benefit scheme. Thus, it was administered by
the unemployment funds and financed in the same ways as unemployment
benefits. Anyone aged 60-66 could retire if he or she fulfilled two require-
ments. First, he or she had to fulfill the eligibility criteria in the unemploy-
ment-benefit scheme (see above). Second, membership in an unemployment
fund for 10 of the last 15 years was required.
Benefits were equal to the unemployment benefit as long as the claimant
fulfilled the eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits. When this was no
longer the case, most often after 21⁄2 years, benefits were reduced to 80% of
the maximum amount. After another two years, benefits were further re-
duced to 70% of the maximum amount. Benefits were taxable like any other
income, and linked to the development in prices and wages in the same way
as the unemployment benefit.
Development of the Danish early-retirement benefit scheme 
from 1982 to 1998
Table 15 reports the legislative changes in the Danish early-retirement bene-
fit scheme from 1982 to 1998. The picture emerging from Table 15 is one of
significant retrenchment. As in unemployment benefits, the partial freeze of
benefits for 21⁄2 years dating from 1982 with a later extension of one year
implied significant retrenchment.20 The improvements passed in 1986 and
1987 implied, among other things, that the 70% level of benefits was
changed to 80% and that the earlier retrenchments were compensated to
some extent. In 1990, benefits were again linked to the development in real
wages, as they had been at the beginning of the period. The most dramatic
retrenchment was the reform of the scheme negotiated in the autumn of
1998. This reform implied that future claimants would be entitled only to
the less generous old-age pension when they turned 65, that strong incen-
tives were introduced not to join the scheme before the age of 62, and that a
special contribution had to be paid starting from the age of 35, which will
probably lead to less claimants.
When looking at the institutional structure surrounding the scheme,
changes have taken place only in relation to the financing of the scheme. The
changes mentioned in connection with the Danish unemployment benefit af-
fected the early-retirement benefits since they were financed in the same
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way. Two changes affecting only the early-retirement scheme further under-
line the tendency towards less government financing following these
changes. In 1991, the number of years of membership required to be eligible
for early-retirement benefits was raised from 10 of the last 15 years to 20 of
the last 25 years. This change gave the unemployment funds around
100,000 new members (calculations based on Danmarks Statistik, Statis-
tisk tiårsoversigt 1996) and thus raised the revenue from member contribu-
tions significantly. Apart from a possible lower number of claimants in the
future, the special contribution introduced in connection with the reform in
1998 also implied increased financing from members, both because the spe-
cial contribution is higher and because it has to be paid for 25 years.
The question then is whether the increased financing from members
would indirectly lead to more or less retrenchment. Most likely, it will not
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Table 15 Changes in Danish early-retirement benefits,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 10/11 October January Fully or partly freeze of -119.4% -18.9%
1982-1983 1982 1983 benefits for 21⁄2 years
L 165 May October Freeze of most benefits -4.5% Not
1983-1984 1984 1985 for another year measurable
L 49 December January The 70% level of benefits +3.2% +2.9%
1986-1987 1986 1987 abolished and replaced
by 80%
L 160 March July Most benefits increased +5.2% +2%
1987-1988 1988 1988
L 223 June January Benefits tied to the No direct
1989-1990 1990 1991 development in real budgetary
wages implications
L 125,174 April July Early retirement reform. -19.6% Not
and 175 1999 1999 Pension age lowered (very measurable 
1998-1999 from 67 to 65 years. uncertain
Special contribution estimation)
introduced,and strong 
incentives for later 
retirement introduced
Total -35.1%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment
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have much effect. It is important to note that the basic features of the financ-
ing of the scheme are left unchanged. The government still carries the mar-
ginal burden of the expenditure and pays the majority of it. Thus, even 25
years of payment of the new contribution to the early-retirement scheme
equals less than one year’s benefits. Altogether, none of the restructuring re-
forms affect the conclusion of significant retrenchment.
The Dutch disability-pension schemes
The Netherlands had two closely connected schemes covering the risk of dis-
ability21; the aaw, which was a peoples’ insurance scheme and the wao,
which was a workers’ insurance scheme. The wao paid benefits to workers
and the aaw to people not eligible for benefits in the wao. Despite the aaw
being a peoples’ insurance scheme, both schemes were managed by the In-
dustry Insurance Associations. Applications for a disability pension were
considered by the Joint Medical Committee (gmd), a medical and vocation-
al body connected to the Industry Insurance Associations. The schemes
were financed from contributions from employers and employees and from
state support. In 1982, the state covered 4.5% of the total expenditure
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistisch Jaarboek 1984: 328-329).
The schemes covered persons between 18 and 64. The entry into both
schemes was sickness benefits. After receiving sickness benefits for one year,
a person could apply for a disability pension, provided he or she had some
connection with the labour market prior to becoming disabled. The basic
criterion for judging the application was a person’s ability to fulfill a com-
mensurate job, in the sense of a job matching his or her qualifications.
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Table 16 The connection between degree of disability and benefits in the Dutch disability-
pension schemes
Degree of disability % of basis or former wage
80-100 80
65-80 65
55-65 50
45-65 40
35-45 30
25-35 20
15-25 (only wao) 10
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Hence, the scheme was meant to cover the loss of income from not being able
to perform such a commensurate job, not to cover disability per se, and the
cause of the inability was irrelevant. In other words, the scheme did not dis-
tinguish between risque professional and risque social. Furthermore, the law
stipulated that the gmd should consider how the disability would affect the
person’s possibility of actually finding a commensurate job (known as ‘the
labour-market consideration’). Finally, the administrative practice concern-
ing the awarding of disability pensions was very lenient. In fact, the Industry
Insurance Associations had decided to give the claimants all the benefit of the
doubt. This implied that people applying for a disability pension, almost as a
matter of pro forma, were awarded a full disability pension. Only the very
doubtful cases were in fact considered by the gmd (Aarts & de Jong 1996a:
22-26). Thus, 85% of the disability pensioners in 1982 were fully disabled
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistisch Jaarboek 1983: 324).
The level of benefits was decided according to the table shown below. Any-
one employed had their benefits calculated from former wage, whereas peo-
ple with no former employment had it calculated from the so-called ‘basis’,
which in 1982 was approximately nlg 2,250 per month. Both benefits in the
aaw and in the wao were indexed twice a year (cf. Vording 1993: 14-28).
Development of the Dutch disability-pension schemes 
from 1982 to 1998
Table 17 below shows the legislative changes in the Dutch disability-pension
schemes from 1982 to 1998. The picture emerging from Table 17 is one of
drastic retrenchment. The Dutch disability schemes have been retrenched in
many ways. Benefits were frozen from 1982 through 1989 and from 1993
through 1995, yet in some years with marginal budgetary effects due to lim-
ited inflation. In 1984, benefits were also cut, and the labour-market consid-
eration was removed from the awarding of benefits in 1986. Finally, another
reform added significant retrenchment in 1993: Eligibility was tightened
due to new rules about commensurate jobs and due to the requirement that
the relationship between the impairment and the disability is objectively as-
sessable. New claimants will also face significantly lower levels of benefits
when after some years in the scheme, their benefits only to some extent will
be related to their former wage. Especially young claimants will face signifi-
cantly lower levels of benefits as the length of the period on wage-related
benefits will be dependent on age, just as the level of benefits after this wage-
related period will be partly dependent on age.
The final question in relation to the Dutch disability-pension scheme is
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Table 17 Changes in Dutch disability-pension schemes,1982-1998
Law number Passed Effect Content Expected Actual 
budgetary budgetary
consequences consequences
L 749 December January Indexation of benefits -16.7 % -5% 
1982 1982 1983 limited to 1% in 1983
L 674 December January Benefits frozen for -4.3% -5.7%
1983 1983 1984 another year.Most (covers L 271
benefits cut by 2.4% as well)
L 271 June July Most benefits cut by 2.4% -1.6%
1984 1984 1984
L 652 December January Benefits frozen for 1985 -3.3% See below
1984 1984 1985
L 633 December January Maximum benefits in -4.4% See below
1984 1984 1985 the wao reduced to 70% 
of former wage.Earlier 
cuts in nominal benefits 
reversed
L 704 December January Benefits frozen for 1986 -2.3% -12.4%
1985 1985 1986 (covers L 652 
and L 633 as 
well)
L 561 November January ‘The Labour-market consi- -6% See appendix 1
1986 1986 1987 deration’abolished (uncertain 
estimation)
L 624 November December New indexation rules No direct
1991 1991 1991 budgetary 
implications
Freeze of social- security Benefits frozen for 1993 -3.2% -4%
benefits for 19932
L 412 July January Tightened eligibility -23.9% See appendix 1
1993 1993 1994 criteria,cuts in benefits (uncertain 
estimation)
Freeze of social- security Benefits frozen for 1994 -2.6% -3.2%
benefits for 19942
Freeze of social- security Benefits frozen for 1995 -2.8% -3.3%
benefits for 19952
Total -61.1%
1 + indicates expansion of the scheme;– indicates retrenchment
2 The decision was taken in the autumn of the year before
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whether any institutional changes affect the above conclusion of drastic re-
trenchment. The institutional structures surrounding the Dutch disability
schemes have undergone significant changes (cf. Teulings, van der Veen &
Trommel 1997; Bannink 1999; van der Veen & Trommel 1999).
First of all, the administrative changes discussed in relation to unemploy-
ment benefits implying a decreased influence of the social partners also af-
fected the disability-pension schemes, since they were administered in the
same way. In addition, the gmd was abolished as of 1995, leading to a
transfer of the tasks to the lisv. The question is whether these changes will
indirectly imply retrenchment. The awarding of disability pensions almost
automatically involves an element of discretion. Therefore, who actually
awards benefits is crucial. The reason for reducing the influence of the social
partners was that their administration was considered too lenient. There-
fore, there are good reasons to believe that these changes in the administra-
tion of the disability-pension schemes will imply a stricter administration of
the scheme and, hence, indirectly retrenchment. However, no quantitative
evidence has been found.
The financing of the scheme has also undergone several changes. Through
the 1980’s, contributions from the employers to the wao were gradually re-
moved. From 1990, employer contributions to the aaw were abolished and
replaced by contributions from employees. The government had also gradu-
ally removed its financial support for the schemes. However, from 1990 to
1993, it strongly supported the schemes, paying between 40% and 50% of
the total expenditure (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistisch Jaar-
boek 1993: 292-293; 1995: 298-299). As a result of the ‘Bolkenstein mo-
tion’22 (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1993-1994: 22730, 21), all state
support for the schemes were removed as of 1994. In 1997, taking effect in
1998, the financing of the schemes was changed again.23 From then onwards,
the wao would be financed solely by contributions from employers. Their
contributions would consist of a basis contribution equal for all employers
and a contribution partly dependent on the level of disability in each firm.
The latter contribution was meant to cover the costs of the first 5 years of dis-
ability. The employers could choose to opt out of the scheme and not pay the
differentiated contribution. However, the employer then had to pay for the
first 5 years of disability himself or take out insurance. In other words, the fi-
nancing of the scheme was changed to provide employers with an incentive
to try to keep down the number of disability claimants. At this stage, it is im-
possible to say anything precisely about this potential indirect effect.
Altogether, the two types of restructuring reforms add to the picture of
drastic retrenchment emerging from Table 17, even though the exact effects
are impossible to quantify.
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Actual variation in extent of retrenchment
After having documented the retrenchments implemented in the selected
social-security schemes, the question is what variation in retrenchment can
be observed. Starting with the question of variation between the two coun-
tries, the general picture is that more retrenchment has been implemented in
the Netherlands than in Denmark. The Danish old-age pension was actually
expanded, 10.4%,24 whereas the Dutch old-age pension was retrenched
somewhat, 17.4%. The figures also suggest that the Dutch unemployment-
benefit scheme(s) was retrenched more than the Danish with 33.7% com-
pared to 30%. When considering the uncertainties involved in measuring
the budgetary impact of retrenchments, the difference is not large enough to
warrant a conclusion that unemployment benefits in the Netherlands have
been retrenched more than unemployment benefits in Denmark. The differ-
ence of 3.7% might simply be due to measurement errors.25 Therefore, a
more obvious conclusion is that unemployment benefits in the two countries
have been retrenched equally. Finally, disability pension/early-retirement
benefit schemes have been retrenched to a different extent in the two coun-
tries. The Dutch disability-pension schemes have been retrenched drastical-
ly, 61.1%, and probably even more if the effects of the changes in the institu-
tional structure surrounding the schemes are taken into account. In Den-
mark, the early-retirement scheme was retrenched by 35.1% while the dis-
ability pension was neither retrenched nor expanded when taking into ac-
count the effects of the administrative changes in the 1990’s. Altogether, as
regards two of the three types of schemes, the Dutch experienced the most
retrenchment. In relation to unemployment benefits, the figures only war-
rant a conclusion that the schemes in the two countries have been retrenched
to the same extent.
As regards the development over time in Denmark, it seems that in general
the schemes fared better from 1982 to 1993, and especially from 1986 to
1989, than after 1993. In the old-age pension scheme, the expansion took
place from 1986 to 1990 whereas the enhanced role of means testing, which
will imply retrenchment in the future, was passed in 1993. The disability-
pension scheme was expanded from 1983 to 1988, but from 1991 and on-
wards,26 the implementation of the various restructuring reforms clearly im-
plies retrenchment. Turning to the early-retirement benefit scheme, a signifi-
cant retrenchment of the scheme took place in 1998. A comparable retrench-
ment was implemented from 1982 to 1984, but modified somewhat by the
expansion from 1986 to 1988. When comparing the full development from
1982 to 1993 with the development after 1993, the early-retirement scheme
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was retrenched slightly more in the latter period; 19.6% compared to
15.5%. Yet, the difference is too small to warrant a substantive conclusion
about a difference in retrenchment. Concerning the development of the un-
employment scheme, significant cuts were implemented from 1982 to 1984,
but somewhat modified in 1987. Additional cutbacks were implemented
during the 1990’s. When the uncertainties of measuring the budgetary ef-
fects are taken into account, this scheme fared the same in the two periods.
Altogether, 2 out of the 4 schemes, old-age pension and disability pension,
fared better from 1982 to 1993 than after 1993. The other two schemes
fared similarly in the two periods. A closer look at the first period reveals
that significant retrenchment of 2 of the 4 schemes, unemployment benefits
and early-retirement benefits, took place from 1982 to 1984. Thus, signifi-
cant retrenchment measures were also implemented from 1982 to 1993.
Turning to the Netherlands, the retrenchment of the old-age pension
scheme has been spread quite evenly over the pertinent time periods, 1982-
1989, 1989-1994, and 1994-1998. At least the differences are too limited to
warrant any conclusions about variation. Looking at the disability-pension
scheme, the retrenchment has been concentrated in the first two periods. Fi-
nally, looking at unemployment benefits, the major part of the retrench-
ments took place in the period 1982 to 1989. Only slight retrenchments
were implemented in the subsequent two periods. When studying all three
schemes across all three time-periods, differences are found. In general, the
most retrenchment was implemented from 1982 to 1989. Compared to the
period 1989 to 1994, more retrenchment was implemented in unemploy-
ment benefits, and compared to the period 1994 to 1998, more retrench-
ment was implemented both in relation to unemployment benefits and to the
disability pension. However, it is worth noting that the retrenchment in the
first period took place almost entirely from 1982 to 1985. Finally, when
comparing the period 1989 to 1994 with the period 1994 to 1998, there is a
general picture of more retrenchment in the former period. This conclusion
is based on the much greater extent of retrenchment of the disability-pen-
sion scheme in the former period.
When looking at the pattern of retrenchment across the different social-
security schemes, it is found that in the Netherlands, the old-age pension
scheme was retrenched significantly less than the two other schemes, and
the disability-pension scheme significantly more than unemployment bene-
fits. In Denmark, the early-retirement scheme and unemployment-benefit
scheme were retrenched the most. The disability-pension scheme was nei-
ther retrenched nor expanded and the old-age pension scheme has been ex-
panded.
88 retrenchments in denmark and the netherlands
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 88
Before comparing the actual variation in retrenchment with the hypotheses
developed in chapter 4, it is worth comparing the results of other investiga-
tion of retrenchment. As discussed in chapter 4, the alternative to the micro-
data used in this study would have been macro-data in the sense of social-
expenditure data. Other studies have used such data. Both Castles (2001)
and Siegel (2001) find that the Netherlands is the oecd country having re-
trenched social-security expenditure the most since 1980. This is also the
case when Siegel (op. cit.) controls for the number of claimants. In both
studies, Denmark is found to be one of the countries having conducted limit-
ed retrenchment and actually having a higher level of social expenditure in
the mid-1990’s than at the beginning of the 1980’s. Alber (1998) has con-
ducted a more qualitative analysis of retrenchment of a number of social-se-
curity schemes in Austria, Germany, and in the Netherlands over approxi-
mately the same time period as chosen here. He draws two conclusions of in-
terest for this study. First, he (op. cit.: 41-48) concludes that the Netherlands
has experienced more retrenchment than Germany and especially Austria.
In other words, it is not only in comparison with Denmark that the Nether-
lands has had more retrenchment. Second, Alber ranks the retrenchment of
the three Dutch schemes investigated in this study in the same way it has
been done here. Thus, the disability-pension scheme was retrenched the
most and the old-age pension scheme the least, with the unemployment-
benefit scheme falling in between. In summary, some of the conclusions
drawn above can be supported by Alber’s research.
Without putting too much emphasis on this ‘validation’ of the findings, it
does indicate that the findings of this study are consistent with other investi-
gations of variation in the extent of retrenchment. The next question is
whether the findings are in accordance with the hypotheses developed in
chapter 4.
The match between the actual and expected variation in retrenchment
The first hypothesis concerning retrenchment in Denmark and in the
Netherlands from 1982 to 1998 was that retrenchment would not be sweep-
ing. An evaluation of this hypothesis depends on the definition of ‘sweep-
ing’. Basically, this is a question whether the glass is half empty or half full.
A very narrow definition of sweeping would be that it implied the abolition
of social-security schemes. When applying this definition, Denmark and the
Netherlands have definitely not seen sweeping retrenchment. Using a wider
definition of retrenchment, the result is obviously less clear. Yet, when look-
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ing at all the schemes, it takes a wide definition of ‘sweeping’ to argue that
retrenchment has generally been sweeping. Benefits have been cut, but gen-
erally only about 10-20%, and eligibility has been tightened, yet it has by no
means become difficult to enter the schemes. Furthermore, in Denmark, the
old-age pension has actually been expanded. Thus, if all the reservations
about the definition of sweeping allow any conclusion, it seems that the only
scheme that has suffered something like sweeping retrenchment is the Dutch
disability-pension schemes. Altogether, the first hypothesis has been sup-
ported by the empirical developments.
The hypothesis concerning the two countries was that more retrenchment
would have taken place in the Netherlands than in Denmark due to the dif-
ferent systems of party competition. This was also the picture emerging
above. When looking at all the social-security schemes, the Dutch schemes
have generally been retrenched more than the Danish ones.
Turning to the development over time in Denmark, the hypothesis was
that more retrenchment would be implemented from 1993 to 1998 than
from 1982 to 1993. This hypothesis was supported as well. Yet, the right-
wing governments ruling Denmark from 1982 to 1993 actually implement-
ed a number of significant retrenchments during their very first years in gov-
ernment. Later, they implemented a number of improvements to the
schemes, so the final result of the period is not much retrenchment, at least
less than what was implemented by the social democratic-led governments
since 1993. However, the retrenchments implemented during the first years
of right-wing rule were not predicted by the theoretical framework present-
ed in chapter 3.
Looking at the development over time in the Netherlands, the hypothesis
was that most retrenchment would be implemented from 1989 to 1994 fol-
lowed by the period 1994 to 1998, and then the period 1982 to 1989. How-
ever, this does not correspond to the pattern found above. More retrench-
ment was implemented from 1989 to 1994 than from 1994 to 1998, but in
contrast to the expectations, the period 1982 to 1989 was the period with
the most retrenchment. When looking more closely at the period 1982 to
1989, it becomes clear that the retrenchments took place mainly from 1982
to 1985, whereas few retrenchments took place from 1986 to 1989. In other
words, it is the development from 1982 to 1985 than runs counter to the hy-
pothesis derived from the theoretical framework. If this period is ignored,
the pattern over time in the Netherlands corresponds to the expected out-
come.
Turning to the variation across schemes, the pattern in Denmark matches
the hypothesis in the sense that unemployment benefits and early-retirement
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benefits were retrenched the most and disability pensions and old-age pen-
sion the least. In general, they were actually not retrenched at all. Looking
at the pattern in the Netherlands, unemployment benefits were, as expected,
retrenched more than old-age pensions. However, contrary to what was ex-
pected from the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3, the disabili-
ty-pension scheme was retrenched more than the other schemes and not as
expected less than unemployment benefits.
Altogether, the actual variation in retrenchment in Denmark and in the
Netherlands from 1982 to 1998 does match the hypotheses developed in
chapter 4 considerably. More retrenchment was implemented in the Nether-
lands than in Denmark, and more in Denmark from 1993 to 1998 than
from 1982 to 1993. However, some unexpected retrenchment was imple-
mented in Denmark from 1982 to 1984. In the Netherlands, the develop-
ment was as expected after 1985. In other words, except for the develop-
ments in both countries in the very first years studied, the theoretical frame-
work was quite successful in predicting the variation in the extent of re-
trenchments across time and between the two cases. Looking at variation
across schemes, the framework predicted the variation in Denmark, but not
in the Netherlands where disability pensions were retrenched the most. On
balance, it seems the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 predicted
the variation in welfare-state retrenchment fairly well. Yet, by no means
was the value of r-square 1.
In this way of investigating the explanatory power of a theoretical frame-
work, there is one caveat: It is based on correlation arguments, that is the
match between the predicted variation and the actual one. What a correla-
tion argument does not guarantee is that causal propositions underlying the
hypotheses are in fact right. Even though the theoretical framework pre-
sented in chapter 3 predicted the variation in retrenchment in Denmark and
in the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998 fairly well, it is still an open question
whether the politics surrounding retrenchment do in fact work the way pre-
sented in chapter 3. Are the politics of welfare-state retrenchment the poli-
tics of blame avoidance? Do governments pursue a justification strategy of
blame avoidance? Does party competition around retrenchment work the
way discussed in chapter 3? The only way to answer these questions and
thus provide a further investigation of the explanatory power of the theoret-
ical framework is to do case studies of the politics of retrenchment in the
two countries. This is the subject of the next two chapters. The chapters
may also provide some indication as to why retrenchment has not always
taken place as predicted.
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6 Dutch Politics and welfare-state retrenchment.
How party competition produced consensus
The aim of this chapter is to take a closer look at Dutch politics and welfare-
state retrenchment from 1982 to 1998. Yet, to make sense of what has hap-
pened from 1982, it is necessary to start out with a short section on Dutch
politics and welfare-state retrenchment in the preceding period, 1973 to
1982. Subsequently, there will be sections describing each of the three types
of governments that ruled the Netherlands in this period; the cda-vvd gov-
ernments from 1982 to 1989, the cda-pvda government from 1989 to
1994, and the pvda-vvd-d66 governments from 1994.
More specifically, the aim is to establish how party strategies around re-
trenchment developed in the period in relation to other political parties and
in relation to the electorate. For each period, there will be an investigation
into the government initiatives concerning the welfare state, the societal re-
actions, how the governments have tried to legitimise their policies, and the
reaction of the opposition. The focus will be on social security. Neverthe-
less, developments in other policy areas will be included to the extent that
they are necessary to make sense of what happened in relation to social secu-
rity. These issues have been studied using both primary and secondary
sources.1
Depillarisation and fumbling response to the oil crises 
From a historical perspective, Dutch politics are one of the clearest exam-
ples of the politics of accommodation inherent in Lijphart’s (1969) concept
of ‘consociational democracy’. Due to a consensus at the elite level about
power sharing, autonomy for the sub-cultures and proportionality, the con-
flicts stemming from the ‘pillarisation’ of Dutch society never materialised
into an adversarial style of politics that could have threatened democratic
stability (Lijphart 1979; Gladdish 1991: 33-49; Andeweg & Irwin 1993:
23-49). The consensual style of politics was also clearly visible in relation to
party competition. In the two decades following the Second World War, the
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Netherlands was mainly governed by oversized coalitions. Members of
these governments belonged to one or more of the three major denomina-
tional parties, kvp, chu, or arp, and either the Social Democrats (pvda) or
the Liberals (vvd) (Andeweg & Irwin 1993: 119). Thus, power sharing in
the Netherlands was very much dominated by denominational centre par-
ties, and Dutch politics in the first part of the post-war period can aptly be
characterised as ‘governing from the centre’ (Gladdish 1991).
In the second half of the 1960’s, the pillarisation of Dutch society started
to collapse rapidly. The most immediate effect of ‘depillarisation’ on Dutch
party competition was a significant decrease in the vote-share of the denom-
inational parties. The 1967 election was the first election where the three
major denominational parties did not gain at least half of the seats in the
Dutch parliament.2 At the same time, a number of small, new parties en-
tered Dutch politics. The only lasting one was d66 (Gladdish, 1991: 42-
49).3 The reaction of the denominational parties to their rapidly declining
vote-share was to initiate a merging process. During the elections in 1977,
the three parties ran on a common list, and the merger into the cda was
completed in 1980 (Gladdish 1991: 54-58; Verkuil 1992).
The pvda also saw new opportunities and it launched a ‘polarisation
strategy’, that is a more adversarial style of politics. The party’s hope was
that it no longer had to govern at the mercy of the denominational parties,
especially the kvp, but could become the dominating party in government
(cf. also Green-Pedersen & van Kersbergen 2002). This was to become pos-
sible through a significant increase in the party’s vote-share, at the expense
of the declining denominational parties (Tromp 1989; Gladdish 1991: 52-
54; Hillebrand & Irwin 1999). The pvda did seem to have some success
with its strategy. It gained votes in the 1971, 1972, and 1973 elections. Af-
ter the 1973 election it, together with d66, ppr, kvp, and arp, was able to
form a government with its leader, Joop den Uyl, as Prime Minister.4 At the
succeeding election in 1977, the pvda gained a historical high of 33.8% of
the votes (Andeweg & Irwin 1993: 105). Yet, this was a Pyrrhic victory. A
cda-vvd government took over. After the elections in 1981, pvda partici-
pated in a government with cda and d66 for about 9 months, (see below),
but otherwise, the party was out of office until 1989.
One of the issues at the centre of Dutch politics from 1973 to 1982 was so-
cio-economic policy. As can be seen from Table 6, the Netherlands was
quite negatively affected by the two oil crises. Yet, the governments were un-
able to find a coherent policy response. Monetary policy was wavering
(Jones 1998) and attempts at settlements with the social partners concern-
ing wage restraint failed (Visser & Hemerijck 1997: 93-98). In relation to
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the welfare state, the period until 1982 was also characterised by wavering
and failed attempts. The immediate response of the den Uyl government was
an expansive Keynesian policy and a continuation of the expansion of the
welfare state. Social-security benefits were linked to the wage development
in general in 1974, and the aaw was introduced in 1976 (Cox 1993: 173-
175). However, towards the end of the den Uyl government, its Minister of
Finance launched an austerity policy consisting of a 1% norm, that is public
expenditure should not rise by more than 1% of national, annual income
(Rigter et al. 1995: 323-329). This goal was never met (Toirkens 1988: 32-
52). The succeeding cda-vvd government also opted for an austerity poli-
cy, but was hardly more successful than its predecessor. This failure was not
least due to strong disagreements within the cda, especially between the
two cda ministers Wim Alberda, Minister of Social Affairs, and Frans An-
driessen, Minister of Finance (op. cit.: 53-85; Verkuil 1992: 190-215; Rig-
ter et al. 1995: 335-339). In the 1981 election, the cda and vvd lost their
majority, and the cda was forced to govern with the pvda and d66 (Verkuil
1992: 22-231). This government continued the failed attempts at an auster-
ity policy. The most famous example of this was the government’s attempt
at retrenching sickness benefits in the beginning of 1982. The Minister of
Social Affairs, den Uyl, suggested a retrenchment of sickness benefits in-
cluding, among other things, the introduction of 5 waiting days. However,
after staunch resistance from the trade unions, den Uyl gave up his endeav-
or, and shortly afterwards the pvda left the government with an image of
being unable to implement tough but necessary measures (Anker & Oppen-
huis 1989; Rigter et al. 1995: 340).
Altogether, the years preceding the period investigated in this study were
turbulent both with regard to party competition and socio-economic poli-
cy. In relation to the latter, the result was a fumbling policy insufficient to
meet the macro-economic challenges resulting from the two oil crises. ‘De-
pillarisation’ caused much unrest in Dutch politics in the 1970’s (Tromp
1989), and this is one of the major reasons for the fumbling socio-economic
policy. Yet, looking at the situation around 1982, Dutch party competition,
as noticed by Lijphart (1989) and Wolinetz (1990b: 423), had not really
changed much. Dutch politics were still ‘governing from the centre’ as the
cda had taken over the pivotal role of its three denominational predeces-
sors. Numerically, the cda was of course weaker, but the three major Chris-
tian Democratic Parties had united and a government without Christian
Democratic Parties was still impossible.5 The Netherlands was still a pivotal
system of party competition now with the cda as pivot party. The implica-
tions of which would become clear in the following years.
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The first and second Lubbers governments: No-nonsense policy and 
an emerging consensus
The election in September 1982, resulting from the pvda departure from
the government, again produced a cda-vvd majority in parliament and in
the beginning of November, Ruud Lubbers from the cda was able to form a
government with the vvd. Under the motto of ‘no nonsense’, the new gov-
ernment launched an austerity policy. In the government’s policy statement
(regeringsverklaring) later in November, Lubbers outlined three main goals:
1) reduction of the financing deficit, interest rates and inflation; 2) strength-
ening of the market sector; and 3) job sharing (Keesings Historisch Archief
December 3, 1982).
The new government’s most immediate means to achieving these goals
was wage restraint. Therefore, the government spoke of a ‘breathing space’
(adempauze), that is a freeze of wages, prices and social benefits, in connec-
tion with the coalition agreement (de Volkskrant, November 5 and 13,
1982; nrc Handelsblad, November 13, 1982). Such a breathing space
would imply government intervention into collective agreements and put
strong pressure on the social partners. The only way for them to avoid gov-
ernment intervention was to reach an agreement on wage restraint and job
sharing (Kuipers 1998). Just a few days before the government policy state-
ment in parliament, the social partners in principle agreed upon the ‘Wasse-
naar accord’ with exactly this content (op. cit.). As a follow-up to the agree-
ment, the government limited the indexation of social-security benefits to
1%, implying significant retrenchment (cf. chapter 5), and froze public
wages. In the following months, the new government implemented several
minor retrenchments of social security, especially unemployment benefits
and a nominal cut in the salaries of employees in the educational sector
(Keesings Historisch Archief, March 23, 1983). Finally, after some hesita-
tion, the first Lubbers government also pegged the Dutch Guilder to the
German Mark (Jones 1998).
In the spring of 1983, the new government launched its ideas for a system
change (stelselherziening) of social security. The discussion about a system
change had begun in 1979, but now the government was ready to move. The
system change was basically an umbrella for the numerous changes that
were carried through in workers’ insurance especially in the period until
1987, when they had all become effective (Hoffmans 1989). The majority of
these changes were simply retrenchments. The most important ones were
the lowering of the level of benefits in all workers’ insurance to 70% of for-
mer income and the abolishment of the labour-market consideration in the
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disability-pension schemes. In addition, the two unemployment-benefit
schemes were merged, new rules concerning minimum levels of benefits in-
troduced (toeslagenwet), and wherever necessary, benefits were individu-
alised (cf. chapter 5). However, the retrenchments in connection with the
system change were not the only retrenchments carried through by the first
Lubbers government. First, the freeze of social-security benefits initiated in
connection with the Waassenaar accord was continued in the entire period.
Second, the first Lubbers government also implemented two nominal cut-
backs in workers’ insurance and in the wages of public employees. Taking ef-
fect in January 1984, a 3% cut in the wages used to calculate the level of
benefits was implemented, and this was repeated in July 1984.6
In general, the government tried to legitimise and frame its policies along
three lines. First, by referring to the dire economic straits that the Nether-
lands was facing. In his government’s policy statement, Lubbers declared
‘economic winter’ in the Netherlands (de Volkskrant, November 23, 1982)
and that due to the economic situation, the goal of redistribution could not
be pursued (op. cit., December 17, 1982: 839). The government also tried to
justify the retrenchments by linking them to the job-sharing arrangements
and thus the combat of unemployment (de Volkskrant, April 30, 1983; nrc
Handelsblad, April 9, 1983). As Lubbers said in his government policy
statement, ‘work is more important than income’ (nrc Handelsblad, No-
vember 22, 1982).
Second, the government sought to distance itself from its predecessors’
fumbling and failed attempts at retrenchment. This was perhaps the core of
the ‘no nonsense’ motto, or as Lubbers declared about his government, ‘it is
here to govern’ (cited from Visser & Hemerijck 1997: 100). This approach
was perhaps most visible in relation to the social partners. The first Lubbers
government generally attached less importance than earlier governments to
consensus with the social partners over changes in social security (Geul
1983; Roebroek & van Koten 1985). Unlike its predecessors, the govern-
ment also did not yield to public unrest and protests against its policy. The
nominal cutbacks in the salaries of employees in the educational sector thus
provoked strikes and demonstrations against the government (Keesings His-
torisch Archief, December 17, 1982; March 25, 1983). The cutbacks in the
nominal wages of public employees and the level of benefits in workers’ in-
surance also proved very troublesome. The government started out in April
1983 by suggesting a 2% cut in all public wages and social insurance as of
October 1983 (de Volkskrant, April 1983; nrc Handelsblad, April 1983).
Referring to the worsened economic situation, the government then
changed its plans to a 3.5% cut as of January 1983 (Keesings Historisch
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Archief, November 4, 1983). This decision resulted in widespread strikes
and demonstrations (Keesings Historisch Archief, November 25, 1983; De-
cember 2, 1983). In response, the government softened its policy slightly by
reducing the cutbacks to 3%. The first Lubbers government also avoided the
internal disagreements that had more or less paralysed the cda-vvd gov-
ernment from 1977 to 1981.
Third, in relation to the welfare state, the government presented itself as
very much a Christian democratic government. This was not least possible
due to the placement of cda politicians in almost every government posi-
tion dealing with social security. Apart from the Prime Minister, the Minis-
ter of Finance, Onno Ruding, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment, Jan de Koning, his State Secretary dealing especially with social secu-
rity, Louw de Graaf, and the Minister for Welfare and Public Health, Elco
Brinkman, were from the cda. By presenting itself as very much a Christian
democratic government, the first Lubbers government could link itself to
the social image of the cda – or its predecessors. In his government policy
statement, Lubbers declared that ‘the economic winter asked for an econo-
my with a human face’, and that ‘the government would work for solidarity
between income groups’ (Keesings Historisch Archief, December 3, 1982:
790). The most concrete evidence of this was the special benefits given to the
‘real social minimas’, that is families living from just one income at the so-
cial minimum level. The expenditure on these benefits was small, but it had
great symbolic value as ‘the real social minimas’ attracted significant atten-
tion (Rigter et al. 1995: 373-374).7 The government also tried to link itself
to the Christian democratic emphasis on societal accommodation and re-
sponsibility. The cda itself (1983) spoke of ‘from welfare state to welfare
society’, and Lubbers spoke of
The transformation from a welfare state threatening to become
prohibitive and oppressive to a caring society where people stand
up for each other (Keesings Historisch Archief, December 3,
1982: 796).
Summing up, the first Lubbers government tried to present itself as a govern-
ment that, due to the economic crisis, had to be harsh and could not allow
more fumbling, but also as a government aiming at social fairness and soci-
etal accommodation. In other words, welfare-state retrenchment was
thought justified as an economic necessity calling for societal responsibility,
not as an ideological attack on the basic principle of solidarity.
For the pvda, the new government and its ‘no nonsense’ approach raised
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the dilemma between office and vote seeking. Should the party continue the
already somewhat weakened polarisation strategy through a firm opposi-
tion policy, or should it be more moderate and hope to be rewarded through
participation in the next government? A look into the party’s journal, So-
cialisme en Democratie, during those years, reveals a lively debate on these
issues (e.g. 1982: 11; 1983: 4 & 5; 1984: 4 & 11; 1985: 3). The most imme-
diate response of the pvda was a fairly firm opposition policy. The party
voted against almost every cutback implemented by the first Lubbers gov-
ernment. The strongest opposition was held against the ‘de-connecting’ of
wages and social-security benefits, that is the freeze of social-security bene-
fits, but the pvda also opposed most elements of the system change of social
security.
The pvda tried to portray the retrenchment policy of the first Lubbers
governments as not just a retrenchment policy, but as an unfair one. The
motto of the pvda during those years was ‘fair sharing’ (eerlijk delen). In
parliament, its leader, Joop den Uyl, declared that the government ‘worked
towards a society where again the right of the strong ones applied and self-
interest was indicative’ (Keesings Historisch Archief, November 4, 1983:
693). The pvda also spoke of ‘an atmosphere of dogmatic denounce of the
welfare state’ (Keesings Historisch Archief, September 30, 1983: 619), and
declared that ‘the contrast between strong and weak in society was substan-
tially aggravated’ (Keesings Historisch Archief, October 7, 1983: 632).
However, the opposition of the pvda was not as strong as it may seem. Al-
ternative polices suggested by the party were not without retrenchments
(Keesings Historisch Archief, October 28, 1983: 679-680). As time went on
for the cda-vvd government, the pvda increasingly loosened its firm oppo-
sition policy. In the autumn of 1984, with elections and thus the possibility
of a new government, the party presented its ideas on socio-economic poli-
cy. Just as the government, the pvda suggested lower benefit levels in work-
ers’ insurance; 75% of former income compared to the government level of
70%. However, the party would not guarantee that pvda participation in
the next government would imply a raise from 70% to 75%. Thus, as State
Secretary for Social Affairs, de Graaf, later noted in an interview (Sociaal
Bestek 1987): ‘from the side of the pvda, there was no talk of a ‘frontal op-
position’ against the new system.’ Furthermore, the party would not guar-
antee that a government with pvda participation would index social-securi-
ty benefits again (nrc Handelsblad, November 22, 1984; December 5-6,
1984; de Volkskrant, November 22, 1984; December 5-6, 1984). As a
newspaper commentator noted, the pvda needed room for government ne-
gotiations on its suggestions (nrc Handelsblad, November 22, 1984). The
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pvda very much wanted to return to power and den Uyl even argued that a
pvda-vvd government could be an option to remove the cda from govern-
ment (nrc Handelsblad, November 22-23, 1984; de Volkskrant, Novem-
ber 22-23, 1984).
Summing up, precisely the dilemma between vote- and office seeking
forced the pvda into a mixed response to the ‘no-nonsense’ government.
On the one hand, the party, especially during the first years, constituted a
firm opposition by arguing that the retrenchment policies undermined the
basic principle of solidarity. Yet, when it came to concrete policy sugges-
tions, the pvda did not distance itself dramatically from the government as
this would have implied political isolation. The party tried to have its cake
and eat it too.
The elections in the spring of 1986 turned out to be the last round in the
battle about socio-economic policy in the Netherlands: Before the election,
the cda announced that if the cda and vvd could sustain their majority in
parliament, the government would continue. This was unusual in Dutch
politics. The motto of the cda campaign was ‘Let Lubbers finish the job’,
and together with the vvd, the party emphasised that the positive effects of
its policies were now visible (van der Eijk & van Praag 1987; van Holsteyn
& Irwin 1988). Lubbers also declared that ‘the changes in social security
had been painful but necessary changes’ (cited from van Praag Jr. 1987: 21)
and promised peace in relation to social security for the next period (op. cit.;
de Volkskrant, May 13, 1986).
In the same way as during the years before the elections, the pvda was
caught between office- and vote seeking. On the one hand, still under the
motto of ‘fair sharing’, the party continued to attack the government for an
unfair distribution of retrenchments. The pvda also argued that the cda
had moved closer to the vvd (de Volkskrant, May 13, 1986). However, the
party declared that its only absolute demand for government participation
related to the cruise missile question (Trouw, May 21, 1986).8 Den Uyl also
said that the pvda had given up the polarisation strategy and repeated that
he did not rule out a pvda-vvd government (Trouw, May 3, 1986). In addi-
tion, the election material of the party contained few concrete promises in
relation to social security. The party did not want to be accused of being ir-
responsible in its socio-economic policy (Gladdish 1987).
The result of the election was a major victory for the cda, allowing the
government to continue despite losses for the vvd and gains for the pvda
(van der Eijk, Irwin & Niemöller 1986). Apart from the popularity of Prime
Minister Lubbers, it seems that the explanation for the cda victory should
be found in the voters’ belief that a continuation of the government would
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serve the Dutch economy best (Pellikaan 1987; Irwin & van Holsteyn
1989). Apparently, the cda had been successful in justifying welfare-state
retrenchment as a matter of necessary changes to fight macro troubles, and
thus avoid the issue being turned into a question of advocating or opposing
the welfare state per se (see below).
The question then is why the government was successful in framing the is-
sue in this way? As expected, in order not to preclude itself from future gov-
ernment participation, the pvda could not launch a frontal attack on the
government’s policy for a long time. In addition, the government could, and
did, refer to the social profile of the cda to avoid being accused of launching
an ideological attack on the Dutch welfare state. Yet, the pvda did consti-
tute an at times firm opposition against the government. What seems to
have been a great help for the first Lubbers government is that a general state
of crisis dominated the Netherlands when Lubbers took office (cf. de Beus
1983). Survey data (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 1988: 354-355) show
that the Dutch population did not expect much from the future, in economic
terms. This state of crisis clearly facilitated the first Lubbers government’s
reasoning about unpleasant but necessary retrenchments. Altogether, the
period of the first Lubbers government was the last period with some dis-
agreements among the three major Dutch political parties about socio-eco-
nomic policy. When the pvda, in order to be able to obtain government
power again, in practice gave up the last elements of its polarisation strate-
gy, a consensus on a no-nonsense policy became visible.
As promised if possible, the cda and vvd continued to govern together,
and the second Lubbers government implemented the last elements of the
system change of social security, most importantly the merging of the ww
and the wwv and the removal of the labour-market consideration in the dis-
ability-pension schemes. It also continued the freeze of most social security
benefits. Otherwise, the government kept its promise of peace on the social
security front.
The pvda responded to the success of the Lubbers government at the 1986
elections in two ways. First, it changed its leadership from Joop den Uyl to
the more moderate trade-union leader Wim Kok. Second, a process within
the party aimed at redefining its overall strategy was initiated (van Praag Jr.
1994; Hillebrand & Irwin 1999; Wolinetz 1993). In principle, the party
now gave up the polarisation strategy, which it in practical politics had al-
ready more or less been abandoned (cf. de Partij van de Arbeid 1986). A
clear example of this was that the party supported the ideas of market-ori-
ented healthcare reforms launched by the Dekker Committee in 1987 (Schut
1995).
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The reasons for the more moderate approach of the second Lubbers gov-
ernment towards social security are obvious. As emphasised by the govern-
ment during the election campaign in 1986, and as repeated by Lubbers in
the new government’s policy statement (Keesings Historisch Archief, Au-
gust 21, 1986: 543), the immediate economic crisis of the early 1980’s was
gone and thus an important part of the government’s justification for its re-
trenchments. In addition, even though the pvda had in practice abandoned
its polarisation strategy, it was still in opposition and it was unrealistic to
expect that it would support further retrenchments. A cda-vvd govern-
ment that had already gone quite far could go no further in relation to re-
trenchment of social security. The government did start discussions about a
major overhaul of the disability-pension schemes, yet concrete actions had
to await the pvda joining the government (van Wijnbergen 2000).
In the spring of 1989, the second Lubbers government was brought to a
fall by the vvd parliamentary group and elections were called. In its elec-
tion campaign, which had the motto ‘further with Lubbers’, the cda cam-
paigned for a continuation of the policies of the past 7 years. This time,
however, the party did not declare a preferred coalition partner. The pvda
campaign focussed on showing that the party was ready to govern again,
which limited its criticism of the policies of the last 7 years. Actually, the
party mindfully argued that the image of being unable to make tough but
necessary decisions no longer applied (Wolinetz 1990a). In general, the elec-
tion campaign was quite peaceful (Keesings Historisch Archief, September
14, 1989), with environmental problems as the main theme (Aarts et al.
1992). The election itself did not produce any major changes either. The
vvd and pvda lost slightly, whereas the cda was unchanged (Wolinetz op.
cit.).
The third Lubbers government:wao affair and the fall of the cda
Prior to the elections, there had already been talks between the cda and the
pvda about a government. The leadership of the cda saw several strategic
advantages in a cda-pvda government, among others, broader support for
social-security retrenchments (Metze 1995: 174-176). Hence, it was no sur-
prise that a cda-pvda government could be formed later in 1989.
As Lubbers expressed in the new government’s policy statement (Keesings
Historisch Archief, December 14, 1989), the aim was to continue the socio-
economic policy of the two former Lubbers governments. Yet, as a conces-
sion to the pvda, social-security benefits were indexed again for 1990, 1991
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and 1992. In the meantime, a law was passed containing new indexation
rules for social-security benefits. This law did not directly imply retrench-
ment. However, by specifying a number of conditions for not indexing so-
cial-security benefits, among others, a rise in the ratio between inactive and
active on the labour market, the law did make it easier for the government to
justify a full or partial freeze of social-security benefits. With reference to
this ratio, benefits were not indexed for 1993 and 1994.
The linkage between this ratio and indexation of social-security benefits
indicates that the focus of the government in relation to social security was
changing compared to the first two Lubbers governments. The retrench-
ment by these two governments had mainly been carried through in order to
keep down the costs of social security. The third Lubbers government start-
ed to focus more directly on the number of claimants and talk of uncontrol-
lability and ungovernability in relation to social security. These problems
were seen as part of the ‘inactivity crisis’ in the Netherlands (Visser &
Hemerijck 1997: 136-140). One of the reasons for the inactivity problem
was too lenient access to social-security benefits and attention was quickly
drawn to the disability-pension schemes. The coalition agreement stated
that the number of claimants of disability pension should not be allowed to
grow. In the autumn of 1990, Lubbers tried to recreate a state of crisis and
prepare the country for radical measures to tackle the problem. He publicly
declared that ‘the Netherlands was sick’ and that he would resign if the num-
ber of claimants reached 1 million (Keesings Historisch Archief, September
1991).
The government, especially the pvda, hoped that the goal in the coalition
agreement could be reached with ‘soft’ reintegration measures. Yet, it soon
became clear that this was unrealistic. The government, therefore, started
to work on major changes in the disability-pension schemes. It tried to reach
a compromise with the social partners on the changes, but as this failed in
the summer of 1991, the government launched a plan for a major retrench-
ment of the scheme (Keesings Historisch Archief, September 1991; Vrij
Nederland, July 13, 1996). The government argued that the retrenchments
were unpleasant but necessary to end the dumping of people into the dis-
ability-pension schemes (de Volkskrant, July 15, 1991). The schemes had
gotten ‘out of hand’ (cda 1991). Nevertheless, the plan provoked an
avalanche of political turmoil known as ‘the wao affair’.
Protest against the plan came from two sides. The Dutch trade unions,
both the general fnv and the Protestant cnv, protested strongly against the
plan. The leader of the cnv declared war on the government (de Volkskrant,
July 13, 1991) and the trade unions arranged major demonstrations in Den
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Haag. Inside the pvda, a fierce debate broke out as large parts of the party
were against the plan. Support for the party in opinion polls dropped to an
all time low (nrc Handelsblad, July 31, 1991). In the end, the leader of the
party organisation had to resign, and Wim Kok had to call a special party
congress asking for support for his leadership before things quieted down
again (Keesings Historisch Archief, September 1991; December 1991).
However, this was not the end of the wao affair. The government chose to
wait awhile before actually putting a bill before parliament. In the spring of
1992, the parliamentary group of the pvda declared that it would only sup-
port the retrenchments if claimants already having been awarded a disabili-
ty pension would not be affected by the new rules. The parliamentary group
of the cda disagreed with this demand, but in the end, Lubbers and the cda
Minister of Social Affairs, Bert de Vries, accepted it and more or less forced
the cda parliamentary group to do the same (Keesings Historisch Archief,
May 1993; Metze, 1995: 11-28, 190-197). Later in 1993, the law was then
passed in parliament.
One may ask why the pvda accepted the retrenchment of the disability-
pension scheme at all, or at least denounced the plan when the political tur-
moil broke out. Upon a closer look, however, the strategy of the pvda is not
that surprising. If the pvda had rejected retrenchment of the disability-pen-
sion schemes, the government would most probably have been brought to a
fall and the cda would have chosen to govern with the vvd again for a long
time. In short, the whole office-seeking strategy of the pvda would have
been wasted (Hillebrand & Irwin 1999). However, also in terms of vote
seeking, rejecting the retrenchments would have been politically risky for
the pvda. Its competitors, most prominently the cda, would have been
quick to draw parallels to the failed attempt at retrenching sickness benefits
in 1982. In other words, the pvda would have been quite vulnerable to accu-
sations of still being unable to make tough but necessary decisions and mak-
ing it impossible to tackle the wao problem (Vrij Nederland, July 13, 1996).
The pvda would have been back where it had been ten years before.
The retrenchment of the disability-pension schemes was not the only ma-
jor development on the social security front under the third Lubbers govern-
ment. In the spring of 1992, the Public Audit Office published a very critical
report on the organisation of workers’ insurance, and in response, the parlia-
ment set up a Parliamentary Inquiry (Keesings Historisch Archief, Septem-
ber 1992). The report from the inquiry, which was chaired by the social de-
mocrat Flip Buurmeijer, was published in September 1993. It was very criti-
cal to the organisational structure of social security, especially the disabili-
ty-pension schemes: little if anything had been done to keep down the num-
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ber of claimants and to fight fraud and misuse. The administration of the
disability-pension schemes had been very lenient, literally against the law in
some respects, and oversight of the system had been more or less non-exis-
tent (Parlementaire enquête uitvoeringsorganen sociale verzekeringen
1993). This report provided strong arguments for changes in the organisa-
tional structure of Dutch social security. The government then initiated the
process of organisational changes in workers’ insurance. Among other
things, it privatised the first weeks of sickness in the sickness-benefit scheme.
In the spring of 1994, elections were called again in the Netherlands. The
pvda, which had been almost in constant decline in opinion polls after re-
turning to government (Irwin 1995b), focussed its campaign very much on
its popular leader. Its motto was ‘choose Kok’. The party also tried to repair
its social image after the wao affair (Benschop 1994). However, it did not
dissociate itself from the policy of the third Lubbers government (op. cit.)
and it presented its least left-wing oriented election programme since the
Second World War (Pennings 1995). For the cda, the 1994 election devel-
oped into something of a nightmare. Prime Minister Lubbers announced
that he would leave politics and the cda had chosen Brinkman as his succes-
sor. Unfortunately, the party was internally divided; Brinkman made several
political mistakes; and Lubbers did not keep his promise of not interfering in
the election campaign. In the end, Lubbers actually denounced his successor
and declared that he would vote for another cda candidate (Metze 1995:
199-248). In addition to all this, the new leadership of the party around
Brinkman made a major blunder in January 1994 in relation to social securi-
ty. A fairly austere approach had been chosen in the election programme and
the author of the economic section declared that the party would freeze the
aow for four years. Brinkman did not distance himself from this statement
and freezing the aow came to stand as a campaign issue of the cda (Metze
1995: 207-225; Kleinnijenhuis & de Ridder 1998). In response, old-age vot-
ers gathered in stadiums to protest (nrc Handelsblad, April 13, 1994) and
the cda dropped significantly in opinion polls (Irwin 1995b). As shown by
Kleinnijenhuis & de Ridder (1998: 426-427), social security, defined as
poor pensions for the elderly, became an issue in the election campaign.
The elections proved disastrous for the cda. The party dropped from
35.3% of the votes to 22.2%. The pvda also suffered as it dropped from
31.9% to 24%. However, it had managed to regain some of its strength
compared to some of the opinion polls in the years before and it became the
largest party in parliament. The winners, in terms of seats were vvd, d66
and two parties for the elderly, the latter winning 7 seats not least due to the
aow blunder of the cda (Wolinetz 1995).
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Purple governments: centrist policy without the cda
The result of the 1994 election made the forming of a new government very
complicated as both a cda-pvda and a cda-vvd government would have
to include the d66 to obtain a majority in parliament. In addition, the cda
was paralysed after the defeat. The outcome was a ‘purple government’,
that is a government consisting of pvda, vvd, and d66 (Wolinetz 1995).
In relation to welfare-state retrenchment, this government did not imply
much change compared to the three Lubbers governments. The coalition
agreement stressed the need to keep the number of claimants of social secu-
rity down, as well as the need for sound public finances. The first purple gov-
ernment implemented several retrenchments: social-security benefits were
frozen for 1995, eligibility for unemployment benefits was tightened, the
pension supplement for old-age pensioners having a partner younger than
65 was abolished, and child allowances were cut back substantially. In addi-
tion, the organisational changes in workers’ insurance were continued. The
financing of the wao was also partly changed and the aaw abolished. Final-
ly, sickness benefits were almost completely privatised and a new social-as-
sistance law introduced.
In general, the purple government tried to legitimise these changes by re-
ferring to the political goal of a more active society, that is higher labour-
market participation. Jobs, jobs, and more jobs became its motto. Sound
public finances and fewer people on social security achieved through re-
trenchments and institutional changes were argued to be necessary to ob-
tain this goal (Keesings Historisch Archief, September 1994). The opposi-
tion policy of the cda towards the purple government was somewhat
mixed. The party was in shock after the 1994 election and had no experi-
ence with the role as opposition party. Furthermore, the party changed lead-
ership two times before the 1998 election (Irwin & van Holsteyn 1999).
The fact can be added to this that the purple government very much contin-
ued the policy of cda-dominated governments, which made it difficult for
the party to launch a frontal attack on the purple government. Nevertheless,
the party did try to strengthen its social profile by opposing the cuts in the
old-age pension and child allowances (Keesings Historisch Archeif, Septem-
ber 1994: 605-606).
The election campaign in 1998 proved very peaceful. The government
had indicated that it wanted to continue to govern together, thus taking any
potential excitement out of the election (Anker 1998; Aarts & Semetko
1999; Irwin & Holsteyn 1999). The cda election programme emphasised
improvements of social security and family policy, and the party moved to
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the left in relation to socio-economic policy (cda 1998; de Vries 1999).
However, the party still found it difficult to organise a firm opposition (van
der Brug 1999). The result of the elections was gains for the government, yet
only for the pvda and vvd, and further losses for the cda. The purple gov-
ernment and its socio-economic policy could continue (Irwin 1999).
The purple governments constitute a break from the pivotal position of
the cda in Dutch politics and are the first government since the introduc-
tion of universal suffrage in 1918 without Christian democratic participa-
tion (Irwin 1995a). However, they are in two ways also very much the result
of the pivotal role of the cda in the Netherlands. First, the need of both the
pvda and vvd to accommodate the position of the cda has drawn these
two parties, especially the pvda, towards the centre and thus close enough
to accept co-governance. As argued by Pennings (1999), all Dutch parties
have become more or less centre parties, thus making a government without
the cda possible. Second, for both the pvda and the vvd, a motive behind
the forming of the government was probably also a strategic interest in a
government without the cda. This would undermine the pivotal role of the
cda and strengthen the strategic position of both the pvda and vvd. Alto-
gether, the purple governments are more than anything ‘governing from the
centre’, and evidently, Dutch party competition has not been turned into a
bloc system. Therefore, it is no surprise that the socio-economic policy of
the purple governments has very much been a continuation of the policy of
the Lubbers governments (cf. Hoogerwerf 1999).
The Dutch case – a general view
The formation of the second purple government provides a natural point in
time to conclude the investigation of Dutch politics and welfare-state re-
trenchment. Before turning to the Danish case, it seems advantageous to
ask what support can be found in the Dutch case for the theoretical proposi-
tions put forward in chapter 3. This question can be answered by answering
a number of more narrow questions relating to the different hypotheses de-
rived from the framework.
The first question is whether the Dutch case supports the idea of the poli-
tics of retrenchment as the politics of blame avoidance. It seems so. Welfare-
state retrenchments in the Netherlands have been met with demonstrations,
public protests, and the pvda was punished severely for taking part in the
wao affair. The fate of the cda together with entrance into parliament af-
ter the aow blunder of two elderly parties is a textbook example of the im-
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plications of the ‘new politics of the welfare state’. However, the Dutch case
also shows how the first two Lubbers governments and the purple govern-
ments have been electorally quite successful conducting an austerity policy
including welfare-state retrenchment. Electoral punishment is not an auto-
matic reaction to retrenchment from the electorate.
The second question is whether the political parties try to avoid the poten-
tial blame for welfare-state retrenchment by applying a justification strate-
gy of blame avoidance. The Dutch case supports this idea. At least it is evi-
dent that Dutch governments have constantly tried to justify retrenchments
by referring to the economic need for such measures, and have said little if
anything that could be perceived as an ideological attack on the welfare
state. In the beginning of the period, the focus was mostly on the need to
keep the costs of social security down. Later, retrenchments were justified
by arguing that the number of claimants of social security had become an
uncontrollable burden leading to an inactive society. The Dutch case also
demonstrates how opposition parties, if left wing as the pvda, argue that re-
trenchments are part of an attack on the basic principle of solidarity.
There is also evidence that Dutch governments were successful with their
justification strategy. Based on agenda-setting research, Kleinnijenhuis &
de Ridder (1998: 426-427, cf. also Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg 1995) argue
that ‘rightist’ issues such as economic management dominated Dutch poli-
tics from the beginning of the 1980’s. The 1994 election, focussing on so-
cial security defined as poor pensions for the elderly, was a surprising break
from the otherwise dominant issues in Dutch politics. The break was pro-
duced by the aow blunder of the cda. As Andeweg & Irwin conclude: ‘Ob-
viously, not all measures were popular and there has often been an attitude
of ‘why me?’ and ‘you first’, but there has also been a general acceptance of
the gravity of the situation.’
The third question is whether the success of Dutch governments in defin-
ing retrenchment as a matter of economic necessity can be explained by
Dutch party competition. In part, the answer to this question is positive. As
expected, the pivotal nature of Dutch party competition produced a conver-
gence of the Dutch political parties on socio-economic policy. Placement of
the Dutch political parties on a left-right scale based on their election pro-
grammes (Pennings 1999) clearly shows how they have converged on a cen-
trist position. Furthermore, this conclusion is only strengthened by the fact
that after 1994, the cda, which embodied the centrist character of Dutch
politics, has no longer been part of the government. However, the first Lub-
bers government was successful at justifying retrenchment as a matter of
economic necessity at a time when the pvda still constituted at least some
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opposition. The ‘social image’ of the cda partly explains this. Yet, as ex-
plained above, probably more important was the situation of a state of crisis
in the Dutch population due to the economic crisis. In this indirect sense,
economics has played a role. The state of crisis in the Netherlands under the
first Lubbers government also explains why the hypotheses derived in chap-
ter 4, concerning variation over time in the Netherlands, were only partly
confirmed. The state of crisis opened a ‘window of opportunity’ (Keeler
1993), allowing the first Lubbers government to implement much more re-
trenchment than expected on the basis of the theoretical framework pre-
sented in chapter 3. However, the fact that Dutch governments were able to
continue the austerity policy after remedying the immediate economic crisis
can only be explained by Dutch party competition.
Turning to variation across social-security schemes, the question is
whether the Dutch case yields support for the argument in chapter 3, that
such variation can be explained by the schemes’ connection to the labour
market shaping both government incentives to retrench and governments’
capabilities of justifying retrenchment. Starting with the aow, the relative-
ly limited retrenchment seems explainable by the limited connection to the
labour market. When the attention of the Dutch governments shifted from
just cost-control to keeping the number of claimants down, the aow was
not discussed. The number of aow pensioners is simply not a problem of in-
activity in the same sense as the number of claimants of disability pension or
unemployment benefits. Further, justifying retrenchment of the aow was
highly difficult. As Kleinnijenhuis & de Ridder (1998: 427) argue:
These pensions (aow), however, far from being perceived as or-
dinary social- security benefits for the work shy, were rather seen
as personal savings for which decent people had worked hard
throughout their lives.
As expressed by one of the politicians interviewed: ‘There are two things
you must not do in Dutch politics. One is to touch the aow’. The punish-
ment of the cda for its aow blunder only substantiates this statement.
The theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 also predicted that un-
employment benefits would be retrenched more than disability pensions, a
hypothesis that was not confirmed. The question now is whether the closer
look at Dutch politics in relation to welfare-state retrenchment gives some
indication in explaining the extent of retrenchment in the disability-pension
schemes. The extreme character of the Dutch disability pensions does pro-
vide some indication. Many welfare states have suffered a hidden unem-
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ployment problem, in the sense that economic troubles lead to more
claimants in a number of social-security schemes other than just unemploy-
ment benefits. In the Netherlands, this problem has been very much concen-
trated in the disability-pension schemes. The number of claimants of dis-
ability pension relative to the labour force is much higher in the Netherlands
than in other countries, including Denmark (van der Veen & Trommel
1999: 293).9 The extreme character of the Dutch disability-pension scheme
implies that they are in fact much stronger connected to the labour market
than one should expect from a disability-pension scheme. This provided
Dutch governments with incentives to retrench these schemes dramatically,
and it also provided them with very good arguments as to why unusual mea-
sures were necessary. Lubbers’ famous declaration that ‘the Netherlands is
sick’ exemplifies this aspect. The schemes were simply an obvious policy
failure.
Summing up, a closer look at the Dutch case does offer at least some evi-
dence that the relative success of the theoretical framework presented in
chapter 3 in predicting variation in retrenchment is not purely accidental. In
general, it seems that the hypotheses developed in this study matched the ac-
tual variation in retrenchment for the reasons outlined in chapter 3. Blame
avoidance, justification strategies, party competition, and connection to the
labour market are important aspects if the aim is to understand Dutch poli-
tics and retrenchment. In addition, this chapter also provided some indica-
tions as to why the theoretical framework in some instances was not suc-
cessful in predicting variation in retrenchment. The state of crisis in the ear-
ly 1980’s and the unusual character of the Dutch disability-pension schemes
are important additional factors for a full understanding of the subject.
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7 Danish politics and welfare-state retrenchment:
The difficulties of a right-wing government and 
the possibilities of a left-wing government
This chapter aims to draw a Danish parallel to the Dutch case study of the
previous chapter. The chapter begins with a short section on Danish politics
and the welfare state in the years preceding 1982, especially the period 1973
to 1982. A second section explores the period of right-wing rule from 1982
to 1993. The third section addresses the period of social democratic-led
governments from 1993 to 1998. Finally, some general conclusions are giv-
en about the Danish case.1
Landslide election and fumbling socio-economic policy
Danish politics have historically been dominated by a left wing and a right-
wing bloc. The former has largely been identical to the Social Democratic
Party (Socialdemokratiet). The latter consists of the Conservative Party
(Det Konservative Folkeparti) and the Liberals (Venstre), an agrarian party
gradually transformed into a liberal party. The Social Liberals (Det
Radikale Venstre) held the balance of power and hence decided which bloc
should govern the country. For the first three post-war decades, primarily
the Social Democrats were in power. At times, the Social Democrats ruled in
majority governments including the Social Liberals, and at other times they
formed single-party minority governments (Pedersen 1987; Damgaard
1992; Christensen 2000). The only major change to this pattern before
1973 was the establishment of the non-communist, moderate left-wing par-
ty, the Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF), and its entrance
into parliament in 1960. During the two periods 1966-1968 and 1971-
1973, the Social Democrats were able to rely on the support from sf. The
Social Liberals then chose to support the right-wing bloc (op. cit.).
The 1973 election changed this situation as a number of new parties
gained seats in parliament, among which the largest one was the right-wing
Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) gaining around 16% of the votes.
Among the other newcomers were two centre parties, the Centre Democrats
(Centrumdemokaterne, CD) and the Christian People’s Party (Kristeligt
Folkeparti). In addition, the Communist Party (Danmarks Kommunistiske
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Parti) and the Justice Party (Retsforbundet) regained representation (Peder-
sen 1988). The 1973 earthquake election did not change the bloc nature of
Danish party competition, yet it complicated Danish politics. Both the ef-
fective number of parties (Christensen 2000) and the number of relevant
parties (Bille 1989) increased significantly, and the party system after 1973
was thus more fractionalised and more polarised. For both blocs, forming a
working majority now demanded inclusion of more parties, some of which
were extremist (Pedersen 1988; Bille 1989; Christensen 2000). One result
was that minority governments without stable support became the preva-
lent government form instead of either majority governments or minority
governments with stable support (Damgaard 1997). After the earthquake
election, the Liberals formed a very weak minority government lasting only
for about a year (Elklit 1999). The subsequent election resulted in a social
democratic minority government and, with one exception, social democrat-
ic minority governments ruled Denmark until 1982. The social democratic
liberal government from 1978 to 1979 was the exception and was a break
from the bloc nature of Danish party competition. This government was,
however, short-lived and not very successful (Damgaard 1989).
Parallel to the Netherlands, Denmark was severely struck by the first oil
crisis (cf. table 3). Rising inflation was the most immediate effect of the oil
crisis to which the liberal government responded with deflationary mea-
sures (Nannestad 1991: 142-147). Towards the end of 1974, it became clear
that the Danish economy was moving into a recession. The response of both
the liberal government and its social democratic successor was an expansive
fiscal policy (op. cit.: 148-168). Thus, the expansive reform of social securi-
ty known as ‘the social-security reform’ (socialreformen) initiated before
the first oil crisis (Petersen 1998), could be terminated by introducing a new
social-assistance scheme (bistandsloven). The expansive fiscal policy bene-
fited the growth of the economy, which was 6.5% in 1976. Yet, unemploy-
ment did not come down and the negative effect of the policy was a sky rock-
eting current account deficit (cf. table 3). As a response, the social democrat-
ic and the social democratic liberal governments tried to implement a ‘de-
mand twist policy’. The essence of this policy was to replace import-heavy
private consumption with employment-creating public consumption. A
strategy to fight unemployment was also to improve exit possibilities from
the labour market. The social democratic liberal government thus intro-
duced the early-retirement benefit scheme (efterløn) in 1979. Yet, the ‘de-
mand twist’ policy was not a success and the second oil crisis sent the Dan-
ish economy into the grip of an economic crisis (op. cit.: 170-174). As the
Minister of Finance stated, the Danish economy moved towards ‘the brink
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of the abyss’ (Nannestad & Green-Pedersen forthcoming). The social de-
mocratic governments responded with a wavering fiscal policy and repeated
devaluations of the Danish Krone.
Summing up, just as in the Netherlands, the period 1973 to 1982 was tur-
bulent with regard to politics and macro-economic policy. The 1973 earth-
quake election did not change the bloc-nature of Danish party competition,
yet it did complicate majority building in parliament significantly. This
partly explains why Danish governments responded fumblingly to the
macro-economic difficulties (Green-Pedersen 2001a). An additional reason
was the difficulties of the Social Democrats with regard to the question of
income policy. For the Social Democrats, gaining trade unions’ acceptance
of income policy had always been extremely difficult, but in the 1970’s it
proved impossible. The trade unions demanded economic democracy based
on central wage-earner funds in return for income policy acceptance, a de-
mand supported by no party other than the Social Democrats (Esping-An-
dersen 1985a; Nannestad 1991: 175-181, Green-Pedersen & van Kersber-
gen 2002).
As its predecessors, the social democratic government following the 1981
election had difficulties in working out a coherent plan for action to combat
the macro-economic difficulties. In the summer of 1982, it tried to gain po-
litical support for new measures; most importantly a tax on the interest
gains from private pensions. This initiative failed and the government
stepped down. By that time, the Social Liberals had lost faith in the Social
Democrats and chose to support the right-wing bloc. Hence, the leader of
the Conservative Party, Poul Schlüter, was able to form a minority govern-
ment in September 1982 known as ‘the four-leaf-clover government’, con-
sisting of his own party, the Liberals, cd, and the Christian’s People’s Party
(Damgaard 1989).
Right-wing governments and the difficulties of welfare-state
retrenchment
The new government’s first action was to declare the end of devaluations,
thus effectively pegging the Danish Krone to the German Mark. It also
launched a ‘surprise check’ on the Danish economy (Avisårbogen 1982:
103) allegedly revealing that the economic situation was worse than expect-
ed. As a consequence, the government launched a number of austerity mea-
sures to bring down inflation, reduce the public deficit, and improve foreign
competitiveness. The most significant measures were first a suspension of
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the price indexation of wages (dyrtidsregulering). Second, was an introduc-
tion of tax on the interest gains of private pensions; exactly the measure that
had been the stumbling bloc of the former social democratic government.
Third, was a number of cuts in public expenditure including social security.
The most conspicuous were the introduction of a waiting day in sickness
benefits, a lowering of the benefit level in sickness, unemployment, and ear-
ly-retirement benefits from 90 to 80% of former wage, and a number of cuts
in social assistance (Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1982-1983: 6-60).
As a minority government, negotiations with other parties to pass pro-
posals in parliament were unavoidable. The Social Liberals and the Progress
Party, which effectively constituted the governments’ parliamentary-base,
supported the main elements of the proposals hence passed in parliament
(Jyllands-Posten, October 6, 1982; Politiken, October 6, 1982). Yet, as a
concession to the Social Liberals, the proposed cuts in social security were
changed. Benefit levels in sickness-, unemployment-, and early-retirement
benefits were not curtailed from 90 to 80% of former wage, but instead
more or less frozen for 21⁄2 years with basically the same effect (Jyllands-
Posten, October 12, 14 and 16, 1982).
Compared to the first Lubbers government in the Netherlands, the govern-
ment justified its policies along identical lines. It referred to Denmark’s dire
economic situation at that time and the concomitant need for strong mea-
sures. Its policy measures were presented as a ‘crisis solution’ (Jyllands-
Posten, October 5, 1982), and in his speech at the opening of parliament,
Prime Minister Schlüter declared that ‘1983 will be exceptionally demand-
ing on everyone in Danish society’ (Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1982-
1983: 14). The parliamentary speaker of the Liberals also declared that: ‘it
is actually a thankless task to obtain government power at a point where the
economic situation has been driven so far out…’ (op. cit.: 128). The new
government also tried to distance itself from the preceding years of ‘fum-
bling policy’ and to argue that it was the mistakes of its (social democratic)
predecessors that made the various measures necessary. The parliamentary
speaker of the Conservatives spoke of ‘a change of economic course’
(Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1982-1983: 122), and the government
labelled its policy a ‘restoration policy’ (Avisårbogen 1983: 127). The ‘sur-
prise check’ was meant to demonstrate to the public that the social democ-
ratic governments had left the country in an even worse economic situation
than first expected. In addition, the Schlüter government launched a new
approach to the social partners (Damgaard 1989). For example, the govern-
ment did not negotiate with the social partners when it largely abolished au-
tomatic-wage indexation (Jyllands-Posten, October 6, 1982). The trade
114 danish politics and welfare-state retrenchment
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 114
unions responded by organising demonstrations and a number of strikes
(Jyllands-Posten, October 9 and 14, 1982; Politiken, October 9, 14-16, and
26, 1982).
The new government also tried to present itself as a socially responsible
government. The Prime Minister declared in the opening speech that
The government will stress that people who obviously cannot
take care of themselves will not be affected. Not least, the gov-
ernment will show consideration towards the elderly
(Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1982-1983: 13).
In accordance with this statement, the social pensions, old-age and disabili-
ty pensions, were not frozen. Finally, it tried to argue that it in fact was try-
ing to save the Danish welfare state. As claimed by the parliamentary speak-
er of the Conservatives:
Someone already said ... that the cutbacks in the social-security
budgets will destroy the welfare society, but in fact the opposite
is the case. If we do not clear away the problems, which every-
one admits exist in our social-security system, we will not be
able to afford this system in the future... (Folketinget, Folket-
ingstidende ff 1982-1983: 126).
Thus, just as the Dutch Lubbers government, the Danish Schlüter govern-
ment tried to present itself as a government that, due to the economic crisis,
had to be harsh and could not allow more fumbling, but would also be a
government aiming at social fairness.
Generally, the Social Democrats fiercely opposed the new government’s
austerity policy. They showed little willingness to compromise and voted
against the austerity measures, except the tax on the interest gains of private
pensions. One of the leading Social Democrats said that the policy ‘looked
like a declaration of war’ (Jyllands-Posten, October 6, 1982), and the Social
Democrats, in collaboration with the trade unions, portrayed the policy as
anti-social and a clamp down against the weakest in society (cf. Jyllands-
Posten, October 6 and 8, 1982; Politiken, October 8, 1982). During the par-
liamentary readings of the freeze of a number of social-security schemes,
the speaker from the Social Democrats declared that: ‘among all the dis-
agreeable encroachments and cutbacks against wage-earner families and
ordinary people, this bill is the toughest and most outrageous’ (Folketinget,
Folketingstidende B 1982-1983: 92). During one of the demonstrations
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against the government, a union leader also declared that the cutbacks in so-
cial security ‘had bombed Danish wage-earners back to the time before the
social-security reforms of the 1930’s’ (Politiken, October 26, 1982). The al-
ternative policy suggestions of the Social Democrats were labelled ‘the soli-
daristic way’ and strongly emphasised the need for ‘social restoration’ (So-
cialdemokratiet i Danmark 1983).
In the autumn of 1983, the government received support from the Social
Liberals and the Progress Party for another economic package. The con-
tents of this package were tax increases, but also improvements on the social
security front. Maternity leave was improved and a temporary child-al-
lowance for all children younger than 10 was introduced. In the summer of
1983, the new and more generous disability-pension scheme had already
been passed in parliament.
The failure to obtain parliamentary support for its 1984 budget brought
the government down in the autumn of 1983. The reason was that the
Progress Party, as a matter of principle, voted against the budget and the So-
cial Democrats then saw a chance to bring down the government (Chris-
tiansen 1994). Yet, at that time, an election was not really a problem for the
government as it had had strong support in opinion polls almost since it
took office (Andersen 1995: 5).
The election campaign in 1984 was in many ways a recurrence of the fight
between the government and the Social Democrats over defining the issue as
either one of the painful but necessary cutbacks, or as one of a clampdown
against the weakest in society. The mottos of the social democratic cam-
paign were ‘stop conservatism’, and stop ‘the right-wing wave’. The party
re-emphasised that its alternative to conservatism was ‘the solidaristic
way’, implying ‘social restoration’ (Socialdemokratiet i Danmark 1984).
The parties in government, on the other hand, emphasised the positive re-
sults of their socio-economic policy and the Prime Minister promised no
major cuts in social security in 1984 (Avisårbogen 1983: 164-170; 1984: 1-
5; Borre 1984).
The election turned out to be a victory for the government as its share of
the votes increased from 36.4 to 42.8%, mainly at the expense of the
Progress Party. Nevertheless, the election implied an important improve-
ment in the government’s parliamentary situation. Proposals could now be
passed with the support of only the Social Liberals (Borre 1984). The reason
for the government’s victory should be found in its economic policy and the
voters’ belief that the policy was necessary to combat Denmark’s dire eco-
nomic situation (Andersen 1991: 163-164; 1995: 5). Thus, it seems that the
government had actually been successful in justifying the cutbacks as a mat-
ter of economic necessity.
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As a consequence, we must explore how the government, despite the fierce
opposition from the Social Democrats, apparently managed to justify its
policy so successfully. The answer should probably be found in the effects of
the economic crisis on public opinion. Survey data (Petersen et al. 1996)
show that the economic crisis had created a ‘crisis feeling’ among the elec-
torate, implying a willingness to accept otherwise unpopular measures. In
other words, the economic crisis had made the electorate unusually suscep-
tible to the government’s arguments about economic necessity and in this
way opened a window of opportunity (Keeler 1993) for welfare-state re-
trenchments.
In the Spring of 1984, the government continued its austerity policy with
an agreement with the Social Liberals about a continuation of the suspen-
sion of the price indexation of wages and an extension of the more or less
freeze of a number of social-security benefits until October 1986 (Jyllands-
Posten, April 26, 1984). The Social Democrats once again protested strong-
ly (Politiken, May 2-3, 1984). In the autumn of 1984, the government
aimed at a retrenchment of unemployment benefits. As part of the budget
agreement with the Social Liberals for 1985, the right to endless job offers
was to be abolished, implying that the unemployed would lose their right to
unemployment benefits after approximately five years of unemployment.
The aim of this retrenchment was partly budgetary savings, but the govern-
ment also argued that the unemployment-benefit system itself was a cause of
unemployment. It did not give the unemployed the adequate job-seeking in-
centives (Finansministeriet 1984).
If the Social Democrats and the trade unions had strongly opposed the for-
mer retrenchments, they vehemently attacked this proposal. Another battle
about social security broke out. The unions ran an advertising campaign in
the major Danish newspapers against the proposal, and there was even talk
of a general strike (Jyllands-Posten, October 27 and 31, 1984). This fierce
debate made the government, and especially the Social Liberals, hesitate
and modify the proposal. The rules about extended benefits were introduced
in the bill (Jyllands-Posten, October 18; November 10-11, 1984; Politiken,
October 13 and 19; November 10, 1984). This, however, by no means
dampened the political debate. When the issue was debated in the labour
market committee of parliament, the Social Democrats raised a long list of
questions and continued to attack the government (Politiken, May 23,
1985). The government and the Social Liberals then decided to postpone the
full implementation of the law for several years (Politiken, May 21, 1985).
The entire skirmish was very much a battle of issue-definition and justifi-
cation. The government and the Social Liberals fought hard to define the is-
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sue as a matter of improving educational offers for the claimants and avoid-
ing the client state. As the speaker of the Social Liberals put it: ‘…we are
some in this room who believe that it is a good idea to train long-term unem-
ployed. This is what this piece of legislation is about.’ (Folketinget, Folke-
tingstidende ff 1984-1985: 11335-11336, cf. also Jyllands-Posten, Octo-
ber 15, 1984; Politiken, October 23, 1984). In contrast, the left-wing parties
backed by the trade unions tried to define the issue as a matter of anti-social
cutbacks. The speaker of the Social Democrats called this ‘an extremely ma-
licious, vile, and miserable piece of legislation against the weakest on the
labour market.’ (Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1984-1985: 4426). A
trade-union leader also invented the well-known image in Danish politics of
‘people sliding into social mass-graves’ (Jyllands-Posten, October 13,
1984).
In many ways, this partly failed retrenchment of unemployment was the
turning point for the right-wing governments. A number of social-security
improvements took place up to the following election in 1987. In the spring
of 1985, the government reached broad political agreement, that is includ-
ing social democratic support, on a tax reform. As part of this reform, a uni-
versal child-allowance was reintroduced in the form of the very generous
child-family allowance. A number of other improvements and reversals of
cutbacks also took place: The waiting day in sickness benefits was abol-
ished; sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, and early-retirement bene-
fits were indexed again; the effects of the new rules concerning the duration
of unemployment benefits were postponed; social assistance became more
generous; and the old-age pension was improved twice.2
The reason for the change should be found in the issue of justification and
voters’ attitudes. As Tables 4 and 5 display, the Danish economy improved
significantly through 1984 and 1985, except for the current account (cf.
also Nannestad & Green-Pedersen forthcoming). With the improvement of
the macro-economic situation, the government’s justification for its re-
trenchment measures disappeared. It became clear that the Social Democ-
rats’ vehement attacks on the austerity policy had in fact had an effect on
the electorate. As shown by Andersen (1988: 149-154), the government had
acquired an anti-social image in the sense that a majority of the voters found
that the cutbacks had gone too far and had been unfairly distributed. The
support for the government and its austerity policy had been very much
contingent on the economic crisis (cf. also Andersen 1991). Once this was
gone, the government found itself very much on the defensive in relation to
the welfare state. This became very clear in the autumn of 1985, when the
parties in government lost local elections. The Conservatives even had sur-
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veys carried out conveying the message of the anti-social image (Andersen
1988: 153).
As already indicated, the Social Democrats actually intensified their
strong opposition policy after the 1984 election. The party now started to
deliberate more openly about a government either including sf or based on
support from the party (Avisårbogen 1985: 66, 142). The reason for this
should be found in the question of vote- and office seeking. Before the 1984
election, the Social Democrats probably hoped that the four-leaf-clover gov-
ernment could not survive, since it needed support from both the Social Lib-
erals and the Progress Party. This could have forced the Social Liberals to
support the Social Democrats again, a move that would had been complicat-
ed if the Social Democrats had tied themselves too closely to sf. As a conse-
quence, the Social Democrats had to moderate their opposition policy
slightly before 1984 by not tying themselves too closely to sf. After the
1984 election, it became perfectly clear that a return to power within the
foreseeable future would only be possible if the Social Democrats won a ma-
jority with sf. Thus, the Social Democrats sharpened their opposition poli-
cy even further.
The 1987 election campaign was very much a recurrence of the clash be-
tween the two blocs over socio-economic policy (Bille 1992: 8). The Social
Democrats ran an election campaign under the motto of ‘Denmark for the
entire population’, thus indicating that the right-wing policies had privi-
leged certain groups in society. The party also continued to emphasise that
on return to power, it would implement a socially fair economic policy (So-
cialdemokratiet 1987). As the party’s leader, Anker Jørgensen, put it:
It is going to be a fight over whether we are going to have a wel-
fare state or a society where everyone has to take care of oneself
(Avisårbogen 1987: 74).
Finally, the Social Democrats re-emphasised their willingness to govern ei-
ther with or based on the support of sf (Avisårbogen 1987: 73-80). This was
actually the first time that the Social Democrats and sf discussed a govern-
ment before an election (Bille 1992: 8). The government, on the other hand,
campaigned for a continuation of its economic policy and tried to persuade
the electorate that left-wing rule would imply the waste of macro-economic
improvements since 1982. It also accused the Social Democrats of raising a
bogy with regard to the welfare state and claimed that it had actually im-
proved a number of social-security schemes (op. cit.; Bille 1998: 10-12).
The outcome of the election was a government defeat, losing 4.3% of the
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votes and thus the possibility of ruling solely with the support of the Social
Liberals (Borre 1988). However, with additional support from the Progress
Party, the government could continue. As argued by Borre (1987), the elec-
tion result was basically a return to normal Danish politics. The govern-
ment support in the 1984 election had very much been the result of the eco-
nomic crisis. As this had disappeared, so had the unusual support among
the electorate for right-wing policies including retrenchment measures.
The first task of the new government was to gain parliamentary support
for the 1988 budget. This was a difficult task due to the principal reserva-
tions of the Progress Party towards the budget and an unwillingness of the
Social Liberals to negotiate with the Progress Party (Christiansen 1994;
Bille 1998: 18-19). The government was, therefore, more or less forced into
negotiations with the Social Democrats. The result was a compromise im-
plying improvements of a number of social-security schemes. The new so-
cial democratic leader, Auken, coined these improvements ‘the social demo-
cratic fingerprints.’
Less than a year after the latest election, a new election was called in May
1988 on the question of Denmark’s foreign policy, and especially its nato
membership (Petersen 1989). The election itself did not change much. Yet,
lengthy negotiations changed the government composition to include the
Social Liberals instead of cd and the Christian People’s Party (Jespersen
1989). This government became known as the kvr government.
One of the first actions of the new government was to negotiate an agree-
ment with the Progress Party on agricultural policy. Thereby, the govern-
ment signalled a willingness to make use of the non-socialist majority
(Damgaard & Svensson 1989: 742-743; Bille 1998: 36), and avoid being
forced into costly agreements with the Social Democrats such as the budget
agreement for 1988. The government passed the major part of the 1989
budget with support from the non-socialist majority (Jyllands-Posten, De-
cember 9-10, 1988; Politiken, December 10, 1988), except for proposed re-
trenchments of unemployment benefits. Apparently, some support from the
non-socialist majority could be obtained (Jyllands-Posten, November 26-
27, 1988), but in the end, the government chose to make an agreement with
the Social Democrats implying the abolishment of almost all the proposed
retrenchments. The motive was seemingly the fear of a major battle with the
Social Democrats and the trade unions over the issue (op. cit.; Jyllands-
Posten, December 10, 1988).
The year 1989 was characterised by the launching of great plans for action
on socio-economic policy from both the government and the Social Democ-
rats. The focus in both plans was on tax reform. In addition, the govern-
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ment wanted a reform of unemployment benefits, including some retrench-
ments, but with the main focus on a change in the financing of the scheme
(Jyllands-Posten, May 25-27, 1989; Politiken, May 25-27, 1989). An im-
plementation of the plan with the non-socialist majority was not ruled out,
yet the government clearly aimed at reaching agreement with the Social De-
mocrats (Bille 1998: 61-62). Negotiations went on into the autumn of
1989, but eventually broke down in October. Finally, the government made
an agreement with the Progress Party about the 1990 budget.3 Little, how-
ever, was left of the government’s ‘great plan’ including the retrenchment
measures (Bille 1998: 69-72).
In the autumn of 1990, the government once more tried to reach an agree-
ment with the Social Democrats on socio-economic policy, this time with a
focus solely on tax reform. With the failure to reach an agreement, the
Prime Minister called an election to obtain public support for the govern-
ment’s proposal, which included tax relief (Bille 1998: 89-91).
Altogether, the kvr government period was one of political stalemate
with regard to social security and socio-economic policy in general. The
government based its rule on the support of the non-socialist majority and
passed most of its budget agreements with this majority. Nevertheless,
when it came to political, controversial issues such as tax reform and wel-
fare-state retrenchments in particular, the government wanted the support
of the Social Democrats. They, however, had no incentive to compromise
on, for instance, retrenchments.
The 1990 election campaign was not interesting, as the electorate was
unimpressed by the promised tax reductions (Borre 1991; Nielsen 1992).
The Social Democrats changed their tactics somewhat compared to the pri-
or elections. They declared a preference for a broad-coalition government
with one or several right-wing parties. Yet, they were still willing to rule
based on support from sf (Avisårbogen 1990: 97; Nielsen 1992). The So-
cial Democrats also tried to present themselves as a responsible party in
terms of macro-economic policy (Borre 1991). Still, there was no sign that
the Social Democrats would accept welfare-state retrenchments (Avisårbo-
gen 1990: 94-100). The government parties campaigned for a continuation
of right-wing rule, and both the Liberals and the Conservatives in reality de-
nounced the social democratic suggestion of a broad government (Avisårbo-
gen 1990: 97; Nielsen 1992).
The outcome of the election was a major victory for the Social Democrats,
increasing their share of the votes from 29.8% to 37.4%. However, a large
part of these votes were taken from sf. The political balance in the Danish
parliament was unchanged as the non-socialist bloc continued to hold a ma-
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jority of the seats. Thus, the right-wing government could continue. The So-
cial Liberals had, however, lost 3 out of their 10 seats and chose to withdraw
from government (Borre 1991), which was then renamed the ‘kv govern-
ment’.
In relation to the welfare state, the focus of the kv government was also on
reconstructing and retrenching unemployment benefits. In line with the pre-
ceding period, the government tried to reach an agreement with the Social
Democrats. In the spring of 1991, the two parties negotiated about a change
of the financing of the scheme in the direction of increased employer and em-
ployee contributions. The idea was to make the social partners focus on
keeping down unemployment, for instance, through wage restraint (Jyl-
lands-Posten, January 16, 1991; Politiken, January 16, 1991). Ultimately,
an agreement could not be reached (Jyllands-Posten, May 18, 1991; Poli-
tiken, May 18, 1991, cf. also chapter 6). The focus of the government on
achieving agreement with the Social Democrats on a reform of unemploy-
ment benefits did not, however, imply a general unwillingness of the govern-
ment to use the non-socialist majority in parliament. In the spring of 1991,
this majority passed the first change of the organisational structure of the
disability pension, implying incentives for the municipalities to keep down
the number of awarded disability pensions (Folketinget, Folketingstidende
ff 1990-1991: 2. Session, 7199-7207).
In the autumn of 1991, the government tried again for a more comprehen-
sive reform of both unemployment benefits and early-retirement benefits in-
cluding significant retrenchments (Folketinget, Folketingstidende A 1991-
1992: 334-352, 362-378). Once more the government aimed at an agree-
ment with the Social Democrats, yet not precluding that it would try to use
the non-socialist majority (Politiken, October 2, 1991). The latter possibili-
ty, however, quickly turned out to be non-existent as cd, who were trying to
capture a middle position in Danish politics, denounced all major retrench-
ments (Politiken, October 10, 1991; Bille 1998: 114). Eventually, the gov-
ernment and the Social Democrats were able to reach an agreement over the
1992 budget abolishing the proposed retrenchments of unemployment ben-
efits and early-retirement benefits (Jyllands-Posten, December 6, 1991; Poli-
tiken, December 6, 1991). Instead, the parties agreed to set up a committee,
the ‘Zeuthen committee’, with representatives from the social partners and
experts to investigate the possibilities of a reform of unemployment benefits
(Jyllands-Posten, January 23, 1992).
The year 1992 was dominated by a number of other political events push-
ing social-security reforms to the background. In April, the Social Democ-
rats dramatically changed leadership from Svend Auken to Poul Nyrup Ras-
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mussen, and in June 1992, the electorate voted ‘no’ to the Maastricht
Treaty. Finally, in the autumn, the focus in Danish politics shifted to the
‘Tamil case’, a scandal over the administration of asylum seekers compro-
mising several prominent members of the Conservatives, including the
Prime Minister. The conclusions of the committee, which had been set up to
investigate the case, were very critical towards all the conservative politi-
cians causing the government to step down. The three small centre parties
then changed sides. Consequently, the Social Democrats could form a ma-
jority government with these parties under the leadership of Nyrup Ras-
mussen. This marked the end of more than 10 years of right-wing rule in
Denmark (Bille 1998: 120-152).
Summing up on the period of right-wing rule in Denmark, it illustrates the
weakness of a right-wing government in relation to welfare-state retrench-
ment in many ways. When disregarding the period 1982 to 1984, when an
immediate economic crisis opened a window of opportunity for retrench-
ment measures, the right-wing government’s were never able to justify re-
trenchments as being an economic necessity. They found themselves quite
vulnerable to attacks from the left on the question of social fairness. Hence,
open confrontation with the Social Democrats over retrenchments was too
risky. Retrenchments could only be pursued if a consensus could be estab-
lished with the Social Democrats. A number of times, the governments tried
unsuccessfully to establish such a consensus, especially on a reform of un-
employment benefits. The right-wing governments had to rely instead on a
combination of improved social-security benefits for groups such as pen-
sioners and families with children, and on more indirect ways of improving
public budgets such as increased taxes and pushing fiscal problems on to lo-
cal governments (Green-Pedersen 1999).
A consensus on welfare-state retrenchment never emerged since the Social
Democrats had no incentive to abandon the electorally, very rewarding wel-
fare-state issue. Through nearly the entire period, the only realistic office-
seeking strategy of the Social Democrats was winning a majority with sf.
After the 1990 election when the Social Liberals withdrew from govern-
ment and cd tried to capture the centre position, the Social Democrats had
some incentive to please the small centre parties as a change of sides then be-
came realistic. As a consequence, the Social Democrats modified their op-
position policy, mainly through agreements with the government over the
1992 and 1993 budgets. However, pleasing the small centre parties did not
necessitate a more fundamental change of course, implying acceptance of
retrenchment measures. Such a change was to come later.
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1993-1998: the possibilities of social democratic-led governments
The new government launched its socio-economic policy under the motto of
‘new course towards better times’ (Statsministeriet 1993). It had two main
elements; a tax reform and a labour market reform. The general aim was to
kick-start the Danish economy, which had been in recession since around
1988 (Nannestad & Green-Pedersen forthcoming). Therefore, the tax re-
form, which generally lowered personal income taxes and instead intro-
duced a wide range of green taxes, was designed to be expansive during the
first years, but revenue was neutral in the long run.4 The labour-market re-
form, which partly followed the recommendations of the ‘Zeuthen commit-
tee’, was an attempt to increase the focus on active labour-market policies.
The most conspicuous parts of this reform were probably the introduction
of three leave-schemes, sabbatical, educational, and child-minding leave
and the extension of the so-called transitional allowance to cover the 50-55
year olds as well (Loftager & Madsen 1997).
The government used its majority to pass the proposals without major
changes in the spring of 1993. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives voted
against the reforms and attacked the new government, even though the main
elements in especially the tax reform were close to what the last Schlüter
government had wanted (Jyllands-Posten, June 17-18 and 25, 1993; Poli-
tiken, June 19 and 24-25, 1993). In general, the opposition strategy of the
two major right-wing parties, especially that of the Liberals which was be-
coming the larger of the two in opinion polls, was to emphasise their right-
wing profile and to be more open towards a cooperation with the Progress
Party. The reason for this move was the government participation of the
small centre parties. This implied that the Liberals and the Conservatives
could only regain power if they won a majority with the Progress Party,
which according to opinion polls was a real option (Bille 1998: 156-184).
In September 1994, elections were called again. The campaign had no
specific theme other than a battle between two alternative governments; on
the one hand, the social democratic-led government and, on the other hand,
a liberal-conservative government supported by the Progress Party (Borre
& Andersen 1997: 86-87). The election resulted in a government loss of ma-
jority because the Christian People’s Party did not gain representation and
cd and the Social Democrats lost significantly. However, despite strong
gains for the Liberals, the government alternative was far from obtaining a
majority, and the government could continue as a minority government
without the Christian People’s Party (Bille 1998: 188-194).
For the first social democratic-led government, the period prior to the
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1994 election had been very much dominated by the fact that it had to face
voters less than two years after coming into power. In other words, it had to
deliver positive results quickly. This was undoubtedly the driving force be-
hind the tax reform in 1993 (Nannestad & Green-Pedersen forthcoming).
The government also very much emphasised its ambition for ‘breaking the
curve’, that is bringing down unemployment, which had risen steadily since
1987 (Loftager & Madsen 1997: 135). After the 1994 election, the social
democratic-led government had time for more controversial reforms such as
retrenchment measures.
That it was in fact willing to engage in retrenchment became clear in the
autumn of 1995. In connection with the budget negotiations for 1996, the
government launched a second round of the labour-market reform contain-
ing retrenchments of unemployment benefits. In the proposal put before
parliament in October 1995, the government suggested cuts in the benefits
for young unemployed persons and a reduction in the duration of benefits to
5 years. In addition, it was suggested that entrance to the transitional al-
lowance would be closed immediately. The aim of the retrenchments was
not so much to save cash, but more to support the government’s active
labour-market policy. The retrenchments should provide the unemployed
with greater job-seeking incentives and avoid long-term passivity
(Folketinget, Folketingstidende A 1995-1996: 140-167).
In general, the second social democratic-led government based its support
on both political blocs. However, as regards retrenchment of unemploy-
ment benefits, it was clear from the beginning that they had to be passed
with support from the right-wing parties (Jyllands-Posten, October 5,
1995). As part of the negotiations with the Liberals and the Conservatives,
the government quickly proved willing to tighten eligibility criteria as well
(Jyllands-Posten, November 16, 1995), thus enabling an agreement with
the Conservatives (Jyllands-Posten, November 30, 1995; Politiken, Novem-
ber 30, 1995). Apart from obtaining parliamentary support for the propos-
als, the government hence managed to separate the two major right-wing
parties. The Liberals’ motives for leaving the negotiations were mainly tac-
tical and the party, therefore, chose to support the retrenchments in parlia-
ment (Jyllands-Posten, December 1, 1995). The social democratic-led gov-
ernment had then passed the first major retrenchment of social security in
Denmark since 1984.
It is interesting to compare the discussions surrounding these retrench-
ments with the situation in the 1980’s, when suggestions of retrenchments
of unemployment benefits caused vehement protests from the trade unions.
In 1995, the unions were not enthusiastic about the changes and some criti-
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cism of the government was voiced (Politiken, November 1, 1995). Howev-
er, this time there were no demonstrations and seemingly, the unions had
basically accepted the retrenchments (Politiken, October 3, 1995). Also in
terms of justification, the situation surrounding this retrenchment was very
different from the 1980’s with the fierce debate about ‘social mass-graves’.
Unlike the right-wing governments in the 1980’s, the government was now
able to successfully link its proposals to its active labour-market policy and
its general attempt to combat unemployment. The shortening of the dura-
tion of benefits was labelled ‘an advance of the activation period’, and the
changes for the young unemployed were presented as an intensified effort to
combat youth unemployment (Folketinget, Folketingstidende A 1995-
1996: 152). During the final parliamentary debate about the bill
(Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1995-1996: 2244-2321), only the left-
wing parties tried unsuccessfully to challenge this justification by raising the
issue of social fairness. The government and the right-wing parties contin-
ued to discuss the positive impact of these changes on unemployment and
stressed the implied educational opportunities for the unemployed.
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the Danish economy had, at that time,
definitely moved out of the recession and the contours of a ‘Danish miracle’
were becoming visible (cf. Schwartz 2001a). In the period up to the subse-
quent election, a number of measures were passed aiming at curbing private
consumption, mainly through increased indirect taxation (Bille 1998: 225-
278). In relation to social security, a new social-assistance scheme was
passed with broad political support in the spring of 1997. The scheme en-
hanced the ‘active line’ in social assistance (Plovsing 1998: 80) and implied
further changes in the organisational structure of the disability pension,
thus providing the municipalities with further incentives to limit the num-
ber of awarded disability pensions (Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff
1996-1997: 8301). As elections approached, it was clear that further wel-
fare-state retrenchments had to wait until after the 1998 election.
Which political bloc would win government power was a much more
open question in the 1998 election. The reason was that both cd and the
Christian People’s Party had been forced by their electorate to support the
right-wing bloc again. The Christian People’s Party had been voted out of
parliament at the previous election, and cd had left the government by the
end of 1996 to avoid sharing a similar fate. The focus in the beginning of the
campaign was very much on new political issues such as refugees and immi-
grants, which did not favor the Social Democrats. The party then made a
very successful effort in turning the campaign into a more traditional battle
about social justice and redistribution. This change of focus was partly
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achieved by exploiting the question of the early-retirement scheme. The
right-wing parties had argued that it should no longer be possible to enter
the scheme at the age of 60, but first at the age of 62. In response, the Prime
Minister issued a guarantee that a social democratic-led government would
not retrench the scheme. The Social Democrats eventually turned the await-
ed losses into a small gain and with a very slim margin, the government
managed to hold onto power (Bille 1998: 280-283).
The new government soon faced new challenges. It was clear that some-
thing had to be done about sky rocketing housing prices and the current ac-
count, which had gone into deficit again. In June, the government, there-
fore, intervened with a tax reform supported by the left-wing bloc that most
importantly reduced the value of the right to deduct interest payments from
taxable income (Bille 1998: 287-291). This caused a significant decline for
the Social Democrats in opinion polls (Andersen 1999b).
Against this background, one might have expected the government to de-
lay retrenchment measures. Yet, in the autumn of 1998, the government
reached an agreement on the 1999 budget with most of the right-wing bloc,
including the Liberals and the Conservatives, implying several welfare-state
retrenchments (Finansministeriet 1998; Jyllands-Posten, November 26,
1998). The first was another retrenchment of unemployment benefits fol-
lowing the line from 1995. A committee of civil servants had produced a
number of suggestions (Arbejdsministeriet 1998) that had then been negoti-
ated with the social partners. They quickly reached agreement on the re-
trenchments that were then endorsed by the government and the right-wing
parties as part of the budget agreement (Jyllands-Posten, September 30,
1998; October 1, 1998; Politiken, September 30, 1998; October 1, 1998).
Fractions of the trade-union movement protested against the retrench-
ments, but protests soon died out (Jyllands-Posten, October 8-9, 1998; Poli-
tiken, October 3, 7, 9, and 10, 1998). The government was once more able
to define the retrenchments as part of its active labour-market policy. A sec-
ond retrenchment was a supplementary change in the financing of the dis-
ability pension, implying further incentives for the Danish municipalities to
limit the number of awarded disability pensions. A third retrenchment im-
plied a substantial cut in housing allowances. Finally, the budget agreement
involved a major retrenchment of the early-retirement benefit scheme,
which according to the government would become unsustainable in the fu-
ture once the labour-market effect of the aging population materialised.
However, the government justified its policy along two somewhat different
lines. First, it reluctantly admitted that the changes were in fact retrench-
ments. For instance, it argued that the change of the pension age (cf. chapter
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5) was in fact an improvement (Jyllands-Posten, November 27, 1998; Poli-
tiken, November 28, 1998). Second, it argued that by reaching an agree-
ment with the right-wing bloc, it had in fact safeguarded the scheme by pre-
venting the right-wing bloc from completely abolishing it in the future.
This reform was met by strong protests from segments of the trade unions,
and the Social Democrats dropped to a low in opinion polls (Jyllands-
Posten, November 28-29, 1998; Politiken, November 27-28 and 30, 1998).
The government responded with concessions to the trade unions (Jyllands-
Posten, December 8, 1998; Politiken, December 2 and 8, 1998) and the
protests died out (Jyllands-Posten, December 7, 1998; Politiken, December
10, 1998). Yet, the Social Democrats were still very low in opinion polls.
Even a public admission from the Prime Minister that he had not kept his
promise from the election campaign did not improve social democratic
opinion polls (Jyllands-Posten, December 14, 1998; Politiken, December 14
and 20, 1998). Most of the changes were not passed in parliament before the
beginning of 1999, and the retrenchment continued to cause problems for
the Social Democrats as the trade unions wanted more concessions. To-
wards the end of the entire controversy, the government became more offen-
sive in its justification of the retrenchments. It continued to argue that in fact
it had safeguarded the scheme but also stressed that the retrenchments were
necessary to secure higher rates of labour-force participation from the 60-
65 year olds (Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1998-1999: 3873-3876).
Altogether, this period of social democratic rule in Denmark illustrates
the possibilities of Social Democratic Parties in bloc systems exploiting a
‘Nixon goes to China’ logic. The period until 1994 was dominated by the
government’s short-time horizon due to the approaching election. Since
then, social democratic-led governments have passed unemployment bene-
fit and early-retirement benefit retrenchments, which were politically im-
possible for the right-wing governments due to the social democratic oppo-
sition. Once the Social Democrats showed willingness to pursue such re-
trenchment measures, a political consensus with the major right-wing par-
ties was easily established. This opened up new possibilities of justification.
For instance, limitation of the duration of unemployment benefits, which in
the 1980’s had been defined as an attempt to dump people into social mass-
graves, was now defined as active labour-market policy and thus part of the
struggle against long-term inactivity.
From this perspective, why the retrenchment of the early-retirement
scheme was tremendously problematic for the Danish Social Democrats,
comparable to the problems of the pvda in 1991, obviously calls for an ex-
planation. The problem was not that the issue was defined as one of social
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fairness, but rather that the electorate had certainly not forgotten the
promise of not retrenching the scheme declared by the Prime Minister dur-
ing the election campaign. The electorate simply felt betrayed, resulting in a
major drop in opinion polls for the Social Democrats (Andersen 1999b:
266-268). Even if Social Democratic Parties can exploit a ‘Nixon goes to
China’ logic, consistency and trustworthiness are still important features in
the eyes of the electorate.
The Danish case – a general view
As in the Dutch case study, it will be worthwhile concluding this chapter by
asking a number of questions relating to different hypotheses derived from
the framework in chapter 3. This should provide a basis for answering the
more general question of whether the cases support the theoretical proposi-
tions put forward in chapter 3.
First, it seems relevant to ask whether the Danish case supports the idea of
looking at retrenchment from the blame-avoidance perspective. In general,
the answer is positive. Danish governments have been met with demonstra-
tions, strikes, and strong protests to retrenchment proposals. Therefore,
adopting a cautious strategy and demonstrating a willingness to modify re-
trenchment proposals were imperative. Yet, the Danish case suggests that
governments are not automatically punished for retrenchments at the polls.
The best example is the success of the first Schlüter government.
The second question relates to the role of justification strategies. The
above analysis clearly indicates that governments try to justify retrench-
ments along the lines suggested in chapter 3. No Danish government ever
agitated for retrenchments on the grounds of being against the basic idea of
social solidarity. Not even the Schlüter governments in any way presented
themselves as neo-liberal governments having welfare-state retrenchments
as a goal per se. As did the social democratic-led governments, the Schlüter
governments maintained the necessity of welfare-state retrenchments to
safeguard the welfare state. Yet, the social democratic opposition strongly
and successfully argued that hidden ideological motives were underlying the
retrenchments.
The third question concerns whether the possibilities of Danish govern-
ments framing the welfare-state retrenchment issue are shaped by the strate-
gies of the political parties. The answer is in part yes. Even when facing
fierce social democratic opposition, the first Schlüter government was able
to justify its retrenchment measures as an economic necessity due to consid-
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erable crisis-awareness among the electorate. However, for the rest of the
period examined, the strategies of the political parties have been decisive.
Once the immediate economic crisis disappeared, the social democratic-op-
position strategy paid off, and the right-wing governments had to recognise
their vulnerability with regard to the fairness issues. Hence, several im-
provements to social security were passed. For the rest of the period until
1993, the governments refrained from open confrontation with the Social
Democrats over welfare-state retrenchments. In contrast, the social democ-
ratic-led governments have easily been able to achieve a consensus with the
major right-wing parties on retrenchments.5
Turning to variation across social-security schemes, connection to the
labour market has been an important factor in explaining why the old-age
pension and the disability pensions have fared the best. Under the Schlüter
governments, when cost-saving was the strongest motive for retrenchments,
justifying retrenchments of the two schemes was difficult as exemplified by
the justification from Schlüter in 1982 for not freezing the two schemes.
Both are labelled ‘social pensions’, implying that they are benefits given to
weak and deserving people who cannot help their own situation. The im-
provements to both schemes around 1987-1988 were also clearly justified
as a matter of improving the conditions for very well deserving groups (cf.
Folketinget, Folketingstidende ff 1986-1987: 12878-12886). The 1983 re-
form of the disability pension, which implied a significant rise in the number
of pensioners, effectively connected the scheme much closer to the labour
market. The scheme partially became an exit option from the labour mar-
ket. When labour-market considerations under the social democratic-led
governments then became the driving force for retrenchments, the disabili-
ty-pension scheme came into focus along side with the early-retirement
scheme and the unemployment-benefit scheme, which were prime targets
for retrenchments aiming at improving the functioning of the labour market
and increasing labour-force participation. As shown above, the retrench-
ments of especially unemployment benefits were also justified as an attempt
to move people away from passive benefits.
In sum, a closer look at Danish politics does largely support the theoreti-
cal framework put forward in chapter 3. Apart from the first Schlüter gov-
ernment, Danish governments’ willingness to implement welfare-state re-
trenchment does indeed seem to depend on their capabilities of achieving a
political consensus allowing a justification of retrenchments without being
seriously challenged. At the level of social-security schemes, connection to
the labour market also seems to have been a crucial factor.
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8 The evidence on balance and some quibbles
This chapter aims at two things. First, at briefly summarising the results of
both parts of the empirical investigation. This will be done by discussing
each of the six hypotheses developed in chapter 4. Second, a number of pos-
sible quibbles and alternative explanations will be discussed. Chapter 2 pre-
sented a number of theoretical propositions about variation in welfare-state
retrenchment. The general aim of the research design was to be able to rule
out such alternative explanations. However, this was as always only possi-
ble to some extent, leaving a number of plausible alternative explanations
that deserve discussion.
The empirical support for the framework on balance
The first hypothesis was that there would be no sweeping retrenchment.
Chapter 5 revealed support for this hypothesis with the qualification that
defining ‘sweeping’ is difficult indeed. The underlying argument was the
idea of the politics of retrenchment as one of blame avoidance. The Danish
as well as the Dutch case supported this idea. In both countries, retrench-
ment proposals were met with demonstrations and protests. Several of the
governments also experienced electoral punishment for retrenchment.
However, both cases also demonstrated that governments are not necessari-
ly punished for retrenchment.
The second of the six hypotheses suggested the implementation of more
retrenchment in the Netherlands than in Denmark, based on the different
systems of party competition. This hypothesis was confirmed in chapter 5
and chapter 7 showed that a consensus on retrenchment policy did in fact
not emerge in Denmark until after the Social Democrats regained power in
1993. As long as they were in opposition, they had no incentive to give up
their ownership of the welfare-state issue by engaging in welfare-state re-
trenchment. The Dutch case demonstrated how the pvda was ‘forced’ to
abandon its ownership of the welfare-state issue through the 1980’s to be-
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come an acceptable government partner for the cda. Thus, it does seem that
the different systems of party competition can explain the variation be-
tween the two cases. However, it goes without saying that the framework
cannot explain all the details in the party competition surrounding re-
trenchment. In the Dutch case, the framework would have, for instance,
predicted the pvda to choose a centrist course more rapidly than the party
in fact did, and it is also surprising that the cda gave away part of its pivotal
power when it declared the vvd its preferred government partner before the
1986 election.
The third hypothesis suggested that more retrenchment would be imple-
mented in Denmark from 1993 to 1998 than from 1982 to 1993, due to the
different party-colors of the governments. The pattern of retrenchment and
the case study in chapter 7 corroborated this hypothesis. Nevertheless, as
argued in chapter 5, significant retrenchments took place from 1982 to
1984. The reason was the one identified in chapter 7: The immediate eco-
nomic crisis within the period had created a ‘crisis feeling’ among the pub-
lic. This opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for welfare-state retrenchment,
yet one that quickly closed again.
The fourth hypothesis implied that the Netherlands would experience
more retrenchment from 1989 to 1994 than from 1994 to 1998, and more
from 1994 to 1998 than from 1982 to 1989 due to the different party com-
positions of the governments. The actual pattern of retrenchment was
somewhat different. The period 1982 to 1989 was the one experiencing the
most, not the least, retrenchment. A closer look at the data, however, re-
vealed that the surprising retrenchments were almost entirely concentrated
in the period 1982 to 1985. When disregarding this period, that is the time
of the first Lubbers government, the variation in retrenchment over time
was as expected. Also in the Netherlands, the immediate economic crisis
around 1982 created a crisis feeling among the electorate, opening a win-
dow of opportunity for retrenchment. Chapter 6 also revealed that the dif-
ference in degrees of retrenchment between 1986-1989 and 1989-1994 had
to do with politics. The cda was well aware that including the pvda in the
government would make retrenchment politically less risky. Therefore,
plans to retrench the disability-pension schemes were postponed until after
inclusion in the government of the pvda. The final period 1994 to 1998,
was predicted to fall in between the other two in terms of retrenchment be-
cause even though the pvda formed part of the government, the cda was
now in opposition. This would make the ‘purple government’ politically
more vulnerable in relation to retrenchment than a cda-pvda government.
Chapter 6 did not establish full support for this argument. In opposition,
132 the evidence on balance and some quibbles
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 132
the cda did move to the left and tried to strengthen its social image. Howev-
er, the impact of this strategy on the government remains unclear. The
rather bad experiences of the pvda with the wao affair constituted an
equally important factor for the somewhat more cautious course of the
‘purple government’ towards social security.
The fifth hypothesis concerned variation across schemes in the Nether-
lands. Unemployment benefits were expected to experience more retrench-
ment than disability pensions and old-age pensions. This only partly corre-
sponded to the picture emerging in chapter 5. The old-age pension scheme
was retrenched less than unemployment benefits, but the disability-pension
schemes were retrenched more than unemployment benefits, not less. Nev-
ertheless, chapter 6 showed that the schemes’ connection to the labour mar-
ket has been crucial in the Netherlands. The reason for the surprising re-
trenchment of the disability-pension schemes was that the very lenient ad-
ministration of the rules concerning eligibility had turned them into de facto
early-retirement schemes and thus connected them closely to the labour
market.
The final hypothesis concerned variation across schemes in Denmark. Un-
employment benefits and early-retirement benefits were expected to be sub-
ject to a larger retrenchment impact than disability pensions or old-age pen-
sions. Chapter 5 found the pattern to be in accordance with this prediction.
Chapter 7 further provided evidence for the importance of the connection to
the labour market. Unemployment benefits and early-retirement benefits be-
came prime targets for the retrenchments in the 1990’s, which were driven
by labour market considerations. Without being comparable to the Dutch
scheme, the Danish disability-pension scheme also became more closely
connected to the labour market after the 1983 reform, and thus also became
a target for retrenchment in the 1990’s.
On balance, the findings provide considerable support for the theoretical
propositions presented in chapter 3. At the country level, the theoretical
framework offers an explanation why more retrenchment was implemented
in the Netherlands than in Denmark. In addition, if one ‘controls for’ eco-
nomic crisis, the framework is capable of predicting the variation across
time in the two countries. If this factor is controlled for, the Danish re-
trenchment pattern matches the hypothesis developed at the end of chapter
4 even better, and the pattern in the Netherlands corresponds to the expect-
ed one. However, the smaller extent of Dutch retrenchment from 1994 to
1998 then from 1989 to 1994, is probably not as much a function of the fear
of the cda in opposition as it is a function of the need for the pvda to recu-
perate after the wao affair. The framework was also quite successful at pre-
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dicting variation across social-security schemes. The framework predicted
a clear difference between schemes with little connection to the labour mar-
ket and schemes closely connected to the labour market.
The conclusion that there is considerable empirical support for a theoreti-
cal framework is by itself not very interesting. After all, most theoretical ar-
guments are capable of explaining some variation and few if any are capable
of explaining every variation. A more relevant question in relation to the
theoretical framework presented in this study is whether the framework is
capable of explaining more than competing theoretical arguments. Even a
theoretical argument that explains only little variation is a contribution to
scientific knowledge if alternative arguments explain less variation. Along
the same lines, a theoretical framework explaining considerable variation is
hardly a step forward compared to a framework that explains every varia-
tion. Alternative explanations of the identified variation should therefore be
discussed.
Alternative explanations
An endless number of alternative explanations will always exist and, there-
fore, selectively is necessary. Based on chapters 2 and 4, a number of obvi-
ous alternative explanations exist and these will be discussed in the follow-
ing. Regarding the variation between the two countries, the role of the dif-
ferent ‘political economies’ and the role of minority vs. majority govern-
ments will be discussed. Concerning the variation across social-security
schemes, the importance of the financing of the schemes, the organised in-
terest attached to the schemes and the degree of universalism will be taken
up.
Alternative explanations at the country level
As mentioned in chapter 4, the political economies of Denmark and the
Netherlands differ. Denmark is an example of a social democratic political
economy and the Netherlands is an example of a Christian democratic one,
a difference that was easily identified by looking at female labour-force par-
ticipation rates in the two countries. In chapter 2, the argument was further
presented that Christian democratic political economies faced a specific
‘welfare without work’ or ‘inactivity’ problem. To this end, one would ex-
pect the Netherlands to have experienced more retrenchment than Den-
mark.
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A discussion of this claim requires some further deliberations on the ‘wel-
fare without work problem’, since it is unclear to what extent social-securi-
ty retrenchments would solve the problem. In Continental Europe, there are
two groups of ‘inactive’. One is a large number of people of working age re-
ceiving social-security benefits and another comprises women of working
age outside of the labour force. As regards the first group, the Netherlands
certainly has a large number of people of working age receiving social-secu-
rity benefits. But so has Denmark. The broad unemployment figures pre-
sented in chapter 4 did not show any major difference between the two
countries. At least when compared to Denmark, the high number of people
of working age receiving social-security benefits is not a particularly Dutch
problem, apart from their being ‘disabled’ and being more concentrated in
the age group 55-64 (cf. Scharpf & Schmidt 2000b: table A13).1 The figures
presented in chapter 4 proved the second group to be much larger in the
Netherlands than in Denmark. However, it is not explicit how levels of fe-
male labour-force participation can be raised through social-security re-
trenchments as defined in this study. As suggested by Pierson (2001a), Con-
tinental European social-security schemes are in need of ‘updating’, or re-
forms of the type labelled ‘restructuring reforms’ in chapter 4. For instance,
rules not favoring part-time work or married women working must be
changed. However, it is difficult to imagine how, for instance, cuts in bene-
fits would encourage female labour-force participation.
Actually, one may argue that low levels of female-male labour-force par-
ticipation should result in less retrenchment; one of the effects of the aging
population is a shrinking labour force. Apart from improving birth rates,
there are basically two ways of solving this problem. One is to reduce the
number of social-security claimants, and another is to increase female
labour-force participation. For Nordic countries such as Denmark, the lat-
ter is hardly a possibility. The only solution is to reduce the number of peo-
ple receiving social-security benefits, which was the main reason for the ma-
jor retrenchment of the Danish early-retirement benefit scheme in 1998. In
the Netherlands, the situation is in a way more positive. Female labour-
force participation is rising, from 39.4% in 1982 to 62.2% in 1997
(Scharpf & Schmidt 2000b: table A.12), which in part solves the problem of
a shrinking labour force. As a consequence, this reason for retrenching so-
cial-security schemes appears less credible in the Netherlands.
Another version of the ‘welfare without work’ problem of Continental
Europe focusses on the employment unfriendliness of financing social secu-
rity through social contributions instead of general taxation, as it is done in
Denmark. This way of financing social security increases non-wage labour
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costs, which is particularly damaging for low-skilled workers. They cannot
compensate for the higher non-wage costs by lowering wages because their
wages cannot fall below the level of social-security benefits (Scharpf 1997;
2000c; Manow & Seils 2000). However, retrenching social-security
schemes is not the only way to solve this problem. Changing the system of fi-
nancing to favor low-paid workers seems more attractive for governments
wanting to avoid blame and is exactly what Dutch governments have done
(Hemerijck, Visser & Unger 2000). Thus in 1997, the tax-wedge on low
earnings in the Netherlands was lower than in other Continental European
political economies, and actually lower than in Denmark (Manow & Seils
2000: table 3).
In summary, the welfare without work problem in the Netherlands does
not seem a plausible alternative explanation since it is unclear whether so-
cial-security retrenchments represent a response to this problem.2 Together
with the argument that the variation between the two countries cannot be
explained by different degrees of macro-economic troubles, this could be
seen as a refusal of any role of ‘economics’ in the retrenchment process.
However, economics is not unimportant for retrenchment. First, the two
case studies clearly illustrated how governments can implement otherwise
politically impossible retrenchment measures once macro-economic diffi-
culties turn into an immediate economic crisis. Second, chapter 3 claimed
that the push factors towards retrenchment were economic. It is for eco-
nomic reasons that governments are willing to retrench at all. However, this
does not imply that retrenchment is simply a function of economics.
The second alternative explanation of the variation between the two
countries is the existence of majority governments in the Netherlands vs. mi-
nority governments in Denmark. Based on what Strøm (1990b) presents as
‘conventional wisdom’ about minority governments, a plausible argument
suggests that implementation of welfare-state retrenchment is considerably
easier for a majority government. As opposed to minority governments, it is
not necessary for majority governments to convince opposition parties to
support potentially unpopular policies. In relation to the two cases studied
here, little welfare-state retrenchment arguably took place in Denmark be-
cause the minority governments could not obtain parliamentary support for
such measures. The question is whether empirical support can be provided
for this argument.
An investigation of macro-economic policy in Denmark after 1973
(Green-Pedersen 2001a) does not support the conventional wisdom about
minority governments being weak in terms of governing capacity. If one fo-
cusses solely on retrenchments, the social democratic minority governments
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after 1994 have also implemented several significant retrenchments. Conse-
quently, an argument about weak minority governments must relate mainly
to the period of right-wing governments. In chapter 7, the right-wing govern-
ments were claimed not to implement welfare-state retrenchments in order
to avoid a confrontation with the Social Democrats on the issue. The argu-
ment about minority governments is that the right-wing governments would
have liked to implement retrenchments, despite protests from the Social De-
mocrats, but simply could not obtain the necessary parliamentary support.
Due to the opposition policy of the Social Democrats, the only way for the
right-wing governments to obtain parliamentary support for welfare-state
retrenchment was to gather support from the entire bloc of Non-Socialist
Parties. This bloc of parties kept right-wing governments in office for more
than 10 years. As revealed in chapter 7, the majority was somewhat unreli-
able because the Progress Party was weakened by internal disagreements,
and the Social Liberals were not enthusiastic about striking deals with the
Progress Party. This seems to corroborate the argument about minority gov-
ernments wanting to implement retrenchments even in constellation with a
strong social democratic opposition, yet being unable to gather parliamen-
tary support.
The possibilities of passing legislation without the support of the Social
Democrats varied considerably over the period of right-wing rule; so did the
extent of retrenchment actually implemented. Based on the argument about
minority governments, one should expect the patterns of variation to be re-
lated. The right-wing governments should have taken advantage of the situ-
ations where support from the entire non-socialist bloc to pass retrench-
ments was possible. The parliamentary situation of the right-wing govern-
ments was clearly the strongest from 1984 to 1987. This government was
the only one in the period of right-wing rule that needed only one supporting
party in parliament, namely the Social Liberals, and was hence only a ‘for-
mal minority government’ (Strøm 1990b: 94-96). The kvr government
from 1988 to 1990 was also quite strong because the Social Liberals were
part of the government and because the Progress Party, despite strong inter-
nal conflicts, chose a compromising course. It gave up its principal reserva-
tion against supporting the budget. The other three governments were all
weaker. If the governments from 1982 to 1984 and from 1987 to 1988
wanted to avoid compromising with the Social Democrats, they had to gath-
er support from both the Social Liberals and from a not very compromising
Progress Party. The kv government from 1990 to 1993 was weak because
cd and, to some extent, also the Social Liberals made a left move and tried
to distance themselves from the government.
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However, the retrenchments that were actually implemented followed a
somewhat different pattern. First, the period with the largest extent of re-
trenchment was from 1982 to 1984, when the parliamentary situation of
the government was weak. Second, during the period 1984 to 1987, when
the government’s parliamentary situation was strong, there was a change of
course towards social security and implementation of several improve-
ments. Third, in the period 1988-1990, characterised by a strong parlia-
mentary situation, no retrenchments were implemented. The government
passed budgets with the support of the entire non-socialist bloc. However,
when it came to retrenchment measures, the government wanted the sup-
port of the Social Democrats. Apparently, the only period supporting the ar-
gument about weak right-wing minority governments is from 1987 to
1988. During this period, the government was more or less forced to com-
promise with the Social Democrats. The result was an increase in most so-
cial-security benefits. Yet, it is important to note that the government had
already given up its retrenchment policy before its parliamentary situation
worsened after the 1987 election.
Altogether, the pattern of retrenchments under the right-wing govern-
ments can generally not be explained by their parliamentary situation.
When their parliamentary situation was strong, they did not use it to imple-
ment retrenchments, and when it was weak they were actually capable of im-
plementing retrenchments. Nevertheless, claiming that the parliamentary
situation of the right-wing governments has been irrelevant would be wrong.
As argued elsewhere (Green-Pedersen 1999), the parliamentary situation
did in certain cases, the 1988 budget agreement is the best example, influ-
ence the right-wing governments’ welfare-state policies. The argument here
simply claims that the Danish right-wing governments being minority gov-
ernments is not the most important reason for the small extent of retrench-
ments implemented. It was rather the opposition policy of the Social Democ-
rats that, except for the period 1982-1984, made it electorally too risky.
The two most obvious alternative explanations for the variation between
the two countries can thus not be supported upon closer scrutiny.3 Attention
can then be turned to an alternative explanation of the variation across so-
cial-security schemes.
Alternative explanations of variation across social-security schemes
As laid out in chapter 2, a number of arguments about variation across so-
cial-security schemes focus on the financing of the schemes. One argument
(Alber 1998) was that tax-financed schemes would be retrenched the most
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whereas another argument was that financing through employer contribu-
tion would make schemes vulnerable to retrenchment (Anderson 1998).
However, the empirical material in this study does not show any clear con-
nection between mode of financing and retrenchment. In Denmark, there
was considerable variation across schemes even though all schemes were
predominantly tax-financed. The fact that the Dutch old-age pension, to
which employers do not contribute, suffered the least retrenchment com-
pared to unemployment benefits and the disability pensions supports an ar-
gument claiming that schemes financed through social contributions from
employers suffer the most retrenchment. However, the fact that the disabili-
ty-pension schemes in the Netherlands have been retrenched more than un-
employment benefits cannot be explained by this argument. As illustrated in
chapter 5, employer contributions to the disability-pension schemes were
completely abolished in 1990.4 Nevertheless, the major retrenchment was
implemented in 1993. Altogether, there is little evidence in favor of argu-
ments about the effects of different ways of financing social-security
schemes.
The next factor deserving discussion is the different organised interests at-
tached to the different schemes. How this argument fairs depends on which
organised interests are in focus. The two schemes subject to the largest re-
trenchment impact in Denmark, unemployment benefits and early-retire-
ment benefits were the exact two schemes involving trade unions in the ad-
ministration. The same goes for the Netherlands. The only Dutch scheme
studied that was not administered by the social partners, namely old-age
pensions, is the scheme that fared the best. In other words, the involvement
of social partners, especially trade unions, did not prove an effective shield
against retrenchments. This is, however, not because trade unions have not
fought against retrenchments. Chapter 6 showed that Dutch trade unions
combated every retrenchment proposal. The Danish trade unions also vig-
orously combated every attempt at retrenchment from the right-wing gov-
ernments. Their position towards the retrenchments implemented by their
traditional ally, the Social Democrats, was more mixed. They tried to avoid
too much open conflict, yet in several cases were forced into it by rank and
file members.5
Social partners, especially trade unions, are however not the only organ-
ised interests in relation to social security. As claimed by Pierson (1994:
164-166), client groups such as organisations for the elderly have increas-
ingly taken over the role of trade unions as defenders of the welfare state.
This situation has arisen in Denmark and the Netherlands in connection
with the schemes that are not directly supported by the trade unions. In
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Denmark, the organisation for the elderly ‘Ældre Sagen’ has developed into
a large and well-funded pressure group. In relation to disability pensions, a
client organisation called ‘De Samvirkende Invalide Organisationer’ also
exists, which is, however, much less powerful in terms of members and re-
sources. In the Netherlands, a number of organisations for the elderly exist.
These organisations were most powerful when transforming into real politi-
cal parties, two of which won seats in the 1994 election. Yet, not least due to
internal disagreements, both parties lost representation in the 1998 elec-
tion.
The question is whether the success of the old-age pension schemes and
the Danish disability-pension scheme are the result of the existence of such
organisations. Their actual influence is difficult to determine. They tend to
exert their influence through the media and informal contacts and little, if
any research in this field exists. A look at the success rate of the old-age pen-
sion schemes over the period does, however, not indicate that these organi-
sations have been the decisive factor. In Denmark, ‘Ældre Sagen’ was
formed in 1986 and even though the organisation made it into the Guinness
Book of Records because of its rapid growth in members, its political
strength is predominantly a phenomenon of the 1990’s (Nielsen, V. 1996).
However, the Danish old-age pension fared very well in the 1980’s. In the
Netherlands, the organisations for the elderly seriously entered the political
stage by transforming into political parties, which gained seats in parlia-
ment in 1994. However, the Dutch old-age pension fared better than the
other social-security schemes in the 1980’s.
The third argument deserving discussion is the one laid out in chapter 2,
that the more universal schemes are less vulnerable to retrenchment (Korpi
1980; Rothstein 2000). In other words, schemes benefiting large segments
of the population are claimed to experience less retrenchment than schemes
providing means-tested benefits for small segments of the population. As for
the schemes studied here, none of them can be said to provide means-tested
benefits to small segments of the population. However, the social-security
schemes studied do vary in the size of the segments for which they provide
benefits. Old-age pensions have almost the entire population as potential
claimants. Hence, the fact that old-age pensions in both countries have
fared the best supports the universalism argument. However, the argument
is not at all successful in predicting variation across the other schemes. As
for the Dutch case, the disability-pension schemes can be considered the sec-
ond most inclusive schemes. The very lenient eligibility rules have turned
the schemes into de facto early-retirement schemes for most of the popula-
tion. This is reflected in the extraordinarily high number of claimants.
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Therefore, one should expect these schemes to have fared better, not worse,
than unemployment benefits. As for the Danish case, one should have ex-
pected the disability-pension scheme to have fared the worst. This scheme is
the one scheme studied here that comes the closest to the description of a
means-tested scheme for a small segment of the population. Yet, it fared sec-
ond to the old-age pension.
Altogether, the alternative theory of variation across social-security
schemes finding the most empirical support is the argument about universal-
ism. Such an argument can explain why old-age pension schemes have fared
relatively well. It can, however, not explain the rest of the variation across
social-security schemes.
Balance
Summing up on the entire discussion of alternative explanations, this dis-
cussion has indirectly supported the theoretical propositions put forward in
chapter 3. No other theoretical argument has been found to explain the
same level or more of the variation in retrenchment. Other arguments pre-
dicting more retrenchment in the Netherlands than in Denmark do exist.
However, upon a closer look, none of them found much support. At the level
of social-security schemes, the degree of universalism argument was the
most supported alternative, also predicting old-age pensions to have suf-
fered the least retrenchment. However, the theoretical framework of this
study also offered an explanation as to why the disability-pension scheme in
Denmark fared better than the unemployment benefit and early-retirement
benefit schemes. In this way, the framework can be said to find slightly more
empirical support than the universalism argument.
The conclusion that the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 is
the most successful in explaining the variation in retrenchment does not im-
ply that other factors cannot contribute to the explanation of this variation.
Obviously, if one wants to increase r2, this could be done by including other
factors. As argued above, the immediate economic crisis in both countries in
the first half of the 1980’s clearly represent a factor that would help explain-
ing variation over time; a variation not fully accounted for by the frame-
work presented in chapter 3. In relation to the Danish case, the parliamen-
tary situation of the right-wing governments constitutes a parallel factor,
yet not the most important one. At the level of social-security schemes, it is
more difficult to see which factor should be included to increase r2. None of
the alternative theoretical arguments discussed were capable of explaining
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the variation, which could not be explained by the argument about labour-
market connection. 
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9 Party politics matter – summary and implications
This chapter starts with a brief summary of the main findings of the study.
The rest of the chapter aims at discussing a number of implications of these
findings at two levels. First, the implications for the scholarly debate about
welfare-state retrenchment will be discussed. This includes a discussion of
the prospects of generalising the insights of this study beyond the cases stud-
ied here. Second, the chapter will address the broader question about the po-
litical background for the economic ‘miracles’ in the two countries and the
implications that this has for the debate about a country’s ability to adjust
their models of welfare capitalism to a changed economic environment, and
the understanding of the dilemmas of European Social Democracy.
The main findings
The main finding of this study is evidently the importance of party politics
for the development of modern welfare states. This study claims that a focus
on Dutch and Danish party competition is a must if one wants to know why
the Netherlands has generally carried through a larger scale of retrenchment
than Denmark. The same goes for the variation over time in the two coun-
tries. One must consider how the Dutch pivot system of party competition
produced a party consensus around retrenchment. This consensus allowed
various Dutch coalition governments to justify retrenchment measures in
the eyes of the electorate. One must also consider how, except for the years
of economic crisis, the Danish bloc-system of party competition implied a
political stalemate in relation to retrenchment during the right-wing bloc
rule. However, once the Social Democrats regained power, a party consen-
sus around retrenchment emerged.
If an understanding of the reasons for differences in the extent of retrench-
ment of the various social-security schemes is desired, the schemes’ connec-
tion to the labour market must be considered. It affects governments’ capa-
bilities of justifying retrenchment measures in the eyes of the electorate as
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well as shapes government incentives for retrenchment. This factor explains
why the old-age pension schemes in both countries fared the best in this peri-
od, and why the Danish disability-pension scheme fared better than both
unemployment benefits and early-retirement benefits.
The implications for the retrenchment debate
These findings have implications for the retrenchment debate in three differ-
ent, but of course related ways.
The first contribution is the theoretical argument about the importance of
party politics for understanding variation in the scale of retrenchment. This
should be seen in contrast to the strong focus within the retrenchment litera-
ture on economic and especially institutional factors. The claim that poli-
tics matter for the development of welfare states is of course hardly new. As
stressed in chapter 2, ‘politics matter’ was the main conclusion from the ex-
tensive literature on the growth of the welfare state. Yet, the way in which
politics are argued to matter for welfare-state development in this study
clearly differentiates from the traditional ‘politics matter’ claims. The latter
claim implies that retrenchment should be explained by strong right-wing
parties versus weak left-wing parties (cf. Borchert 1995; Korpi & Palme
2001; Hicks 2000: chap 7). The conclusion of this study tends in the oppo-
site direction; but politics still matter.
Other scholars have in two different ways stressed the importance of poli-
tics for welfare-state retrenchment as well. On the one hand, both Cox
(2001) and Schmidt (2002) stress the importance of political discourse and
argumentation for the process of reforming welfare states. Ross (2000a)
and Kitschelt (2001) on the other hand, have drawn attention to the impor-
tance of questions of issue-ownership and party competition. In a way, this
study tries to combine elements from these different arguments into a theo-
retical framework. The study hypothesises that to explain variation in wel-
fare-state retrenchment, two things must be considered: first, government
strategies to justify retrenchment measures. This is where the theoretical
framework connects to ideas about political discourse. Second, how such
possibilities for justifying retrenchment crucially depend on party politics.
This is where arguments about issue-ownership and party competition are
relevant.
The second contribution of this study to the retrenchment debate is the at-
tempt at explaining variation both between countries and across social-se-
curity schemes. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the scholarly debates about
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variation at these two different levels of analysis are rarely connected. This
is problematic. On the one hand, governments do not retrench the welfare
state, they initiate retrenchment of unemployment benefits, old-age pen-
sions, etc. Thus, political dynamics relating to specific policy areas must be
considered. On the other hand, focussing solely on such policy dynamics is
problematic as well, because factors such as party politics working at the
country level are easily overlooked. By focussing on how governments’ pos-
sibilities of justifying retrenchment are shaped by factors at the country lev-
el and at the level of social-security schemes, this study has attempted to
bridge the gap between a focus on either the country level or the level of so-
cial-security schemes.
The third contribution of this study to the retrenchment debate is empiri-
cal. As argued by both Alber (1998) and Pierson (2001a), in-depth empiri-
cal studies of the scale of retrenchment and the political processes surround-
ing retrenchment are much wanted within the retrenchment literature. This
study, for instance, demonstrates empirically the importance of party com-
petition, including ‘Nixon goes to China’ logics.
When discussing the implications for the retrenchment debate, a brief
comparison with Pierson’s (1994; 1996) perspective on the politics of re-
trenchment also seems wanted since it has very much been the starting point
for the entire scholarly debate (cf. Green-Pedersen & Haverland 2002). This
study has followed Pierson’s claim that the politics of retrenchment are the
politics of blame avoidance. However, the implications drawn from this
claim are somewhat different. Pierson (op. cit.) argues that since the politics
of retrenchment are the politics of blame avoidance, governments try to ex-
ploit institutionally created possibilities of pursuing his three suggested
blame-avoidance strategies. In this study, governments are contended to
have more direct ways of overcoming the electoral dangers of retrenchment.
If governments are able to reframe the issue of retrenchment into, for in-
stance, one of economic necessity, they are not confined to institutionally
created possibilities of implementing retrenchment. Pierson thus underesti-
mates the importance of political dynamics related to party politics and po-
litical argumentation, and overestimates the importance of institutional
constraints and capabilities.1
However, this does not imply that Pierson’s three blame-avoidance strate-
gies are irrelevant for studying retrenchment. In both Denmark and the
Netherlands, fine examples of Pierson’s strategies can be found. In the
Netherlands, the compensation strategy is clearly exemplified by the special
benefits given to the ‘real social minimas’. The current claimants of disabili-
ty pensions being exempt from most of the effects of the major retrenchment
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of the Dutch disability pensions in 1993 is an example of the division strate-
gy. In Denmark, the organisational changes in the disability-pension
scheme are a fine example of the obfuscation strategy. The government
achieved a significant retrenchment of the scheme for which it did not seem
responsible because local governments award disability pensions. Another
good example of an obfuscation strategy is the increased means testing in
the Danish old-age pension, the effect of which will not become fully visible
until old-age pensioners are better off.
Yet, the question is whether the fact that such strategies have been em-
ployed can explain variation in retrenchment. An explanation along these
lines would require a systematic difference between the two countries in the
possibilities of pursuing such blame-avoidance strategies. Dutch govern-
ments must have had some possibilities that their Danish counterparts did
not. Such differences have not been identified. The Netherlands has actually
experienced retrenchments without employment of blame-avoidance strate-
gies. For instance, nominal cuts in benefits in several social-security schemes
were implemented twice in 1984. With regard to variation across schemes,
one could argue a simple programmatic structure hindering, for instance,
the implementation of obfuscated retrenchments to be the reason for the
success of the old-age pension schemes. Yet, if one looks at some of the re-
trenchments implemented in other schemes, they would also have been pos-
sible in old-age pensions. For instance, freezing the Danish old-age pension
in 1982 parallel to other schemes would have been no problem. Similarly,
cutting back benefit levels in the Dutch old-age pension parallel to other
schemes would also have been possible.
Examples can be found where unusual opportunities of pursuing these
strategies make it possible for governments to implement otherwise politi-
cally risky retrenchments. The best example from this study is the retrench-
ment of the Danish disability-pension scheme. The right-wing governments
initiated this process in 1991 at a time when retrenchments with visible ef-
fects were politically too risky. Yet in general, Pierson’s three blame-avoid-
ance strategies are rather descriptions of how governments implement re-
trenchments than explanations of why and when it is done. It is hard to
imagine a situation where none of Pierson’s three strategies of blame avoid-
ance could be used. In this way, Pierson’s strategies may in some cases be
complementary to the justification strategy suggested in this study. How the
Dutch governments provided special benefits to the ‘real social minimas’
constitutes an example. This compensation strategy made it easier for
Dutch governments to claim that the retrenchments were socially fair and
not an attack on the principle of solidarity. However, it is difficult to ascer-
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tain that certain countries or social-security schemes should be systemati-
cally more open to the use of Pierson’s strategies than others.
The quibble with any study of just a few cases is the prospect of generalis-
ing the results to other cases. To some extent, this is simply a question of ap-
plying the theoretical arguments of this study to more cases. However, the
question is to which other cases the framework should be applicable.
At the level of social-security schemes, the argument of this study can
readily be extended to other transfer payments. However, when it comes to
services, extending the argument is less straightforward. Services such as
healthcare and care for the elderly have limited connection to the labour
market and one should, therefore, expect them to suffer limited retrench-
ment. However, when studying services, other factors, which are irrelevant
in relation to transfers, may become important. For instance, in the Scandi-
navian welfare states, which have the most extensive services (Huber &
Stephens 2000), most services are also the responsibility of local govern-
ments. This may provide governments with some very tempting possibilities
for indirect retrenchments by pushing on the actual implementation of re-
trenchments to local governments. This was very much what the Danish
governments did in the 1980’s when services were retrenched much more
than transfers (Green-Pedersen 1999). Such factors may also have played a
role for the ‘anti-service’ strategy of the Swedish and Finish governments
during the economic recessions in the 1990’s (Timonen 2001, cf. also Clay-
ton & Pontusson 1998).
A further question of generalisation relates to other types of welfare re-
forms than what have been defined as retrenchment in this study. In other
words, could the theoretical framework be used to study restructuring re-
forms? As argued in chapter 4, a number of restructuring reforms may not
be of the same interest to the electorate as the retrenchments studied here.
Therefore, the politics around such restructuring reforms may be more
dominated by specifically organised interests. Yet, some restructuring re-
forms can attract broad political interest including the electorate, and ideas
contained in the theoretical framework of this study can then be of rele-
vance. For example, market reforms such as contracting out of social ser-
vices were a major issue in both Denmark and Sweden in the 1990’s. How-
ever, Sweden has gone further than Denmark in terms of such market re-
forms and this can be explained by different strategies of the social democ-
ratic parties in the two countries, which has led to different framing of the
issue (Green-Pedersen 2002b).
The final question of generalisation relates to the country level. Extending
the arguments to more countries probably necessitates the inclusion of more
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systems of party competition, as not all countries can be considered either
bloc or pivot systems. Kitschelt (2001) outlines four models of party compe-
tition in his framework for studying retrenchment and party politics. Apart
from looking at more countries, the reason why Kitschelt operates with
more types of party competition than this study is the inclusion in his frame-
work of factors such as the existence of other political cleavages and intra-
party dynamics. Kitschelt thus distinguishes between bloc systems of party
competition as the British one and the systems in Denmark and Sweden. In
the latter countries, the existence of left-libertarian and right-authoritarian
parties affects the strategies of the other parties. It is hard to disagree with
Kitschelt that these differences exist. However, when discussing the inclu-
sion of more factors in a theoretical framework, one always faces a trade-off
between lucidity and explanatory power. Hopefully, this study has shown
that one can understand the party dynamics around retrenchment in coun-
tries such as Denmark by analysing them as bloc systems such as the British
one. Thus, the argument about party dynamics in bloc systems should also
be applicable to a number of Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon cases. The ar-
gument about pivot systems of party competition as the Dutch can be ex-
tended to Belgium in particular.2
However, if the framework should be applied to cases such as Germany
and Austria, including a third type of party system seems necessary, as sug-
gested by Kitschelt (op. cit.). This type refers to cases with a strong Christ-
ian Democratic Centre Party and a strong Social Democratic Party, but with
only a small Liberal Party. Here, the main line of conflict is over socio-cul-
tural issues, not economic ones. Kitschelt argues that such a system should
experience the least retrenchment since there is no major party favouring a
market-oriented agenda, and because the welfare state is part of a patronage
network. From the perspective of this study, two hypotheses about retrench-
ment in such systems may be advanced. First, they resemble bloc systems
with the important qualification that they are bloc systems with a social de-
mocratic and a Christian democratic bloc. As the social democratic bloc can
be expected to have a stronger degree of ownership of the welfare-state issue
than the Christian democratic bloc, something like the ‘Nixon goes to Chi-
na’ dynamic in ‘normal’ bloc systems may exist. The recent, major retrench-
ment of the German pension scheme enacted by the Social Democratic
/Green Coalition may be an example of this (cf. Haverland 2001). Second, in
such systems ‘grand coalitions’ are not uncommon. As suggested by
Kitschelt (2001), such ‘grand coalitions’ will be in a strong position to justi-
fy retrenchment.
When discussing generalisation of the arguments of this study, it is also
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worth considering to what extent the arguments of this study are influenced
by the choice of Denmark and the Netherlands as cases for investigation.
This relates especially to the emphasis of this study on government attempts
at justifying retrenchment. This can be seen in contrast to Pierson’s blame-
avoidance strategies, which were more focussed on hiding retrenchment
from the electorate and which came out of studying retrenchment processes
in the United States and Britain. A possible argument in this context would
be that the kind of blame-avoidance strategy governments can apply de-
pends on the type of welfare state they aim at retrenching. Ross (2000c), for
instance, links the possibilities of framing the issue of retrenchment to Esp-
ing-Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare capitalism. Rothstein’s
(2000) argument about universalist welfare states generating their own
public support (cf. chap. 2) can also be used as an argument for the need for
public acceptance of retrenchment in universalist welfare states.
Being a borderline case between the universal and corporatist welfare-
state regimes, the Dutch welfare state may, however, present somewhat of a
puzzle with regard to such arguments. The need to justify retrenchments
has been the same as in Denmark. This might suggest that the politics of re-
trenchment in universalist and corporatist welfare states are not so differ-
ent. This suggestion can be supported by the findings of survey research,
that the attitudes towards the welfare state are fairly similar in the two types
of welfare regimes but different from the attitudes in the liberal welfare
states (Svallfors 1998; Taylor-Gooby 2001). Instead of linking the politics
of retrenchment to the different types of welfare states, it may then be that
the need to justify retrenchment stems from both countries being consensu-
al democracies in Lijphart’s sense (1999). In consensual democracies, gov-
ernments can be expected to seek broad political support for controversial
reforms, allowing them to justify the reforms. Yet, these are hypotheses
needing much further research.
The politics of miracles and the dilemmas of European Social Democracy
As claimed in chapter 1, retrenching social-security schemes is part of a
larger process of adjusting the political economies of the rich oecd coun-
tries to a changed economic environment. Within the last 20 years, all the
rich oecd countries have had to modify their model of welfare capitalism,
including social security (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Regini 2000; Scharpf &
Schmidt 2000a). Yet, these adjustments of macro-economic policy, wage
policy, social security, and taxation have put the problem-solving capacities
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of the political systems to a severe test, and many countries have found it im-
possible to implement such adjustments. However, Denmark and the
Netherlands are seen as two of the successful adjustment cases (Hemerijck
& Schludi 2000), and scholars discuss the Danish and Dutch miracles (Vis-
ser & Hemerijck 1997; Schwartz 2001a). The question is how to account
for the seemingly high adjustment capacities in the two countries.
Following the new institutional wave within political science (Hall & Tay-
lor 1996; Peters 1998), one way to answer this question would be institu-
tional (cf. Scharpf 2000b). However, providing an institutional explanation
for the developments in the two countries is difficult. As outlined in chapters
6 and 7, the two countries showed very limited adjustment capacities in the
1970’s and at the beginning of the 1980’s, and they could be counted among
the fiasco stories in Western Europe in terms of socio-economic policy. With
the same basic, political institutional set-up, they were, however, much
more successful in the 1990’s. Thus, factors other than institutional ones
must have been at play.
In this book, the argument has been that a focus on party politics is neces-
sary to understand retrenchment politics. This argument can be extended to
socio-economic policy more generally (cf. Green-Pedersen 2001a; b). To
understand the development over time in the two countries with regard to
socio-economic policy, one needs to look at the development of the party
systems in the two countries. As outlined in chapters 6 and 7, the party sys-
tems in both countries were in a state of flux in the 1970’s. In the Nether-
lands, this situation was the result of depillarisation reducing electoral sup-
port for the Christian Democratic Parties and leading the pvda to launch
the polarisation strategy. In Denmark, the earthquake election resulted in a
more fractionalised and polarised party system, and the Social Democrats
found themselves in a difficult situation with regard to the trade unions.
These party-political factors made political stability around socio-econom-
ic policy impossible and the result in both countries was a fumbling socio-
economic policy with disastrous results. However, in both countries, the
party-systems have stabilised and party competition has produced a party-
political consensus around socio-economic policy. In the Netherlands, the
consensus emerged in the mid-1980’s due to the pivotal role of the cda. In
Denmark, it did not emerge until the Social Democrats regained govern-
ment power in 1993. This consensus has lead to a stable socio-economic
policy including controversial welfare-state retrenchments with apparent
successful results.
In search for explanations for the development in the Netherlands, atten-
tion has been drawn to such factors as Dutch consensus culture (Becker
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2001) and policy learning (Visser & Hemerijck 1997). From a consensus-
culture perspective, the development over time is, however, problematic. In
neither of the two countries did a political consensus about adaptations
come about simply because new challenges appeared. The success stories of
Denmark and the Netherlands are not the result of small countries forced to
agree internally to meet the challenges of a more hostile economic environ-
ment. As argued above, the political consensus that eventually has emerged
in both countries is the result of the strategic interaction of the political par-
ties. With regard to policy learning, arguing that policy markers in both
Denmark and the Netherlands have learned from their mistakes with regard
to socio-economic policy seems plausible. However, such an argument can-
not stand alone as explanation for the development in the two countries.
Why did policy learning seemingly occur in the Netherlands and perhaps
also in Denmark, but not in many other countries? The developments over
time are also difficult to explain from such a policy-learning perspective.
Why did policy learning apparently happen later in Denmark than in the
Netherlands? Yet, the argument about party politics might be complemen-
tary to the arguments about policy learning. It may be exactly the political
consensus created by party competition that has made policy learning pos-
sible.
As indicated above, a specific focus on the Social Democratic Parties in the
two countries is also necessary to understand their ‘miraculous’ develop-
ment. The support from Social Democratic Parties has been crucial in order
to secure the party-political consensus around controversial reforms. At the
same time, the changed economic environment of the mature welfare states
put the Social Democratic Parties under specific pressure. This undermined
traditional Keynesian policies, which had served as the basis for Social De-
mocratic strategies in the post-war period. This became evident in both
countries with the failed socio-economic policy in the 1970’s, which came
to be seen as the fault of the Social Democratic Parties. Today, Social Demo-
cratic Parties in both countries have entered a ‘third way’ course (Green-
Pedersen, van Kersbergen & Hemerijck 2001), and this has been crucial for
the political consensus behind socio-economic policy in the two countries.
This study explains the sequences of changes within the two countries.
These sequences have been shaped by the strategic situation of the parties in
terms of regaining office as outlined in chapters 6 and 7 (cf. also Green-Ped-
ersen & Kersbergen forthcoming).
Altogether, party politics matter. Analysing the strategic interaction of
political parties is a must for anyone aiming to understand why and how
countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have been able to respond
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successfully to the challenges their models of welfare capitalism. This is also
the main message of this study and political science in general. Studies of
public policy rarely focus on political parties and when they do, they focus
on the ‘does politics matter’ question. However, as suggested by this study,
there may be other ways to look at party effects on public policy. The way
parties compete and interact may have strong effects on public policy.
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Appendix
This appendix first provides some further comments on the operational defi-
nition of retrenchment. It then explains how the budgetary figures have
been calculated. Finally, it provides two examples of such calculations.
First, not all of the changes implemented in the social-security schemes
studied are retrenchments. There are several examples of improvements of
the schemes and these have been included and studied in the same way as re-
trenchments. Not including improvements would have lead to very mislead-
ing conclusions about differences in extent of retrenchment.
Second, a retrenchment can be made up of more than one single change in
a social-security scheme. A number of changes may be tied together, all of
which are not necessarily retrenchments. Therefore, the overall impact of
changes carried through as one has been used as the baseline. This implies
that a retrenchment, which is part of an overall expansion of a social-securi-
ty scheme has not been analysed as a retrenchment. Consequently, changes
in a social-security scheme altering the distribution of benefits between
groups and of which the overall budgetary impact is zero have also not been
considered retrenchment, notwithstanding the fact that such changes may
have imposed considerable losses on some groups of claimants. Such
changes are more appropriately viewed as a restructuring reform with
greater targeting.
Third, budgetary implications in relation to changes in one social-security
scheme may affect another social-security scheme, and this must be taken
into account. Significant cutbacks in one social-security scheme are not
likely to be of much interest to the electorate if they are simply compensated
by improvements in another scheme. Therefore, when calculating the fig-
ures, the effects on other schemes have been taken into account.
A related problem is to delimit social-security schemes from the tax sys-
tem. Almost all of the social-security benefits examined in this study are
taxable income, so the effects of retrenchment will partly be offset by the tax
system.1 Yet, such effects have generally been disregarded for three reasons.
First, due to the complexity of the tax systems in the two countries, a calcu-
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lation of net-effects is almost impossible. Second, the disturbing effects that
this may have for the conclusions concerning retrenchment seem limited, as
almost all the benefits are taxable income. Third, the budgetary implica-
tions have been used as a way of measuring change in a social-security
scheme, but not in order to examine the impact on government finances or
the economy. Nor does the study aim at measuring the change in living con-
ditions of the claimants. However, sometimes changes in social-security
schemes are so closely linked to changes in taxation that disregarding the
latter would lead to very counterintuitive conclusions. In those cases, such
effects have been included. For instance, the taxation of the Danish national
pension was changed in 1993. This implied a large increase in benefits,
which was mostly offset by increased taxation. In this case, disregarding the
tax system would have implied misleading conclusions about improve-
ments.
Fourth, many changes do not have immediate consequences, but are im-
plemented gradually over many years. This is one of the reasons why macro-
level approaches are problematic. As for the micro-approach used in this
study, which years to use as the basis for evaluating changes is the question.
Delaying the consequences of changes is one possible retrenchment strategy.
In order to take this strategy into account, the changes as fully implemented
have been studied. When considering the actual budgetary implications, the
focus has been on the first year in which the changes are fully implemented
(cf. also below).2 The expected spending consequences have been evaluated
by analysing their budgetary consequences had they been fully implemented
the year they were passed in parliament. This also helps in keeping inflation
and the unemployment rate at a constant level.
Fifth, minor adjustments of social-security schemes are frequent but not
necessarily of much interest. To avoid having to report and analyse a count-
less number of small adjustments, a 1% bottom line has been applied, thus
disregarding changes with likely budgetary consequences of less than 1%.
A caveat here is that one possible retrenchment strategy is to implement a
large number of such small adjustments and in this way achieve significant
retrenchment. Therefore, it has been checked that there has been no imple-
mentation of a number of such small changes in one direction, improve-
ments or retrenchments. This has not been found to be the case in relation to
any of the selected schemes.
154 appendix
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 154
How to calculate budgetary consequences
Estimations of the likely budgetary consequences are calculated as follows.
When changes are fairly uncomplicated and the necessary data available,
estimations have been made by the author himself. The data used for these
calculations have mainly been statistics documenting how the schemes
work. In some situations, research into the functioning of the schemes has
been included as well. When it was not possible for the author himself to
make the estimations, estimations from the parliamentary inquiries were
applied. The use of these figures raises several questions that must be ad-
dressed. A significant objection is that figures from the government have of-
ten proved wrong and unreliable. This may be the case for two separate rea-
sons. First, the figures may prove wrong simply because there is great uncer-
tainty involved in estimating the effects of certain changes, that is reliability
problems. Second, the figures may prove wrong because they were never in-
tended to be right in the first place. They may simply be part of the govern-
ment’s strategy in relation to retrenchment. This second point is the most
important one since its implication is that the government figures are sys-
tematically misleading, or that their validity is questionable.
To some extent, there is a problem with validity. However, it should not be
overestimated. It is not obvious whether governments should be interested
in over- or underestimating the budgetary consequences of retrenchments.
On the one hand, an underestimation may be part of a strategy to ease the
political outcry in connection with retrenchment. For example, the govern-
ment may want to underestimate the number of people affected by a certain
retrenchment. On the other hand, retrenchment is often part of a budgetary
process where the government wants to show a balancing budget or a limit-
ed deficit. Along this line, the government could be interested in overesti-
mating the effects of a retrenchment. Furthermore, budget estimations are
part of the parliamentary reading of a bill, and this puts certain limits on the
possible manipulation of the figures. Thus, it is unlikely that the government
will intentionally submit outright false figures. If this were to become pub-
lic, it would cause severe trouble for the minister and perhaps cost him or
her their job. Hence, in situations where the calculations are fairly straight-
forward, it seems unproblematic to use government estimations. Complica-
tions arise when the estimations require ‘prudent judgments’. In such situa-
tions, there is room for government manipulation, even though the direc-
tion of such manipulation is not quite clear.
Summing up, there may be problems in both reliability and validity when
applying government budget estimations. This is why they have been used
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only as a second solution where calculations are impossible. Furthermore,
whenever possible, the figures have been checked against actual expenditure
figures (see below). Finally, during the parliamentary readings and debates
in parliamentary committees, the figures are to some extent scrutinised.
This may happen through questions from mp’s or approaches from interest
groups, and may force the government to re-evaluate its figures, or to make
public the assumptions on which the figures are based. Whenever parlia-
mentary documents show that such processes have taken place, the results
have been taken into account.
Estimations of the actual spending consequences have been calculated in
two ways. Whenever there is data making it possible to analyse very precise-
ly the consequences of a certain change, these figures have been applied.
Whenever this strategy is not possible, aggregate expenditure figures have
been used. In the first year in which the changes have been fully implement-
ed, spending has been compared to the spending in the year in which the
changes were passed in parliament. The former figures have been corrected
for the development of factors such as the number of unemployed, the level
of inflation, demographic changes, etc. Using the aggregate expenditure fig-
ures raises problems identical to the ones implied by a macro-approach.
Thus, there are a number of situations where it was impossible to estimate
the actual spending consequences. First, when the changes have not yet been
fully or even partly implemented. Second, when the changes aim at reducing
the number of claimants. The reason is that it is impossible to separate the
effects of, for instance, changes in unemployment from changes in eligibility
rules for unemployment benefits. Third, small changes in the schemes can be
very difficult to trace in aggregate spending figures, especially if they are im-
plemented gradually over a number of years. Therefore, unless specific sta-
tistics exist, there has been no attempt at measuring the actual budgetary
consequences of changes with an estimated impact of 2% or less.
In the following, two examples of the calculations of the two spending
measures will be given.
The first example is from the Danish old-age pension: L 119 (1986-1987)
eased the income testing of a number of schemes that provided benefits for
the elderly (home help, personal care, etc.). In relation to the old-age pen-
sion, the law eased the income testing of the pension supplement.3 This
change was to be implemented gradually from 1991 to 1995. Estimations
from the parliamentary readings of the proposal show increased expendi-
ture in 1995, in 1986 prices, of dkk 810 million (Folketinget, Folketingsti-
dende B 1986-1987: 2430). However, this figure covers both increased ex-
penditure in relation to the old-age pension and to the disability pension.
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Based on figures for the payment of the pension supplement in January 1987
(Danmarks Statistik, Statistiske efterretninger, Social Sikring og Retsvæsen
1988: 8, 11), it can be estimated that 72% of the people who received the
pension supplement were old-age pensioners. Thus, an estimation of the ex-
tra expenditure on the old-age pension is dkk 607 million in 1987 prices.4
This equals 2.1% of the total costs in 1987.
The actual rise in expenditure can be estimated in the following way. First
of all, it must be taken into account that L 168 (1987-1988 1. Session) has-
tened the implementation and further eased the income testing. Thus,
changes were already fully implemented in 1993. It is possible to calculate
the number of pensioners who received the full and those who received a re-
duced pension supplement in 1987 and 1993 (Danmarks Statistik, Statis-
tiske efterretninger. Social Sikring og Retsvæsen 1988: 8, 11; 1993: 14, 18).
The number of pensioners who received the full supplement rose from 48%
in 1987 to 69% in 1993, whereas the number who received the reduced sup-
plement decreased from 18% to 12%. It has then been calculated what the
extra expenditure on the pension supplement would have been in 1987, if
the changes had already been fully implemented in that year. When applying
the average between, on the one hand, the supplement for single pensioners
and pensioners married to non-pensioners, and, on the other hand, the sup-
plement for pensioners married to other pensioners (dkk 7.032), and as-
suming that pensioners who have their supplement reduced have it reduced
by 50%, the extra costs in 1987 are estimated at dkk 858 million, which
equals 3.0% of the total expenditure in 1987. The expected extra expendi-
ture was only dkk 607 million. However, L 168 not only hastened the eas-
ing of the income testing, it also eased the income testing further. The ex-
pected extra expenditure from this was dkk 213 million. When subtracting
the dkk 213 million from the dkk 858 million, the actual rise in expendi-
ture is dkk 645 million, which equals 2.3% of the total expenditure in
1987. This figure comes close to the expected 2.1%.
The second example is taken from the Dutch disability-pension scheme.
In 1994, it was decided to freeze benefits in the scheme for 1995. The ex-
pected budgetary consequences equal the rate of inflation (see Green-Peder-
sen 2000: 213-214), which was 2.8% in 1994. The actual spending in 1995
was nlg 7.372 billion. The number of claimants dropped from 909,000 in
1994 to 873,000 in 1995. Corrected for this drop, the expenditure in 1995
equals nlg 18.088 billion, deflated with the rate of inflation in 1994 of
2.8%, this equals nlg 17.595 billion. As total expenditure in 1994 was
nlg 18.199 billion, this implies a decrease in expenditure of 3.3%. This is
fairly close to the expected savings of 2.8%, which, consequently, seems a
reliable estimation.
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Summary
This book is an investigation of retrenchment in Denmark and in the
Netherlands during the period 1982 to 1998, focussing on retrenchment of
old-age pensions, unemployment benefits and disability pensions/early- re-
tirement benefits. The general aim of the book is to contribute to the schol-
arly debate about welfare-state retrenchment in a number of ways. The
main aim is to add to the knowledge of the factors causing variation in re-
trenchment between countries and across social-security schemes. Here, the
argument of the book is that politics is the main factor causing variation. In
this way, the book differs from most other writings on retrenchment that
follow the new institutional wave within political science in general, high-
lighting the role of institutional factors. An additional aim of the book is to
add to the empirical knowledge about retrenchment. As argued by Alber
(1996: 3), ‘… systematic studies of retrenchment processes in a comparative
perspective are still thoroughly missing.’ This book aims at filling a small
part of that vacuum.
However, this book should not only interest scholars engaged in the de-
bate about welfare-state retrenchment. Welfare-state retrenchment is part
of the broader effort of Western governments to adjust their models of wel-
fare capitalism to a new economic environment. Welfare-state retrench-
ments are probably the most controversial part of this effort, and this book
therefore contributes to the understanding of different country’s capacity to
adjust their models of welfare capitalism. Further, Denmark and the
Netherlands have come to be seen as two of the success stories with regard to
this adjustment process. Scholars are thus debating both a Dutch and a
Danish miracle (cf. Visser & Hemerijck 1997; Schwartz 2001; Green-Ped-
ersen 2001). The book draws attention to the role that party politics has
played in the adjustment processes within the two countries. This includes
both the development of the party systems in the two countries and the situ-
ation of the Social Democratic Parties. The discussion of the latter factor
also contributes to the wider debate about the dilemmas of European Social
Democracy.
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Before presenting a brief overview of the book, it is worth spelling out the
main arguments.
The arguments in brief
In its briefest form, the theoretical argument of this book is that politics
matter for welfare-state retrenchment. But what does that mean, politics
matter? This claim consists of two parts. First, the argument is that govern-
ments’ possibilities of implementing retrenchment measures are crucially
dependent on their capabilities of justifying the measures in the eyes of the
electorate. If voters consider retrenchment measures unfair or driven by
hidden ideological motives, they are likely to punish governments at the
polls. In this way, as Pierson (1994) argues, the politics of retrenchment are
the politics of blame avoidance. Instead, governments must convince the
electorate that they are retrenching the welfare state to improve its financial
viability or to remedy some of the policy failures that may follow from it.
The question then is which factors determine governments’ capabilities of
justifying retrenchment measures?
Two linked factors relating to party politics produce variation between
countries because they shape governments’ capabilities of justifying re-
trenchments. First, the electorate has certain standard views of political
parties. Parties of the left are expected to focus on social justice and to sup-
port the welfare state, whereas parties of the right are expected to concen-
trate on keeping down taxation and other issues such as economic manage-
ment. Christian-Democratic Center Parties fall in between. In addition,
they have a reputation for political compromise and social accommodation
that may facilitate the justification of retrenchment measures. These stan-
dard views of political parties influence the electorate’s judgment of the po-
litical parties’ arguments concerning retrenchment. They are much more
likely to accept the left-wing parties’ attempt at justifying retrenchment
than they are to accept arguments from right-wing parties. In the latter case,
they tend to believe that there are hidden ideological motives. Second, the
way political parties compete affects governments’ possibilities of justify-
ing retrenchment measures. What governments need in order to be success-
ful with their justification strategy is a party consensus in the sense that no
other major party attacks their strategies of justification. Whether or not
such a consensus emerges depends on the system of party competition and
the party-color of the government. In bloc systems of party competition, a
consensus emerges only if the left-wing bloc holds office. Bloc systems are
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systems where a left wing and a right-wing bloc compete over government
power by seeking as many votes as possible. The reason for this dynamic in
bloc systems is that due to voters’ standard expectations of political parties
explained above, the right-wing bloc has no votes to gain by attacking a left-
wing government for retrenchment. Pivot systems of party competition are
systems in which a center party, often a Christian Democratic one, is piv-
otal as it can determine whether it wants to govern with the major left or
right-wing party. Such a system produces a party consensus on retrench-
ment when the center party opts for retrenchment because the left-wing
party then has to accommodate the center party if it wants to gain office.
The factor argued to cause variation across social-security schemes is the
degree of connection to the labour market of different social-security
schemes. This factor first affects governments’ options for justifying re-
trenchments. For instance, retrenching unemployment benefits can be justi-
fied by arguing that generous unemployment benefits encourage passivity.
Further, the economic incentives to retrench schemes with close connection
to the labour market are greater.
Generally, the developments in Denmark and in the Netherlands during
the period 1982 to 1998 support the arguments. The book thus offers an ex-
planation why, despite a number of similarities between the two countries,
more retrenchment has been implemented in the Netherlands than in Den-
mark. They both have very extensive and popular welfare states with fairly
similar institutional characteristics; they have faced basically the same
macro-economic challenges in this period, and have quite similar macro-
political institutions. The difference in systems of party competition, bloc
system in Denmark vs. pivot system in the Netherlands, explains the varia-
tion between the two countries. The argument also offers an explanation
why more retrenchment has been implemented in Denmark after 1993 than
during the period 1982 to 1993: Denmark has been governed by social de-
mocratic-led governments since 1993. Finally, the theoretical argument
also provides an explanation as to why old-age pension schemes have expe-
rienced the least retrenchment in both countries; when governments in both
countries started focussing on fighting inactivity, old-age pension schemes
were out of focus because of their more limited connection to the labour
market.
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The structure of the book
Chapter 2 is devoted to giving a review of the literature on welfare-state de-
velopment. The main focus is on the literature concerning welfare-state re-
trenchment. However, to make sense of this latter debate, a short introduc-
tion to the debate about the growth of the welfare state is also provided.
Concerning the literature on welfare-state retrenchment, the focus will be
on arguments about variation across social-security schemes and between
countries.
Chapter 3 sets up a theoretical framework for governments’ choices about
retrenchment. The main argument within this framework is the one present-
ed above. That is, several factors cause variation in retrenchment because
they affect governments’ possibilities of justifying retrenchment in the eyes
of the electorate. In addition, the chapter also argues that office- and vote-
seeking governments are prompted towards welfare-state retrenchment by
economic factors.
Chapter 4 has two main aims. The first aim is to justify the choice of cases,
that is the choice of countries, social-security schemes and time period. Sec-
ond, the chapter outlines the theoretical and operational definition of re-
trenchment used in this book. Here it is worth emphasising that the book
builds on a fairly narrow theoretical definition of retrenchment as another
word for cutting-back or scaling-down social-security benefits.1 The chap-
ter ends by deriving 6 hypotheses about the scale of retrenchment to be ex-
pected in the two countries.
Chapter 5 uses the definition and operationalisation of retrenchment pre-
sented in chapter 5 to evaluate changes in old-age pensions, unemployment
benefits, and disability pensions/early retirement benefits in Denmark and
in the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998.2 The chapter then summarises the
variation in retrenchment identified and discusses to what extent it matches
the hypotheses derived in chapter 4.
Chapters 6 and 7 provide in-depth case studies of the politics of welfare-
state retrenchment in the Netherlands and in Denmark, focussing mainly on
the period 1982 to 1998. The aim of these case studies is to explore to what
extent the causal mechanisms surrounding retrenchment actually are the
ones suggested in chapter 3. What is provided in chapter 5 is basically corre-
lation evidence for the theoretical argument; that is the correlation between
the predicted and the actual welfare-state retrenchment. Yet, the question
remains whether the variation has actually come about for the reasons sug-
gested in chapter 3.
Chapter 8 first summarises the results of the two different types of empiri-
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cal evidence for the theoretical argument; that is both the correlation evi-
dence and the in-depth case studies. The chapter then continues with a dis-
cussion of a number of alternative explanations for the variation in re-
trenchment identified in chapter 5. The point is whether the theoretical ar-
gument of this book can explain more of the variation in retrenchment than
other theoretical arguments.
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the entire book and tries to draw some
lessons from it at two levels. First, the lessons for the retrenchment debate
will be discussed. Then the chapter moves on to discussing the broader issue
of the two country’s apparent success in adjusting their models of welfare
capitalism to a changed economic environment.
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Notes
Notes Chapter 1
1 More information about the operational definition and examples of its
use can be found in appendix 1.
2 These evaluations of the different schemes are based on figures measur-
ing expected and actual budgetary consequences. The calculations be-
hind the figures are reported in Green-Pedersen 2000 and are available at
www.ps.au.dk/greenp or via email at cgp@ps.au.dk.
Notes Chapter 2
1 For a comprehensive review, see van Kersbergen (1995: chap. 2). 
2 That Christian Democratic Parties have played an important role in the
expansion of welfare states within Continental Europe is not unrecog-
nised by the power-resources theory (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990: 38-
41). However, Social Democratic Parties are still considered ‘the true
proponents’ of the welfare state (cf. van Kersbergen 1995: 23-26).
3 The two debates have generally not been connected. Thus, studies fo-
cussing on variation across social-security schemes have generally ne-
glected variation among countries and vice versa.
4 An additional type of economic argument would be arguments about
globalisation. Such arguments have mainly been put forward by econo-
mists (for an overview, see Swank 2002). Generally, political scientists
have not found much effect from globalisation on the welfare state
(Rhodes 1996; Garrett 1998; Pierson 2001b; Castles 2001). 
5 As discussed above, this argument can also be applied to variation across
social- security schemes.
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Notes Chapter 3
1 The ‘popular entrenchment’ of the welfare state is well documented by
survey research. Ferrera (1993), Papadakis & Bean (1993), Svallfors
(1998), and Taylor-Gooby (2001) provide comparative evidence. For re-
search on Denmark and the Netherlands, see chapter 4.
2 This should not be misunderstood as an argument that retrenchment is a
direct effect of ‘globalisation’. The changed economic environment of
mature welfare states has to do with both international and domestic
forces and the exact role of the different factors is a debated issue (cf.
Garrett 1998; Pierson 1998, 2001b; Scharpf 2000c; Schwartz 2001b).
Furthermore, changes in the economic environment should not be exag-
gerated. There is little evidence that a generous welfare state is generally
incompatible with economic growth, high employment, etc. (Scharpf
2000c). Yet, the changed economic environment does seem to imply that
governments have had to consider the welfare state’s implications for the
economy much more carefully.
3 The notion of a centre party is often unclear. In this study, a ‘centre par-
ty’ refers to a party located in the centre position on the left-right scale.
In theory, a centre party can thus be the party furthest to the left or right
in a party system (cf. Hazan 1997: chap. 2).
4 Both Kitschelt (2001) and Laver & Hunt (1992) discuss four systems of
party competition, although not the same four systems. In this context,
focussing only on bloc vs. pivot systems has been chosen because they
can be seen as the two basic models. Other models of party competition
will be discussed in chapter 9.
5 A bloc may consist of just one party. This is of minor importance for the
following analysis.
6 As shown by Keman (op. cit.), pivot parties are often Christian Democ-
ratic Parties.
Notes Chapter 4
1 This description refers to the Social Liberals and after 1973 to the Centre
Democrats, and the Christian People’s Party.
2 The cda is the result of a merger completed in 1980 between three Chris-
tian Democratic Parties; kvp, arp, and chu.
3 In both countries, parties further to the left and to the right of the above-
mentioned parties have been represented in parliament.
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4 The purple government (pvda, vvd, and d66) governing from 1994 to
2002 was a major innovation in Dutch politics and was a break from the
pivotal position of the cda in Dutch politics. Therefore, these govern-
ments and their policies will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
5 Due to a lack of figures for both countries, several indicators are reported
only for the period 1982-1998. 
6 This measure is included because there is a significant element of ‘hidden
unemployment’ in many social-security schemes. The measure is based
on the oecd definition of broad unemployment as people of working age
receiving social-security benefits or having subsidised employment
(oecd 1998: 33). The figures for the Netherlands have kindly been pro-
vided by Paul de Beer, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, cf. also Sociaal
en Cultureel Planbureau, Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport (1998). The
Dutch figures include people receiving unemployment benefits, social as-
sistance, disability pension, early-retirement benefits (vut), or having
subsidised employment as a percentage of the broad labour force, that is
employed people plus broad unemployment. The Dutch figures cover the
age group 15-64. The figures for Denmark show people receiving unem-
ployment benefits, social assistance and rehabilitation, disability pen-
sion, early-retirement benefits and transitional allowance, leave al-
lowances and people taking part in active labour-market measures as a
percentage of the broad labour force. Unfortunately, applicable figures
for active labour-market measures are not available before the labour
market reform in 1993. Thus, the figures for Denmark before 1994 un-
derestimate broad unemployment slightly. The figures for the years
1987-1998 are from Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt (1999;
2000). The figures for the years 1984-1986 have been provided by Dan-
marks Statistik. Unfortunately comparable figures for the years 1982-
1983 are not available, mainly due to the way statistics on social assis-
tance were organised. The figures for Denmark cover the age group 18-
66.
7 In indices constructed by Schmidt (1993) and Colomer (1996), Denmark
and the Netherlands thus have identical scores. In the index constructed
by Huber, Ragin & Stephens (1993; 1997), Denmark scores 0 while the
Netherlands scores 1. This difference is due to Dutch bicameralism. 
8 In a re-examination of his analysis, (1999: 73-94), Esping-Andersen
finds that both Denmark and the Netherlands cluster as universalist (so-
cial democratic) welfare states.
9 The difference in social expenditure has to do with the service side of the
welfare state, see below. 
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10 As will be discussed in chapter 6, the organisation and to some extent
the financing of social security in the Netherlands were drastically
changed during the second half of the 1990’s. The description below cov-
ers the situation before these changes.
11 Only public social-security schemes will be dealt with. Private or occu-
pational social-security schemes are beyond the scope of this study. As
argued by Pierson (2001a), the reason is that including private or occu-
pational welfare turns the concept of ‘the welfare state’ into a multi-di-
mensional phenomenon making comparative investigations extraordi-
narily difficult.
12 The Netherlands has no public superannuation or second-tier earnings-
related pension scheme. In Denmark, one, ATP, was introduced in 1964.
Yet, contributions and benefits are so modest that the scheme can be ig-
nored (Myles & Pierson 2001).
13 Green-Pedersen (2002a) contains a review of the ‘dependent variable’
debate and pursues the argument about the theoretical nature of the
problem further.
14 Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the meaning of ‘sweeping’.
Notes Chapter 5
1 The following necessarily excludes many details about the schemes and
the changes in them. Anyone interested in these details should consult
Green-Pedersen 2000 and the specialised literature cited.
2 Due to a lack of space, changes with expected budgetary consequences of
less than 1% are not reported in the tables.
3 The calculations behind the figures are reported in Green-Pedersen 2000,
which can be obtained at www.ps.au.dk/greenp or by writing an email to
cgp@ps.au.dk.
4 The following descriptions of the social-security schemes are written in
the past tense to indicate that this was the structure of the schemes in
1982. The use of the past tense does not necessarily imply that the rules
have changed.
5 Apart from the law (lov om folkepension), the following description is
based on Vesterø-Jensen (1985) and Jørgensen (various years [b]). 
6 Where nothing else is indicated, all figures are from: Danmarks Statistik,
Statistiske efterretninger, Social sikring og Retsvæsen (various years).
7 Two additional minor retrenchments have taken place. Income testing
for the basic amount for pensioners aged 67-69 was passed in 1982.
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Since the income testing only related to considerable earnings from
work, the budgetary implications were, however, very small; equal to
0.6% of the total expenditure in 1982. In 1993, the income-test was ex-
tended to all pensioners. Once more, the budgetary effects were very
limited; equal to 0.4% of the total expenditure.
8 These changes will be discussed in connection with the disability-pen-
sion scheme and the early-retirement scheme.
9 This will happen for two reasons. The number of people with private
pensions is rising, and, starting in 1991, the prevalence of occupational
pensions has increased dramatically (Arbejdsministeriet/Finansminis-
teriet 1995: 57-69; Nielsen, F. 1996).
10 The following draws on Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen
(1998), and Voorlichtingscentrum Sociale Verzekering (various years).
11 Benefits were actually frozen from 1982 to 1989. In the years not re-
ported in Table 11, the effects were negligible due to the very low level of
inflation. The positive budgetary effects for two years are partly the re-
sult of finding a consistent way of measuring the effects (see Green-Ped-
ersen 2000: 213-216). 
12 This change was necessary to fulfil the third eu directive on equal treat-
ment of men and women.
13 Apart from the law (lov om arbejdsløshedsforsikring), the following
draws on Ploug et al. (1992), Brüniche-Olsen (various years), and
Hansen & Jørgensen (various years).
14 Early-retirement benefits, which were also administered by the funds,
and unemployment benefits were financed together, so member and em-
ployer contributions were contributions to both schemes (see below).
15 The following draws on Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen
(1998) and Voorlichtingscentrum Sociale Verzekering (various years).
16 Benefits were actually frozen through 1989, but due to the level of infla-
tion, the budgetary consequences were limited.
17 Apart from the law, the following draws on Winter (1980) and Jør-
gensen (various years [a]).
18 In the spring of 2001, a new Disability-pension Act was passed. This
law changed the criteria for awarding benefits by introducing a new
work-capacity criterion. The idea is that a significant number of disabili-
ty pensioners have unexploited work capacity, and that they should
rather be in partly subsidised jobs than receiving passive benefits. The
law thus expects fewer claimants. At the same time, only one type of ben-
efits will exist, which for many claimants will be a considerable improve-
ment. Thus, the government’s long run budgetary expectation is an ex-
pansion of 7%. However, the estimations are highly uncertain. 
169notes on chapter 5
The politics of justification  22-08-2002  15:44  Pagina 169
19 Apart from the law, the following draws on Hansen & Jørgensen (vari-
ous years).
20 After the freeze ended, benefits were indexed following parliamentary
decisions each year.
21 The following draws on Aarts & de Jong (1990; 1996a; 1996b) and
Voorlichtingscentrum Sociale Verzekering (various years).
22 This was a motion put forward in parliament by Frits Bolkestein, the
leader of the vvd.
23 As part of this change, the aaw was abolished, and instead, special
schemes were set up for the groups not covered by the wao scheme.
24 The future effects of enhancing the importance of means testing within
the scheme will modify this result somewhat.
25 Here, and in the following, substantive conclusions will not be based on
differences in extent of retrenchment smaller than 5%.
26 The restructuring reforms were initiated under the right-wing govern-
ments, yet intensified by the social democratic-led governments after
1993.
Notes Chapter 6
1 Apart from the source quoted in the text, the investigation draws on: 1) a
survey of two major newspapers at a number of central moments. The
centre-left ‘de Volkskrant’ and the liberal ‘nrc Handelsblad’; 2) Keesings
Historisch Archief (various years and issues); 3) five semi-structured,
anonymous interviews with leading politicians; 4) parliamentary de-
bates and other parliamentary documents; 5) various party documents,
such as election programmes, Green Papers, etc.; 6) miscellaneous docu-
ments, that is coalition agreements, published speeches, etc. In addition,
whatever relevant secondary literature was found has been included, es-
pecially Metze (1995), Rigter et al. (1995), Visser & Hemerijck (1997),
and Hemerijck, Visser & Unger (2000).
2 ‘Parliament’ refers to the second chamber (Tweede Kamer).
3 This party had democratic reforms of Dutch politics as its main issue. In
relation to socio-economic issues, the party is a centre party, yet general-
ly to the left of the cda (Andeweg & Irwin 1993: 50-78).
4 The ppr was a splinter party from the kvp. The kvp and arp only sup-
ported the government half-heartedly. Members of their parliamentary
groups publicly declared that they did not support the government
(Gladdish 1991: 52-54).
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5 The decline of the denominational parties was also less important as they
had most often opted for oversized coalitions (cf. Andeweg & Irwin
1993: 119).
6 These cutbacks were, however, removed when the level of benefits was
reduced to 70%.
7 The government spent around nlg 200-400 million per year (cf. for in-
stance Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1982-1983: 17976; 1983-
1984: 18506; 1984-1985; 19026).
8 The pvda demanded a re-negotiation of the agreement with the U.S.
concerning the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands.
9 However, as shown in chapter 4, broad unemployment is not much dif-
ferent in the two countries.
Notes Chapter 7
1 Apart from the sources quoted in the text, the investigation into the fol-
lowing draws on: 1) A survey of two major newspapers at a number of
central moments; the social-democratic oriented ‘Politiken’ and the
right-wing ‘Jyllands-Posten’; 2) five semi-structured, anonymous inter-
views with leading politicians and political advisers; 4) parliamentary
debates and other parliamentary documents; 5) various party docu-
ments and governmental publications such as election programmes,
Green Papers, etc.; 6) ‘Avisårbogen’, an annual of political events based
on newspaper articles. In addition, whatever relevant secondary litera-
ture was found, especially Bille (1998), has been used.
2 The shift of strategy is also detectable in socio-economic policy more
generally (cf. Green-Pedersen 2001a).
3 Thus, the party supported a budget for the first time (Christiansen
1994).
4 An element in the tax reform was the conversion of all benefits in social
assistance and the old-age pension into taxable income, the latter includ-
ing the increased importance of means testing within the scheme.
5 The Liberal Conservative government that took office after the election
in November 2002 has shown no intention of welfare-state retrench-
ment and has actually expanded the welfare state. 
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Notes Chapter 8
1 Also compared to other Continental European countries, the large num-
ber of ‘disabled’ in the Netherlands does not imply that inactivity, as a re-
sult of people receiving social-security benefits, is generally higher (cf.
Hemerijck 1999: table 1).
2 It is possible to argue that the Netherlands needed to retrench more be-
cause the country needed fiscal room for following the Scandinavian way
of solving the employment problem, namely by creating jobs in public
welfare services. However, the Netherlands has not expanded public wel-
fare services (Visser & Hemerijck 1997).
3 In chapter 4, differences between Denmark and the Netherlands were
also identified with regards to the programmatic structure of their wel-
fare states. However, the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 2
would predict these differences, e.g. financing through social contribu-
tions and involvement of social partners in the administration of bene-
fits, to lead to less retrenchment in the Netherlands than in Denmark, not
to more as has been found in this study.
4 The recent, partial privatisation of the scheme has of course reintro-
duced employer financing, albeit in a different form.
5 This reaction of the trade unions further substantiates why it is political-
ly easier for Social Democratic Parties to carry through retrenchment
measures.
Notes Chapter 9
1 In his most recent publication (Pierson 2001a), Pierson has paid more at-
tention to politics.
2 The language cleavage in Belgium may be so strong that basing an analy-
sis solely on the socio-economic divide may make little sense. Hemerijck
& Visser (2000) argue that this cleavage has overshadowed other prob-
lems.
Notes Appendix
1 Parts of the Danish disability pension are not taxable. In principle, the
Dutch old-age pension is taxable income; yet, special rules imply that
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old-age pensioners pay limited income tax and social contributions. The
Danish old-age pension is taxable income. However, special tax-rules
implied that single pensioners with no other income paid no taxes. This
rule was changed in 1993.
2 A problem that can only be taken into account in a few cases is that the ef-
fects of certain retrenchments may change once the context changes, for
instance, the demographic structure.
3 The Danish old-age pension is described in chapter 5.
4 dkk 583 million in 1986 prices.
Notes Summary
1 More information about the operational definition and examples of the
use of it can be found in appendix 1.
2 These evaluations of the different schemes are based on figures measur-
ing expected and actual budgetary consequences. The calculations be-
hind the figures are reported in Green-Pedersen 2000 available at
www.ps.au.dk/greenp or via email cgp@ps.au.dk.
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